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PREFACE
 
The Orbiter subsystem hardware/software interaction analysis examines software
 
interaction with hardware failure modes. Each failure mode identified in
 
subsystem FMEA (failure mode and effects analysis) is examined for interaction
 
with software. The analysis is based upon key questions which identify potential
 
issues. These potential issues are to be resolved by providing rationale for
 
retention or identifying and implementing changes to eliminate the issue.
 
The figure on the following page illustrates the relationship of the
 
hardware/software interaction analysis to the verification process which leads to
 
the statement of flight readiness. As shown, the analysis is a supporting item
 
which is a portion of the data base utilized by the FRAT's (flight readiness
 
assessment teams) and the associated SEAM (Systems Engineering Assessment
 
Meeting) teams in planning and controlling the verification process. The overall
 
issue of hardware/software interface compatibility is addressed by the verifica­
tion process itself. The analysis scope is limited to examination of single
 
failure modes, as identified in the FMEA, and the interaction of these failure
 
modes with the software as reflected by the software requirements.
 
The hardware/software interaction analysis is performed on a preliminary basis by
 
the JSC Reliability Division. Results are then coordinated with JSC engineering
 
and Rockwell/Space Systems Group engineering and reliability to obtain inputs and
 
approval signatures. The approval sheet for the Forward Reaction Control System
 
are presented below. The Rockwell signatures represent their review of-the open
 
issues and risks, if any, performed against the summarization of the analysis.
 
Section 5.0 presents the analysis summary which groups the failure modes by
 
similar retention rationale and is a convenience in identifying groups of failure
 
modes in which the analysis is similar. The reviews with Rockwell did not cover
 
each checklist. The minutes presented in the appendix document the nature and
 
depth of the Rockwell analysis review.
 
This analysis verified that no open issues remain.
 
Approved: 7 
*_Joseph H._Levine
aChief, Reliability Division
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1.0 INTRODUCTION. This report documents the results of the analysis of the
 
hardware/software interaction analysis for the Forward Reaction Control System.

This analysis examines the interaction between hardware failure modes and
 
software in order to identify associated issues/risks. These issues/risks are
 
resolved through changes to software requirements to remove them, or surfaced to
 
project/program management with appropriate retention rationale.
 
2.0 SCOPE. All Orbiter subsystems and interfacing program elements which
 
interact with the Orbiter computer flight software are analyzed. The analysis

for each subsystem or interfacing element is presented in a separate volume of
 
this report (see section 3.1).
 
The analysis examines failure modes identified in the subsystem/element FMEA
 
(failure mode and effects analysis). Potential interaction with software is
 
examined through evaluation of the software requirements, not detailed
 
implementation. The analysis is restricted to flight software requirements only,

and excludes utility/checkout software. The BFS (backup flight system) software
 
is considered only as necessary, and only as it differs from the primary; the
 
basic thrust of the analysis is keyed to the primary system.
 
The analysis is based upon the hardware design and software requirements as they

existed as of the date of the analysis. Future updates will be published as
 
necessary to incorporate changes to either the hardware or software.
 
3.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS.
 
3.1 HARDWARE/SOFTWARE INTERACTION ANALYSIS REPORT VOLUMES. The hard­
ware/software interaction analysis results are reported on a subsystem basis,
 
each in a separate volume. The separate volumes which make up this report are as
 
follows:
 
Volume Subsystem
 
I Purge, Vent, and Drain
 
II Payload Deployment and Retention
 
III Payload Bay Doors
 
IV Main Propulsion
 
V Data Processing Subsystem

VI Hydraulics
 
VII Auxiliary Power Unit
 
VIII Reaction Control
 
IX Electrical Power
 
X Orbital Maneuvering
 
XI Environmental Control and Life Support
 
XII Integrated Avionics
 
XIII Electrical Power Distribution & Control
 
XIV GNC (Guidance, Navigation & Control) Support

XV Displays & Controls
 
XVI Communications & Tracking

XVII Instrumentation
 
3.2 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS. The primary documents used in performing the analysis

included the following:
 
a. SD75-SH-0016A, "Failure Mode Effects Analysis, Forward Reaction
 
Control Subsystem," Dec 18, 1978.
 
b. JSC 11174, "OV-102 Space Shuttle Systems Handbook," September 22,
 
1977.
 
c. SD76-SH-0026A, "Functional Subsystem Software Requirements, Sequence

Requirements," March, 1978.
 
d. SD76-SH-0020, "Functional Subsystem Software Requirements, Displays
 
and Controls," February 1, 1978.
 
e. SD76-SH-0027D, "Functional Subsystem Software Requirements, Systems

Management," October 16, 1978.
 
f. MG038103, "Backup Flight System Management/Special Processes and
 
Sequencing Program Requirements Document," December 20, 1978.
 
g. SD75-SH-OOIOE, "Functional Subsystem Software Requirements, Redundancy
 
Management," June 1, 1979.
 
4.0 DESCRIPTION.
 
4.1 GROUND RULES. The hardware software analysis is performed according to the
 
following ground rules:
 
a. The hardware/software analysis will be limited to investigating the
 
software interaction with the failure modes of the hardware as delineated inthe
 
subsystem FMEA's.
 
b. Software interaction will be limited to involvement of software of the
 
onboard computers.
 
c. Only failure modes of hardware with software interfaces (software

monitoring and/or software control) are analyzed.
 
d. The software detection must be considered with respect to each phase

of the mission [prelaunch (OPS 1 only), ascent, onorbit, and entry].
 
4.2 ANALYSIS CHECKLIST. The basic tool for the analysis is the checklist
 
(figure 4-1). A separate checklist is used for each failure mode analyzed. Note
 
that the "FMEA Number" inthe heading refers to the FMEA document number, not the
 
page number on which the failure mode istreated.
 
The checklist consists of three sections: Body, change/retention rationale 
summary, and explanation/comments. Each of these sections isdicussed below.
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-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 
SUBSYSTEM FNEA NUMBER 
ITEM FAILURE MODE 
'I. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES Q NO El 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
le. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES ] NO E
 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES E] *NO j
 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [] NO
 (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMEiTING ALTER;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO 0 
FAILURE l'ODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIE;ITING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES El NO E] 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MOE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES ] NO
 
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 El *ifl 20 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FNEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A f]YES5]NoFl 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES Cj*N' F] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES iI*N0 E 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY
 
i.0 	NO H/S ISSUES 3.El NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5.El ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.r[ HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. C DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6.0l RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
ZFNEA CHANGE RECOM,1ME'DED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
Figure 4-1. Hardware/Software Analysis Checklist.
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The questions in the checklist body are answered using the following guidelines:
 
a. Question 1. Will the information provided to the onboard software and
 
the processing of that information cause annunciation of the failure and/or

initiation of a corrective action in response to this failure mode?
 
b. Question la. Answer question la. if the answer to question 1 is "no."
 
Information available to the software could be in the form of (1) sensor data
 
used by onboard software but not for automatic fault detection (data used in
 
software routines or fault detection available through callup or dedicated
 
displays); (2) system and/or subsystem performance parameters; or (3)
 
measurements which are downlisted. Answer "yes" if such information could be
 
used to annunciate the failure condition or initiate responsive action. In
 
explanation comments, specifically identify the information available for
 
software detection.
 
c. Question 2. If all of the following questions are answered "no,"
check the "no" block and explain the difference in the explanation/comments 
section:
 
(1) Are the master measurements listed under "Failure Detectability
In-flight" on the FMEA (1) used by the onboard software in detecting time 
critical failures (if routed to GPC), or (2) used by the onboard software in 
annunciating non-time critical failures via callup displays, or (3)downlisted
 
for non-time critical failures?
 
(2) Are other measurements, dedicated displays, crew detection, and
 
system/subsystem parameters available or able to detect this failure mode?
 
(3) If "failure detectability in-flight" specifies only software
 
action, does the software actually initiate the corrective action as called out
 
in the "corrective action" portion of the FMEA?
 
d. Question 3. The question considers only the cases wherein. the
 
software determines a failure.
 
e. Question 3a. Answer question 3a if the answer to 3 is "no." If the
 
answer to 3a is "yes," call out the possible corrective action in the
 
explanation/comments section.
 
f. Question 4. The question is considered for both the detected and the
 
undetected failure. The overstress or inducement of another failure may be
 
acceptable action. Overstress by software is improper commands, sequencing, or
 
timing resulting in action exceeding hardware design requirements or exposing
 
hardware to excessive environments.
 
g. question 5. The question is considered for both the detected and the
 
undetected failure. Limit adverse effects to effects directly resulting from
 
software commands or subsequent actions resulting from erroneous inputs as a
 
result of the failure.
 
h. Question 6. The hardware/software may change the method of detection
 
and/or correction after the first or the second failure; consider this in
 
answering the question. Determine if the software will be able to use the
 
redundance of the hardware. If the hardware/software interaction following the
 
particular failure mode changes the criticality, in comparison to the FMEA, check
 
the box provided in the summary section of the checklist.
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i. Question 7. If crew action is not required to respond to the failure,
 
check the "N/A" block. Cues which provide inputs to the crew include but are not
 
limited to cathode-ray tube annunciation, caution and warning, visual cues,
 
audible cues, callup and dedicated displays, subsystem status data, panel meters,
 
etc.
 
j. Question 8.A and 8.B. Answer these questions only if either question
 
1 or 3 is "yes."
 
(1) Question 8.A. Consider that the failure occurs while the
 
vehicle is being flown using the primary system. What will happen if the BFS
 
must be engaged subsequent to the failure? Will the fact that the failure has
 
occurred prevent the BFS from operating properly, under any conditions? A "no"
 
answer is a potential issue (requiring explanation) only if the BFS can normally
 
tolerate the failure (when it occurs during BFS operation).
 
(2) Question 8.B. Consider that the failure occurs while the
 
vehicle is under BFS control. A "no" answer is an issue (requiring explanation)
 
only if the BFS response differs from that for the primary system.
 
4.2.2 Change/Retention Rationale Summary. Each failure is assigned to one of
 
six possible groups, based upon the answers obtained in the checklist body.
 
Boxes are provided to indicate the category assigned. Figure 4-2 presents the
 
criteria for group assignment.
 
A box is also provided to indicate that changes are required to the FMEA. The
 
FMEA evaluation of in-flight detectability is sometimes inaccurate and requires
 
change. In addition, other errors (e.g., incorrect criticality assignment or
 
incorrect evaluation of redundancy screens) are occasionally noted during the
 
analysis and are documented here.
 
A space is provided to detail acceptance rationale, change recommendations, or
 
suggested FMEA changes. This space may also be used to provide a short general
 
comment to expand the retention rationale grouping.
 
4.2.3 Explanation/Comments. Each question answered by checking a box identified
 
with an asterisk is discussed in this section. The circumstances for checking a
 
box not identified with an asterisk are discussed, and the rationale for not
 
making such a change is presented, if applicable. This section may also be used
 
to explain, expand, or qualify answers. Each discussion is identified with the
 
corresponding question number.
 
4.3 ANALYSIS SUMMARY. The analysis results are summarized on the basis of
 
retention rationale grouping and recommended changes/retention rationale. Figure
 
4-3 depicts the form utilized for this purpose. A particular retention rationale
 
definition, acceptance rationale statement, or recommended change is listed in
 
the left column, with the applicable failure modes listed on the right. The
 
issue/risk is briefly described with acceptance rationale or software
 
requirements change recommendation. The summary provides a basic overview of the
 
total analysis results.
 
5.0 ANALYSIS SUMMARY SHEETS. The analysis results are summarized on the
 
following sheets. The failure modes have been grouped by issue/retention

rationale (or change), affording an overview of the results for the entire
 
subsystem.
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CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE
 
1. 	 NO * CHECKED - NO HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ISSUES ARE APPARENT FROM THE ANALYSIS. 
SYSTEM IS FAIL OPERATIONAL/FAIL SAFE WITH RESPECT TO THIS FAILURE MODE UNDER 
CURRENT DESIGN. 
2. 	 ONLY * CHECKED ON QUESTION 6 - NO HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ISSUES ARE APPARENT FROM
 
THE ANALYSIS. RISK HAS BEEN ACCEPTED VIA HARDWARE CIL.
 
3. 	 ONLY * (YES) CHECKED ON QUESTION la - NO SOFTWARE DETECTION IS PROVIDED. 
FAILURE EFFECT IS NOT TIME CRITICAL. FAILURE MAY BE DETECTED BY OTHER MEANS 
OR FUNCTION IS NOT MISSION/SAFETY CRITICAL. 
4. 	 * CHECKED ON QUESTION 3a - * ON la MAY OR MAY NOT BE CHECKED - SOFTWARE DOES
 
NOT TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR FAILURE. FAILURE EFFECT IS NOT TIME
 
CRITICAL. CORRECTIVE ACTION MAY BE INITIATED BY CREW. PLANNED CHECKOUT
 
ACTIVITIES WILL DETECT FAILURE. SYSTEM IS FAIL OPERATIONAL/FAIL SAFE
 
WITHOUT SOFTWARE DETECTION AND CORRECTION.
 
5. 	 STANDARD RETENTION RATIONALE DOES NOT APPLY. SPECIFIC RETENTION RATIONALE
 
IS SUMMARIZED FOR THIS FAILURE.
 
6. 	 ISSUES IDENTIFIED AND CHANGES ARE DESIRABLE. SPECIFIC CHANGES ARE
 
SUMMARIZED.
 
NOTE: 	 DO NOT CONSIDER ANSWER TO QUESTION 2 IN DETERMINATION OF
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY CODE. CONSIDER RESPONSES TO BOTH
 
QUESTION 2 AND 6 IN DETERMINING WHETHER AN FMEA CHANGE IS REQUIRED.
 
Figure 4-2. Change/Retention Rationale
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS SUIiMARY 
SUBSYSTEM FMEA 
ANALYSIS RESULT ITEM/FAILURE MODE 
~0 
-4"-s 
z¢ 
D' 
, 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS SUMMARY
 
FMEA _SD75-SH-OOI6A
SUBSYSTEM Forward Reaction Control-

ANALYSIS RESULT ITEM/FAILURE MODE
 
HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK Helium Storage Tank - Rupture (03-2F-l01010-l)
 
Helium Feedline - External Leakage (03-2F-101013-l)

Quick Fill Disconnect, He - Fails Open, Cap Leaks (03-2F-101070-l)
 
Test Quick Disconnect, Propellant - Ext. Leakage/Flight (03-2F-01090-1)

Propellant Line Flex Assy. - External Leakage (03-2F-102106-1)
 
Feedline and Fittings - External Leakage (03-2F-102108-1)

AC Motor Operated Valve (Tank) - Fails Closed (03-2F-102120-1)

Quick Disconnect - External Leakage (03-2F-102150-1)
 
DC Solenoid Operated Valve - Fails Closed - 'Premature Operation
 
(03-2F-102170-1)
 
Tank Assembly and Propellant Acquisition Device - Small Crack - External
 
Leakage (03-2F-lllllO-2)
 
Tank Assembly and Propellant Acquisition Device - Restricted Flow
 (03-2F-111110-3)
 
Tank Assembly and Propellant Acquisition Device - Loss of Gas in
 
Propellant Acquisition Device (03-2F-III1II0-4)
 
Flex Line and Fittings - External Leakage (03-2F-121308-1)
 
Thrust Chamber -.Burn Through (03-2F-121312-I')
 
c3 Nozzle Extension - Burn-Through (03-2F-121313-1)
 
Vernier Thruster - Erratic Operation (03-2F-131310-3)
 
Vernier Thruster - Burn-Through (03-2F-131310-4)
 
Helium Pressure Regulator - Fails Closed (03-2F-101030-2)

Tank Assembly and Propellant Acquisition Device - Large Rupture
 
(03-2F-111110-1)

Purge Quick Disconnect, Propellant - External Leakage During Flight

(03-2F-101080-1)
 
Helium Quad Check Valve - Fails Closed (03-2F-101095-2)

Vernier Thruster - Loss of Output (03-2F-131310-1)
 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS SUMMARY
 
FMEA SD75-SH-OOl6A
SUBSYSTEM Fnrward Pprtinn Cnntrnl 

ANALYSIS RESULT ITEM/FAILURE MODE
 
NO HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ISSUES D.C. Solenoid Valve - Fails to Close (03-2F-101020-3) 
D.C. Solenoid Valve Fails Closed (03-2F-101020-4)
-
Helium Pressure Regulator - Fails Open (03-2F-101030-1)
 
Relief Valve - External Leakage Overboard (03-2F-101060-1)
 
Relief Valve - Burst Disc Ruptures (03-2F-101060-2)
 
Relief Valve - Fails to Burst (03-2F-101060-3)
 
'Relief Valve - Opens Low (03-2F-101060-4)
 
Relief Valve - Fails to Open (03-2F-101060-5)
 
Helium Quad Check Valve - Fails Open (03-2F-101095-1)
 
Injector Plate - Mixture (03-2F-121311-1)
 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS SUMMARY
 
SUBSYSTEM Forward Reaction Control FMEA SD75-SH-0016A 
ANALYSIS RESULT ITEM/FAILURE MODE 
OUT OF SCOPE - GROUND ONLY Manual Valve - Fails Closed or Open (03-2F-101050-l) 
Manual Valve - Internal Leakage (03-2F-101050-2) 
Quick Fill Disconnect, He. - Fails Closed/Ground OPS (03-2F-101070-2) 
Purge Quick Disconnect, Propellant - Fails Closed/Ground OPS. 
(03-2F-l01080-2) 
Test Quick Disconnect, Propellant - Fails Closed/Ground Ops 
(03-2F-101090-2) 
Quick Disconnect - Fails Closed/Ground Ops. (03-2F-102150-2) 
6.0 ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SHEETS
 
Following are the analysis checklist sheets for each failure mode evaluated.
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*HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-IOl010-1 
SUBSYSTEM* Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Helium Storage Tank 	 FAILURE MODE Ruture 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES [ NO E 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?­
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORnATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES f NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FIEA EVALUATIOU OF YES [*.0 ] 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTUARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO [ 
(EITHER BY COMIMADIIG HARDWARE ACTION[ OR IMPLEMEITInG ALTER:;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES fl NO [] 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR II.PLEiIE;ITING ALTERiNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [ iO 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO 
OTHER FUNCTIO3S? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 E *i[- 2f--
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTIOtI IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A DYES ]a|OE 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES ]*NO U 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES F]*NO DI 
*EXPILJNATION REQUIRED (SE_BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTIOf! RATIONALE SUMMtARY 
1.0 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. 0] NO SOFTWARE DETECTION S. Q]ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. FJ HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMSmENDED CHANGES BELOW 
[ ]FMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. GAX will give a class 2 alert upon sensing an out-of-tolerance condition. (<500 psi)
 
Gross leak detection will give a class 2 alert.
 
8. Backup flight system same as primary.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBjITER IC2 
SUESYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONIROL FMEA NO 03-2F -iOIClE-i iKEv:±Z/IE/7 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: ChIT. FuNC: i 
.
0 /N RI : MC 2aZ-0082-0 03 1/-0032 CRIT. HWu: I 
.PfN VENOOR:BLD-9990A0 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF CF Sm 
. UA %)TIFY :2 PHAS(S): PL X LO X OU X C X LS 
:ONE REO'O PER EACH NUMBEk OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING 
:PROPELLANT TANK AFTER FIRST FAILURE: C 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A 
.FAYLURE DET&CTARLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT: 
.PPESSURE INDICATION V42P-1iICC IMMED IATE/SECONUS 
.1113c REFE ENCE SUCuMLNTS: 
vJ07-'- 31-l F 
['ROUNETURNAOCUND? .............. YES 5J,72-CH-103 - 2 
.SAME AS FLIGHT VS70-42100I 
PREPARED BY: APPROVEG ty: 
DES J TAGGART DES 
REL R DIEHL REL 
.1TEM: TANK 
HELIUM STORAGE, FILAMENT WOUND. 
.- UNCTION: 
"TO STORE HELIUM1 AT A MAX IWORKING PRESSURE OF 4GO0 PSI FUN 
PRESSURIZATION OF THE FWO RCS MODULE PRCPELLANT SUPPLY SySfEM. TANK 
CNSISTS OF A DOUBLE MELT TI LINER WITH DUPONT 49 FISER AiNO EPOXY RtSIN 
FONDING OVER WRAP.
*rPILURE MODE: RUPTURE, EXFERNAL LEAK (S) 
a 	 RUPTURE - LARGE CRACK hHICH PROPUGAYES AROUND TANK Ix-.EIAT LY. 
LcAK4GE - FRACTURE i;HICh DOES NOT PkOPOGATE TO RUPTURE. 
'.CUSE- (S) 
SVIRATION, STRESS CORROSION, TEMP. RISE, FATIGUE, INADVEP1TN1 
OVEP-PRESSURIZ4TICl (GROUND OPS). 
.EFrFCTtS): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (h)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (W)CREW/V.hICLc:­
(A) LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION TO FUEL OR OXIDIZER. (6) EXPLOSIVE 
* (PANSION OF HELIUM WITHIN RCS MODULE. (C) POTENTIAL LOSS LF 
'41SSION-ABORT DECISION OEPENDANT ON EXTENT OF DAIAGE. D) PtGT-NIIAL 
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
.CrMRECTING ACTION: 
NONE AVAILABLE EXCEPT POSSIBLE RESCUE IF VEHICLE SlILL INTACI.
 
R EMAR KS/HAZARDS : 
HAZARD CF SHRAPNEL PROPAGATION, HOWEVER, UTILIZATION OF FILANMtNT wUUo-IND 
TANK MINIIZES OR ELIMINATES THIS HAZARD. ADITIONAL IAZARO OF ?IOUUL 
OVLR PRESSURIZATION STILL EXISTS. NO REDUNDANCY PHOVIDEG FUR fr-IS I1tM 
- REFERENCE HAZARD 1YXX-03O2-02. 
OF f'OOR QUAkLi
 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -101010-1 REV:!!/o0/71 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: 1 
.P/N Ri :M4C282--OC82-0031/-0032 M,IT- Hw: I 
.P/N VENDOR:BLD-999040 MISSIONS: HF VF -X FE OF SM 
.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL X LO X 00 X DO X LS 
* 	 :ONE REQ'D PER EACH 
:PROPELLANT TANK 
REDUNDANCY 	 SCREEN: A-N/A 3-N/A C-N/A 
.PREPARED BY: A y tcyD 'i':, A Si D taii
 
.DES J TACGR 0E ­
.REL - R DIEHL RE R (
 
:ITEM: TANK
 
. HELIUM STORAGE, FILAMENT iOUND.
 
.FUNCTION: 
TO STORE HELIUM AT A MAX WORKING PRESSURE OF 4003 PSI FQR 
PRESSURIZATION OF THE FWO RCS MODULE PROPELLANT SUPPLY SYSTEM. TANK 
CONSISTS 3F A DOUBLE MELT TI LINER WITH DUPONT 49 FIBER AND EPOXY RESIN 
BONDING OVER W-RAP. 
.FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAK (S) 
RUPTURE - LARGE CRACK hHICH PROPOGA T -ES ,ROUNO TANK lf.IMiEDIATELY. 
LEAKAGE.- FRACTURE hHICH DOES NCT PROPOGATE TO RUPTURE. 
.CAUSE[ S): 
VIBRATION, 	STRESS CORROSION, TEMP. RISE, FATIGUEv INADVERTENT
 
OVER-PRESSURIZATION [GROUND OPS). 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (CIMISSICN (D)CREV,/VEHICLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION TO FUEL OR OXIDIZER. (B) EXPLOSIVE
 
EXPANSION OF HELIUM wITHIN RCS MODULE. (C) POTENTIAL LCSS OF 
MISSIZN-ABORT DECISION DEPENDANT ON EXTENT OF DAMAGE. (D) POTENTIAL 
LOSS OF CREt/VEHICLEo 
.DISPOSITION F RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TES" (C)INSPECTION (O)FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(4) FILAtMENT WOUND TANKS ARE OESZGNED TO LEAK BEFORE RUPTURE 4HICH
 
LIHITS FAILURE PROPAGATION DUE TO SCHRAPNELO INCREASED STRAIN
 
CAPABILITY 	 IS PROVIDED BY THE COMPRESSIVE LOAD ON AN UNPRESSURIZED 
LINER- THE FACTOR OF SAFETY IS L.5 X MAX WORKING PRESSURE OF 4000 PS1G.
 
DUAL SEALS ARE PROVIDED AT TANK FLANGE. (B) TANKS ARE SUBJECTED TO
 
PROOF PRESSURE (LIAX WORKING PRESSURE) DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING. QUAL
 
TESTS IlOLUDE 1000 PRESSURE CYCLES EQUAL TO 4 TItlES LIFE PEOUIREIENT, 90 
DAY CREEP TEST AT MAX WORKING PRESSURE PLUS RANDO'M VIBRATION AT 
ANTICIPATED MISSION LEVELS FOR 48 MIN IN EACH AXIS. (C) IN PROCESS 
-INSPECTION 	 INCLUDES RADIO GRAPHIC INSPECTION OF VELDS & FLUORESCENT 
PENETRATION INSPECTION FOR SURFACE FLAtlS. TURNAROUND CYCLE FOR EVIDENCE 
OF RUPTURE. AUDIT CONDUCTED 3/9/78 VERIFIED SUPPLIER RECEIVING 
INSPECTION CONTROLS RAW MATERIAL AND PURCHASED COMPONENTS AND IN-HOUSE 
INSPECTION CONTROLS CORROSION PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS, TEST HANDLING 
STORAGE ENVIRONMENTS, MEASUREMENT STANDARDS, TEST EQUIPMENT, NDE 
TESTINGs PARTS PROTECTION, MEG PROCESSES AND FINISHES. CHEMICAL ETCHING, 
X-RAY AND PROOF TEST OF LINER AND PECHANICAL PROPOERTIES AFTER HEAT 
TREAT ALSO VERI.lED BY INSPECTION. (D NO HISTORY AVAILABLE. TANK IS 
BEING DEVELOPED FOR SHUTTLE PROGRAM., 
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02--5 SD75-SlI -0003 
.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYS IS CHECKLIST 03-2F-l01013-1 
SUBSYSTEH Fwd Reaction Control 	 FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-OO16A 
ITEM Helium Feedl.ine 	 FAILURE 1ODE ._xternn I eakage 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE NODE (i.e., AUTOATICALLY YES nJ NO 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION 111 RESPONSE). 
Ta. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOTWARE COULD *YES No _ 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES Dl NO [f 
(EITHER BY CO.!NUADItIG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERS:ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR ThE SOFTWARE TO COIPENSATE FOR THIS *YES Li No Ri 
FAILURE NODE (ETHER.Y COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIE;ITING ALTER.NATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES El NO 0 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE'MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES l No £"
 
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [ *1E] 2E] 
ACTION A ID HARDWARE/SOFi WARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTIOH IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YES[UiOE] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIOU AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES ]*fO [] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES f-l*NO ­
.*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEk BELOW) 
- ----- - -- - - --.-- - ---------- -- ----------------- . . -.-.-.------- 
CHANGE/RETENTION- RATIONALE SUMMIARY 
1. NO H/S ISSUES _ 3.F NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. Q ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELCW
 
2. HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. [ DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6.0 RECOP4ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
rFMEA CHANGE RECOi.ENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMIMENTS: 
1. GAX will give a class 2 alert upon sensing an out-of-tolerance condition. (<500 psi) 
Gross leak detection will give a class 2 alert. 
8. 	Backup flight system same as primary.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO C3-2F -101011-1 kcv~ii/cw/7.
 
.ASSENELY :PRESSURIZATION HELIUM - ABORT: CRIT. FuN: i 
.P/N RI :VO7O-421701 CPIT. H42: I 
.P/N VtNOOP; MISSIONS: HF VF X FF cIb s" 
.QUANTITY 	:2 PHASE(S): PL X Lb X C0 X DO X LS x
 
:ONE SET PER PROPELLANT NUM3ER OF SUCCESS PAIHS 1,EXAINING
 
* 	 AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 0 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-IiA b-N/A C-N/A 
.FAILURE DETbCTAELE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT: 
.HELIUM TANK PRESSURE DRO P AT OFF-NOMINAL RATE; IMMEDIATE 
.VQ2P-1110C; 1112C; 1113C; 1114C REFERLNG% UCUMENIS: 
.GROUND TURNAROUND?..............YES MJ070 Ilb 
.SPMr AS FLIGHT INSTRUMEN 'TATION SD72-Sh-5103-2 
VS70-421C61
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED 6Y:
 
DES A SIEGELIN 6RS
 
REL R DIEHL RL
 
.ITCM: HELIUM FEED LINE 	AND
 
* FLUID FITTINGS. 
:FUNCTION:
TU PROVICE 	FEED LINE FROM HELIUM TANKS TO HELIUM 
REGULATION/PRESSURATION 	SYSTEM AND TO PROPELLANT
 
SNKS.;
 
.FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 	 (5) 
.CAUSE(S):
 
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION/FATIbUE, IMPROPER INSTALLATIUN IWELL).
 
FLUID FITTING SEAL FAILURE.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTRFACES (C)WiSSIOq (D)CREW/VcHICL­
(A) LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY IF NOT ISULATA LE. (IL. IF UPSf.uAm OF 
S&LENOID VALVE). (b) POTENTIAL OVERPRESSURIZATION jF FORWAKU 10..-jL 
FROM GROSS LEAK. (C,D) POTENTIAL MODULE DAMAGE RESULTING IN LO-S OF
 
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE IF GROSS LEAK OCCURS DURING CRITICAL ,ANEOVt0rm.
 
.CORRECTING ACTION: 
INITIATE ABORT. CHECK VALVES MAINTAIN PROPELLANT TANK R,SIDUAL GAS 
PRESSURE TO ALLOW POTENTIAL PLOW DOWN MODE UTILJZATIN. 
.REMARKS/HAZARLJS:
 
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR LINES. IF LEAK RATE 1S EXCrSSIVE P_ZSSUAE
 
BUILD-UP IN MODULE MAY RESULT IN HAZARD. SEE HAZARD IYXX-0.On2-c2.
 
ORICINAL PAGE- g3 
OF POOR QUAUI 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWO - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -101013-1 REV: 11/09/? 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION HELIU' - ABCRT: CRIT. FUNC: I 
.P/N RI :VQ0-421701 CRIT. HON: I 
.P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM 
.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL X LO X CO X CO X LS X 
*,:ONE 	 SET PER PROPELLANT 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/4A C-N/A
 
PRPRDBY:-. APPROV.. PRVE jN~)O
.DES A SLEGELIN DES
 
.REL R DIEHL REL . ,- J A.. _m'L ..
 
* 	 PPROVED WITH CHANGES
 
* See Section 13.0 
.ITS'!: HELIUm FEED LINE AND 
* 	 FLUID FITTINGS. 
.FUNCT 	 ION: 
TO PROVI-DE FEED LINE FROM HELIUM TANKS TO HELIUM 
REGULATION/PRESSURATION SYSTEM AND TO PROPELLANT 
TANKS.
 
.FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (S)
 
"CAUSE{ SI:
 
MECHANICAL S'HOCIC, V[BRATION/FATIGdE, IMPROPER INSTALLATION (,aELD).
 
FLUID FITTING SEAL FAILURE.
 
.EFrECT(S)z ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)-I4SSION (D)Cr'W/VEHICLE:
 
,
(A) LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY IF NOT tSOL TABLE. (IEO IF UPSTPEA'M OF 
SOLENOID VALVE). (B) POTENTIAL OVERPRESSURIZATION OF FCPiAlR0 MODULE 
FROM GR.OSS LEAK. (C;O) POTENTIAL MODULE DAMAGE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
 
MISSION/CREEN/VEHICLE IF GROSS LEAK OCCURS DURING CRITICAL IANEUVERS. 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN (B2TEST (C)INSPECTION (D-)FAILURE HISTORY;
 
(4) FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 40 IILL INIMIZE FAILURE POTETIAL. FLUID 
FITTINGS HAVE DUAL SEALS. 'IELD CONSTRUCTION REDUCES JOINTS AND POSSIBLE 
LEAK PATHS. FASTENING CLAMPS AND TUaE BENT) DESIGN 'ALLOWS DECREE OF 
MOVEMENT wHICH HELPS PREVENTING LEAKS. (B) POST INSTALLATION TEST NND 
OPERATIONAL CHECKOUTS WILL VERIFY SYSTEM INTEGRITY. ALL LINES 
SUBJECTED TO 1.25 PROOF TEST. CC) IN PROCESS INSPECTIDN INCLUDES NOT F 
LEAK CHECKS DURING INSTALLATION TURNiLROUND INSPECTION INCLUDES 
MAONITORING .FUNCTLOMAL TESTS DURING PRESSURIZATION CYCLE FOR EVIDENCE OF 
LEAKS. IHERE ACCESSABLE VISUALLY INSPECT FOR DAMAGE. HARDWARE 
INS-PECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANNING RQtMTS APPROVEO 6Y Nt"SA. (0) 
MIN.OR FAIL.URE HISTORY-CORROSION AND FAB PROBLEMS REPORTED DURING APOLLO 
PROGRAM AND CORRECTED. 
WITH APPLICABLE TMO/TPC REQUIRENENT- HARDWARE INSPECTION IN ACCORDhINCF 
WITH PLANNING RQFMTS APPROVED, BY NASA. (0) MINOR FAILURE 
HISTORY-CORRgOSIOa AND FAB PROBLEMS REPORTED DURING APOLLO PROGRAM AND 
CORR ECTED, 
SS 	 D75 -S£H -003
 
- - - - -- - ------------------------------------- 
- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ------------------------ -- -- --- - - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---
-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101020-3 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FtEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM D. C. Solenoid Valve - Helium FAILURE NODE Fails to Close 
1. DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES , NO rn 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
U. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 1]
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATION OF YES t- NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES 0 NO [] 
(EITHER BY CONt4NDItG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES 0l NO EW 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR INIPLEIIETING ALTERIATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES El mt 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES [] NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *l] 2FX 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FNEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTIOU IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A DYESE]NOO]
 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIOn AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	 IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES [J*NO U 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES []*NO fl 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
-	 -- -.. - .....-------------

CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE 'UN'ARY 
1. -I NO HYS ISSUES 	 3. E NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. E] HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK- 4.-- DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECO,%4ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
In-Fl ight Detectability
 
m FMEA CHANGE RECOMiENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Switch scan will detect failure in OPS-2 only and only on demand. 
May not be used on STS--. 
18
 
SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - OgkIlER IC2 
SOBSYSThN :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2P -1C1020-3 REv:t3/a6/7, 
.aSSEM:ELY :PRESSURIZATlION ABORT: CRIT. FuNC: 
.P/N PI *MC28k-0419-001i/-0012 CRIT. HWD: 3 
.P/N VENDORA732E5 MISSIONS: HF VF / FF UF S, 
.QUAN T ITY .4 PHASE(S): PL X LO X 0 X DO X LS 
:TWO REQ0D PER PRESSURANT NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING 
:FEED ASSEMBLY AFTER FIRST FAILUkR: 2 
REDUNOANCY SCRE5N: A-PASS E-PASS C-PAS:. 
.FAILUPE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES )IE TO EFFECT: 
AELIUM TANK< PRESS, V42P 1i11,l112,1113,1114, SECONDS
 
.AND PRESS LINE;V42PII5, 1116 AND POSITION IND. REFERENCr D3CuMENTS:
 
.112CX, 1122X,112 4X,112bX VL7O-0OS24;
 
-GROU\ND TURNAROUND?..............YES mJolO-coo1-ulb
 
.SAME AS FLIGHT INSTR.
 
0 VS70-42100i
 
PREPARED BY: ADPRCVED BY: 
LEES R BURKiART DES 
REL R DIEHL KEL ------­
:ITEM: VALVE,D.C. SOLENOID
 
OPERATOD, HIGH PRESSURE. HE 126C6-4000 PSIAJ SOLENOID ACTUAICO,
 
51-STARLE, (1/2") (LV 10i/I2/1O3/104.
 
.CUNCT ION:
 
THES VALVES ARE UTILIZED TO CONTROL HELIUM PRESSUKIZATION OF Thu RLS
 
MODULE. IN THE OPEN POSITION A FLOW PATH IS PROVIDED FRCM THE IH-LIUM
 
SUPPLY TANK(S) TO THE REGULATuR(S). TWO PARALLEL PATHS ARE PRUVIDLE
 
FOR FUEL AND OXIDIZER. ONE PATH IS NORMALLY OPEN PER TANK. IHE VALVE
 
IS CLOSED AND PARALLEL VALVE OPENED SU6SEQUENT TU A 0ON SI-EA
 
FAILURE.
 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (F)
 
* WHEN COMMANDED TO ISOLATE DOWNSIREAM FAILURES
 
.CAUSE(CS):
 
CUNTAMINATION, VIBRATION, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL INPUT, I;'1PROPER OP NI.G
 
ACTUATION, PIECE PART FAILURE.
 
.EFFSCT(S): ON (A)SUESYSTEM (B)INTE&FACES (C)MISSION (D)CREW/VEHICLE:
 
(A,CO) NO EFFECT, VALVE IS FUNCTIONED (CLOSED) ONLY SUESEQuENT TO A
 
2ND ORDR FAILURE. KB) NO EFFECT, DOES NOT INTERFACE WITH UlHER
 
SUBSYSTEMS.
 
.CLRRECTING ACTION:
 
NONE ­
.EMARKS/HAZAIDS:
 
NJONE. ,-" 
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.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-1 01020-4 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FI.IEA ',UBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM D. C. Solenoid Valve - Helium FAILURE NODE Fails Closed 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTUARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTO(LATICALLY YES [ NO 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION Ii RESPONSE)?. 
la. 	 IF NOT. DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES ] -NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTIIARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO 
'(EITHER BY COMI!ANDING HARD.ARE ACTION OR IMPLEMEUTING ALTERATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE To COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES D NO [ 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMIIANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR INPLEIIE;iTING ALTERIATE 
PROGRAI LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [ NO 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? -. 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES El NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (COUSIDER CREW *0 Dl *lf- zF 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A f'YESONOfE] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	 IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES E*Nm El 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES EI*NO Li 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTIOR RATIONIALE SUM.AR.
 
1.FJ NO H/S ISSUES 3.fl NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5.O]ACCETANCIE RATIONALE BELOW
 
2.M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. " RECOI-1ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
-]FMEA CHANGE RECOI,,hE;'DED 
EXPLANATION/COIMEITS: 
1. Switch scan will detect failure in OPS-2 only and only on demand.
 
May not be used on STS-I.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFF-ECTS ANALYSIS - OR5I1E, 102
 
SUESYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -101020-4 REV:12/'LEit7 
.ASSSBLY ±PRESSU IZATION ABORT! CRIT. FUNC: IR 
.P/N'Rl :MC24-O419-0Cl1/-C12 CIT. HWC: 2 
.P/Nl VENDOR:73E35 MISSIONS: HF VF X rF F Sm 
.2UA.NrITY :Z PHASE(S): PL X LO X C. X 00 X LS 
:TWO REQ'D PER PRESSURANT NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS RL.AgiNING 
:FEED ASSE'BLY AFTER FIRST FAILuRE: I 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS -PASS C-FAIl 
.FAiLUR.E DETLCTABLC IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME Tb EFFECT:
 
.MONITCR TANK PRESSURE AND POSITION INDICATION MINUT3s
 
.V 2X-I120X,iI22XtlIZ4X, li26X REFERENCE OOCLENI :
 
VL70-U0O249
 
*qRUJD IURNAROUND?.....YES MJOTO-OLG-OI.z 
.SAI- AS FLIGHT INSTR. SD72-SH-03-2
 
VS,0-421cci
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: 
DES , R BURKHART DES 
REL R DIEHL REL 
.1mFM: VALVE,D.C. SOLE NOID C-C\\ Y'A P\ZJ O 
OPERATED, HIGH PRESSURE. HE (3600-4000 PSIA) SOLEN1O AC-TUATED, 
EI--TARLE,.(1/2") (LV 101/102/103/IC10). 
-UNCTION: 
THESE VALVES ARE UTILIZED TO CONTROL hELIUM PRESSURIZATIOrN OF THt RCs 
MUOULE. IN THE OPEN POSITION A FLOW PATH iS PROVIDED FgOM THE HELIUM 
SUPPLY TANK(S) TO THE REGULATOR(S). TWo PARALLEL PAIHS ARE FOvI'JD 
FOR FUEL AND OXIDIZER. ONE PATH IS NORMALLY OPEN PEK A.. THc VALVt 
IS CLOSED AND PARALLEL VALVE OPENED SUBSECUENT Tb A uO0N SIREAM 
FAI LURE 
.FAILURE MODE: FAlLS CLOSED (F) 
.CAUSE (S): 
VISATION, CONTAMINATION CONTINUOUS INADVERTENT CLOSING S1'H4AL -Uc TO 
SHORT CIRCUIT, PIECE PART FAILURE. 
.EFF&-CT(S): uN (A)SUbSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREa/VEhICLL 
(A) LOSS OF REDUNDANT PRESSURIZATION PATH.. (B,D) NO EFFECT. (C) 
* A3URT DECISION DEPENDENT ON MISSION PHASE AND ELUWDOWN CAPAEILI"[Y.
.0CRECTING ACTION: 
IF CAUSED BY VIBRATION, THE VALVE MAY BE CAPABLE OF OPENTNC WiT-i A Ntw 
COM AND OR, SWITCH TO PARALLEL REGULATION PATH - COMMAND PAALLEL 
ISOLATION VALVE OPEN. 
.RE PMRKS/HAZARCS: 
POTENTIAL HAZARD IN ABORT SITUATION. SEE CONSOLIDATED CONTRULS FWIcA 
NUMEcR 71635 FMEA 1. 
ORIGINAL PAGE is 
OF POdR QUALry 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWO - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -10L020-4- REV:12!08/"
 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: IS 
.P/N RI :MC284-0419-0O1/-0012 CRIT. HOW: 
.P/N VENDOR:73835 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM 
.QUANTITY 	 :4 PHASE(S): PL X LO X 00 X DO X LS 
:T4O REQ'D PER PRESSURANT 
:FEED ASSEMBLY 
REDUNDANCY 	SCREEN: A-PASS B-PASS C-FAt
 
:PREPARED BY: APPROVE APPR ED 0 N A
 
.DES .'/__4AW.CL ssM
R BURKHART DES - - m U.,-
.REL R DIEHL REL R ER 
( VED WITH CHANGES
 
.ITEM: VALVE,O.C. SOLENOID See Section 13.0
 
OPERATED. HIGH PRESSURE. HE (3600-4000 PSIA) SOLENOID ACTUATED,
 
81-STABLE, (1/2") (LV 101/1021103/104).
 
.FUNCTION: 
THESE VALVES ARE UTILIZED TO CONTROL HELIUM PPESSURIZATICN OF THE RCS 
MODULE. IN THE OPEN POSITICN A FLOW PATH IS PROVIDED FRCM THE HELIUM 
SUPPLY TANK(S) TO THE REGULATOR(S). TWO PARALLEL PATHS ARE PROVIDED
 
FOR FUEL AND OXIDIZER- ONE PATH IS NORMALLY OPEN PER TANK. THE VALVE
 
IS CLOSED AND PARALLEL VALVE OPENED SUBSEQUENT TO A DOWN STREAM
 
FAILURE.
 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED IF)
 
.CAUSE(S): 
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION CONTINUOUS INADVERTENT CLOSING SIGNAL DUE TO 
SHORT CIRCUIT, PIECE PART FAILURE. 
.EFFECT(S): ON (AISUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREh/VEHICLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF REDUNDANT PRESSURIZATION PATH. (B,0) NO EFFECT. (C)

ABORT DECISION DEPENDENT ON MISSION PHASE AND BLOWDOWN CAPABILITY.
 
.OISPOSITION & RATIONALE IA)DESIGN {B)TEST (C)INSPECTICN (O)FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(A) SERIES CONTROL CIRCUITRY PROVIDED TO MINIMIZE FAILURE MODE 100
 
MICRON FILTER IS PROVIDED. MEDIA HAS BEEN FILTERED TO 25 MICRON PRIOR
 
TO ENTERING TANK_ SPECIAL EMPHASAS PLACED ON THE DESIGN AND LAYOUT OF
 
SOLENOID WIRING TO PRECLUDE SHORTS. (B) QUAL TEST INCLUDES 48 MINUTES 
PER AXIS OF RANDOM VIBRATION AT ANTICAPTED MISSION LEVELS AND LIFE
 
TESTING CONSISTING OF 2200 OPERATING CYCLES. ITEM IS USED DURING SYSTEM
 
EVALUATION AT WHITE SANDS TESTING- (C) TURNAROUND INSPECTION INCLUDES
 
MONITORING 	 TESTS TO VERIFY ELECTRICAL POWER TO SOLENOID VALVE FOR 
EVIDENCE OF SHORT CIRCUIT, SUPPLIER AUDIT CONDUCTED 8-31-77 VERIFIED
 
SUPPLIER INSPECTION EXCERCISED CONTROL OF PARTS ID, PARTS PROTECTION,
 
MFG PROCESSES, CONTAMINATION CONTROLS AND CORROSION PROTECTION
 
VERIFICATION. (D) THERE IS NO FAILURE HISTORY FOR THIS SPECIFIC DESIGN.
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST .03-2F-101030-1 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Helium Pressure Regulator FAILURE NODE Fails Open 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?
 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORFIATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND Ia CONSISTENT WITH THE FI1EA EVALUATION OF 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE 
(EITHER BY COMMIANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiIENTIIG ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR 

INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IFCREW ACTION ISREQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED 

TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIO;I AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 
*EXPLAIATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUNI'Aki' 
YES [ NO E 
*YES NO ® 
YES [*D 
YES D NO [ 
*YES ] NO W-­
*YES :1 ],O 
*YES LINO x] 
*0 [ *ll 2E] 
N/A DYESD-Ii!OE 
YES []*I: FL 
YES 5--NO fa 
I.[ NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.F_0 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION S. EACCEPTANCE RATIONALE CELOW 
2. HARDWARE ACCEPTS RiSK 4. r- DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOt1:IEiDED CHANGES BELOW 
[JFMEA CHANGE RECOI,EMSDED 
EXPLANATION/COHMENTS: 
1. 	 Detection of this fa.ilure mode is not desired as these are redundant series regulators. 
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - OmBIER 102 /it • 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 63-2P -iC0030-1 PLV:C6/i/7. 
.ASSEMELY :PRES SUPI ATION ABORT: CRIT. FUNG: 
• /N P I :MC284-0418 CRI. CD: 3 
/t VENDOR:Th3390'l MISSIONS: HF VF X FF UF SM 
. ZANTITY :4 PHASE(S): PL LO X 00 X DUI X LS 
:TWO REOUIREG PER NUMBER OF SUCCESS PAIHS R&MA1NiN -
:PRESSURANT PATH AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 1 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-N/A C-FAS 
.FAILURE DETECTAaLE IN FLIGHT?. N/A TIME TO EFFeCf: 
.STAN0BY UNIT SECONDS 
REFERENCE DUCUMENTS: 
VS70-421CC I
 
.GROJNL TURNAROUND? ............. YES MJO70-CC31-CE

.CPOUNU CHECKOUT TEST PORTS S072-SH-OI03-2 
PREPARED 5Y: APPROVED !Y: 
DES J. TAGGART 5Es 
REL R DIEHL REL 
.ITEM: REGULATOR, PRESS, HE, 
SERIES REOUNCANT. SET AT UNEQUAL OUTLET PRESSURES - PRIMARY S&t LUWcK 
THAN SECONDARY (PR 101/102/103/104). 
FUNCTION:
 
TO REGULATE STORED HELIUM PRESSURE FROM 4300 PSIG iAX TO ULLAGE
 
PRESSURE OF 245 (+ OR -3) PSIG FUR PURPUSE OF PROPELLANT FXLD 15
 
THRUSTERS. TWO PARALLLL PATHS WiTH TWO SERIES REGS ARt Pt uIOEu -Uk
 
EACH PROPELLANT TANK. 
.PAILUrE MODE: FAILS OPEN (F) 
O,R LEAKS INTERNALLY. 
.CAUSE(S): 
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE-FLEXURES,
 
hELLOWS, POPPET ASSY. 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREW/v£ir1LE:
 
(A) LOSS OF ONE REGULATOR ELEMENT IN ONE PATHf (PRIMARY) AN& RISt iN 
PROPELLANT FEED PRESSURE TO SECONDARY REGULATOR ELEMNf PRESSURE 
SETTING. (5,0,D) NONE. 
.CORRECTING ACTICN: 
NONE REQUIRED - SERIES REGULATOR ELEMENT WILL AUTOMATICALLY TArkc OVER 
FUNC ION. 
*. A'
0KS/HAZARDS:
 
SEE FAIRCHILD FMEA t RR74339-12.
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.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101030-2 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control 	 FNEA NUMBER SD75-SH-OO16A 
ITEM Helium Pressure Regulator FAILURE MODE Failq flinsed 
1. DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTONATICALLY YES NO E 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
la. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFOPJATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATION OF 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE 

(EITHER BY COMtNDIIG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMIENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFT,'ARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS 

FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COPMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiIE;iTITNG ALTERuATE 
PROGRA LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE UVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR 

INDUCE AOTHER FAILURE? 

5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT
OTHER FUNCTIONIS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONISIDER CREW 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMIEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE 
S*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
.-. ..	 . - - . 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
i.E NO H/S ISSUES " - -. 
2. HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 
FMEA should be .changed from"NA" 
WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? • 

*YES NO 
YES U *O0
 
YES I
NO 
*YES l NO EW 
*YES n1O 
I
 
*YES NO
 
*0 U] *1] 2[E] 
N/A 	 U-]YESE-UOE-
YES UJ*l'o F
 
YES I*NO U
 
- --" . . . . . - -... -- -. . - -..- -. - . - . . 
. 3. NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE 'BELCW 
4. J DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOIMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
to "yes" for in-flight detectability via V42Plll5C and ll16C. 
E)FMEA CHANGE RECOIE:4DED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1-. V2Pii15-C 1i1-C, wil sensethe pressure drop-initiating a class 2 alarm from
.GAX. ... ...... ............. . - . -. .. 
2. 	Failure is "hardware detectable" by V42PIII5C and V42PI.116C pressure drop.
 
6. 	Upon regulator failure the redundant parallel "leg" can be utilized.
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SHUTILE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORoI1ER 102 
SU3SYSTEM :FWO - REACTION CCNTR2IL FMEA NO G3-2F -il$l-30-2 R.v:i/13/7.
 
'
 
.ASSEMBLY !PRESSJRIZA1ION ASURT- CIT. F N :  IN 
.P/N Ri :MC284-D41 C, IT. kw0: 2 
.P/N VbNOR:743301 MISSIONS: HF VF. X FF OF SM 
.nUA\NTITY 	 :4 PHASEIS): PL LO X U) X D0 X LS 
:Twtl REQUIRED PER NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS kLMAINING 
:PRESSURANT PATH AFTER FIRST FAILURE:
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS %-PASS C-PAS'
 
:FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGr-iT?. NA 	 IIAm TO EFFhC): 
.STANDBY REDUNDANCY 	 AINUFES
 
REFERENCE DCCUMENTS: 
VS70-4+2Ii01 
.GRUUNC TURNAROUND? ..............YES PJO-,uul 
'GROUN, CHECKOUT TEST PORTS SD72-SH-C103-2 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED EY: 
DES J. TAGGART DES 
REL R DIEHL REL 
ITEW: REGULTUR, PRESS, HE,
 
SERIES REDUNDANT. SET AT UNEQUAL OUTLET PRLSSURES - PRIMARY SET LCG4ER
 
THAN SECONDARY (PR 101/1021103/1C4).
 
.FUNCTION: 
TC REGULATE STORED HELIUM PRESSURE FROM 40C0 PSIG MAX 7C, uLLAG -
PRESSURE OF 245 (+ OR -3) PSIG FOR PURPOSE OF PROP*LLANT FEED IG 
THRUSTERS. TWO PARALLEL PATHS WITH TWO SERIES REGS ARE PROVIDED FCR 
EACh PROPELLANT TANK. 
.FAILUKeS MODE: FAILS CLOSED 	 (F) 
* (LOW PRESSUREH)
 
.CAUSE(S):
 
CCNiAMINATICN (PARTIAL BLOCKAGE OF PILOT SCREEN) FRUIEN MuISTURE FIECE
 
PART FAILURE, VIBRATION.
 
.EFPECT(S): ON (A)SUBSY$TEM (S)INIERFACES (C)MISSION (i)REW/VzniCLh; 
(A) LOSS OF ONE REGULATOR PATH. (B,C) POTENTIAL A,3CRT bzCAUSL UNE 
ADDITIONAL FAILURE MA CAUSE LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION AND SL'bSE1,U.NT
 
VEHICLE LOSS. (0) NONE. (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFtcTS - IF
 
FAILURE OCCUR BEFORE El SEPARATIUN, LOSS OF HELIUM WOULO PR -V=NT 51
 
SEPARATION AND LOSS OF CREW/VEAICLE WOULD RESULT.
 
.CORRECTING ACTION:
 
CLOSE HIGH PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE IN EFFECTED PATH AND OPEN Htir
 
PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE IN PAKALLEL PATH.
 
.REMARKS/HAZARDS:
 
POTENTIAL ABORT bECAUSE ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE (CLOSEJ) MAY CAjSE LOSS
 
OF PRESSURIZATION AND SUBSEQUENT VEHICLE LOSS U<EQUIRES 2N.,OROR 
FAILURE) CEPENDENl ON MISSION PHASE. SEE FAIRCHILL FMEAi 'Rre743 9-1t. 
2bOiIGNAL PAGE 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -101030-2 PEV:i1/13/75 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CRIT. FU4C: Ip 
_P/N RI :)C284-0418 C.IT. HDi: 2 
.P/N VENDOR:74339001 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF flF SM 
.QUANTITY :4 PHASE(S): PL LO X 00 X DO X LS 
:TwO REQUIRED PER 
;PRESSURANT PATH
 
* 
 REDUNDANCY 
SCREEN: A-PASS 
 B-0 ASS C-PASS
 
:PREPARED BY: AP ED APPR \'ED N

.D E S J . T A G G A R T D E ;5" -, l l z/'," . : ' ,,-',. S .J j r.Y _ _ ,_ ' 
.REL R OIEHL REL 
APPOVED WITH CHANGES 
.ITEM: REGULATOR, PRESS, HE, See Section 13.0 
SERIES REDUNDANT. SET AT UNEQUAL OUTLET PRESSURES - PrI.tzY SET LOWER 
THAN SECONDARY (PR 101/102/103/104). 
.FUNCT ION: 
TO REGULATE STORED HELIUM PRESSURE FROM 4000 PSIG MAX TO ULLAGE
 
PRESSURE OF 245 C+ OR -3) PSIG FOR PURPOSE OF PROPELLANT FEED TO
 
THRUSTERS. TWO PARALLEL PATHS WITH ThO SERIES PEGS ARE POGVIOED FOR
 
EACH PROPELLANT TANK.
 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (F)
 
* (LOh PRESSURE) 
.CAUSE(S:"
 
CONTAMINATION (PA,,RTIAL BLOCKAGE OF PILOT SCREEN) FROZEN MOISTURE PIECE 
PART FAILURE, VIBRATION.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CRE ,/VEHICLE:

(A) LOSS 3F ONE REGULATOR PATH. (B,C) POTENTIAL ABORT PECAUSE O:NE
 
ADDITIONAL FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION AND SUBSEQUENT
 
VEHICLE LOSS. CD} NONEED)
 
DISPOSITION-& RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY: 
(A) EXPERIENCE FROMi PREVIOUS REGULATOR DESIGIN TO BE APPLIED TO PRECLUDE
 
PIECE PART FAILURE AND SELF GENERATED CONTAMFINATION. ALSO, 25 MICRON 
INTREGAL INLET FILTER PROVIDED TO MINIMIZE CONTAMINANTS. (B) QUAL 
TESTING INCLUDES 28 HOUR SAND AND DUST TEST, 48 MINUTES PER AXIS OF 
RANDOM VIBRATION AT ANTICIPATED MISSION LEVELS AND LIFE CYCLE TESTS OF 
5O 00O CYCLES FOR THE MAIN STAGE AND 100,000 CYCLES FOR PILOT STAGEO 
(C) TURNAROUND INSPECTION INCLUDES MONITORING TESTS TO VERITY FUNCTIONA'L
 
OPERATION IS WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS. SUPPLIER AUDIT CONDUCTED VERIFIES 
WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS. SUPPLIER AUDIT CONDUCTED VERIFIES SUPPLIER 
CONTAMINATION CONTROL, AND STORAGE ENVIRONENT. (D) NEW DESIGN FOP. 
SHUTTLE APPLICATION. NO FAILURE HISTORY DATA AVAILABLE FOR THIS DESIGN. 
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101050-I
 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control 	 FMEA HUMBER SD75-SH-OO6A 
ITEM Manual Valve 	 FAILURE M4ODE Fails Closed or Open 
1. 	 DOES-THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES U NO E 
AUNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IllRESPONSE)?
 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES nO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D O ](EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE 'ACTION OR IMPLEMETING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO ]J
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIE;TING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [ NO OW
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES ] NO®R 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW VAIY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (COISIDER CREW *0 ] *1D] 20 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF 'CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND 'TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A D]YESX -LOO]
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIOI AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	 IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED 'AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES [l*NQ F-
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREWI/VEHICLE? 	 YES EXI* O 
*EXPLANATIO:I REQUIRED (SEE GELOW)
 
...................................................................................
 
CHANGE/RETE:ITION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.Q0 NO H/S ISSUES 	 NO DETECTION 5. Al3. E SOFTWARE 	 CCEPTANCE RATIONALE RELOW 
2. m HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. -- DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOM,MENDED CIIA!:SES BELOW.4 
H-FIIEA CHANGE RECO;MENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. If valve is cracked open V42Plll5A, 1116A would alarm.
 
6. There are no success paths remaining after first failure.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORFITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :FWO - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-ZF -1)105C-1 REV:C1/Lq/7 
.ASSEMELY :FKESSURIZATION ABORT: C.IT. FUNC: 
.P11 RI :MvC284-0480-00C1/-0002 CAIT. rwo: 
.P/N V ANDOR:576Ol5, 5760016 MISSIONS: tiF VF X FF OF SM 
.rUANTITY :2 PHASEIS): PL LO X 00 X O X LS 
ZONE REQ'D PER TANK NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING 
-AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS L-N/A C-PAS5 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES T1M Tu &FFECT: 
.PPOPELLANT TANK PRESSURE V,2P-1210,1115,1116,1310 CrONES ro MIINJTcS 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: 
.SROUNC TURNAROUND? ............. YES SD72- ri-QJ1, -2
 
.SAMt AS FLIGHT VS70-421001
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: 
DES R. GONZAL-Z 
_S _ 
REL R DIEHL REL 
.ITEM: VALVE ,MANUAL-OPL-RATED. 
1wO POSITION SELECTOR VALVE (WITH STRUCTURAL INTERLOCK) (M- 1 ±/l1b2). 
* 	 1UNCT ION: 
TO PROVIDE ISOLATION OF PROPELLANT TANK(S) FROM PRESSU: E CYCLES w-irLE 
PERFORMING GROUND C/O AND/OR SERViCINb OF PRESSUR1ZATION SYSI-M• 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED OR OPEN (_
 
• 	 STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
 
.CAUSE(S)'
 
&-VFRE: MECHANICAL SHOCK OR VI3RATION CAUSING DETENT MOVEYv-NT ON A 
DEFICIENT VALVE LOSS OF INTERLOCK BY FRACTURE OF DRIVE FINGLR OR 
RUCKER, CORROSION, CONTAPMINATION, IMPROPER USE. 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSlEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (,)CRLvl/VEHICLE:
 
-,(,)(B) LOSS OF FUNCTION (IN ABILITY 10 PERFORM SYS C/3. (C) LAU\Cli
D (D) EFFECT.uELAY. NO 
.COR ECTING ACTION: 
NONE AVAILABLE. 
.Z EMIARKS/HAZARDS: 
NO HAZARDS IDENTIFIED. 
ORIGINAL PAGE iS 
OF POOR QtALf 
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101050-2
 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control 	 FNEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Manual Valve 	 FAILURE MODE Internal Leakage
 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE nODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES NO 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION In RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES U NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO E]
 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAkE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES H NO 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES Ql ,o [EJ 
FAILURE EODE (EITHER BY COMMAtDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIE;ITING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE NODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE hARDWARE OR *YES [ NO [n
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
]
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES El NO (7
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CO SIDER CREW *0 *~ 2f_F 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED nI/A UTYES[WjVOO]
 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. 	CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES [-NO
 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES Rjl*o
 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUM.;IARV 
i.D7 NO H/S ISSUES 3.[ NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. [] ACCEPTANCE RATIO:NALE SELOW 
2.[] HARDWARE-ACCEPTS RISK 4. C DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. E3 RECOVMEMDED CHANCES BELOW 
EFMEA CHANGE RECONMENDED
 
EXPLANATION/CMMENTS:
 
1. 	Ifvalve is cracked open V42PIII5A, 1116A would alarm.
 
6. 	There are no success paths remaining after first failure.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANAL'SIS - CRSITER 102
 
SULSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -101%GC-a R EV:1/C4/1./ 
.ASSEMELY :PRESSURIZATION ASORT: CRiT. FUNC: 
.P/N RI :MC284-0480-0001/-0002 CGII. hrOD: 3 
.P/N VENDOR:5760C15, 5760016 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF Sm 
.')UANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL LO X C. X [LU X LS 
IONEREQ 'D PER TANK NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATrS RcMA1NING 
: AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 0 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PAS 5-N/A C-PAS.' 
:FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT: 
.PROPELLANT TANK PRESSURE V42P-I21O,1115,1115,1310 SECONDS TO ,INUTES
REFEREAIO LCU~L-'iTS: 
* MJ070-COl--15P
.
 
. . . . . . . . . . . .
S':-ROUNU TURNAROUND? .YES SD72-SH-Clc-2
 
.SAME AS FLIGHT VS?7-4212c1
 
PREPAREU BY: APPRCVED BY:
 
DES R. GONZALEZ DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
.ITEM! VALVErAANUAL-OPERATE.
 
. TWO POSITION SELECTOR VALVE (WITH SIRUCTURAL INfERLOCN) (XV 1Ol/I02).
 
.U'JNCTION: 
TO PROVIDE ISOLATION OF PROPELLANT TANK(S) FROM PRESSURE CYCLES WHILE
 
PERFORMING GRWUND C/O AND/OR SERVICING OF PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM. 
.FAILURE MODE: EXCESSIVE INTERNAL (_ 
* LEAKAGE. 
.CAUSE(S): 
SEVERE MECHANICAL SHOCK OR VIBRATION CAUSING DEE.NI MOVEMLNT GN A
 
DEFICIENT VALVE LOSS OF INTERLOCK bY FRACTURE OF uFIVE FiN,:GER O
 
RUCKER, CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, IMPROVER US-.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUSSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (O)CR-W/VtHILL,: 
(AE) LOSS OF FUNCTICN (IN ABILITY TO PERFORM SYS C/O). (L) LAU.NCm 
* CELAY. (0) NO EFFECT. 
.CCiRECTING ACTION: 
* NONE AVAILAELE. 
.R EMARKS/HAZARDS:
 
NO HAZARDS IDENTIFIED.
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-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101060-1
 
SUBSYSTEM _Fwd Reaction Control 	 FIEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Relief Valve 	 FAILURE NODE External ILeakage fverboaLrd 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES NO [ 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?­
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES fl NO I] 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATIO.1 OF YES [*NO0 ] 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO [ 
(EITHER BY COMMltANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTW4ARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES l O 
FAILURE VODE (EITHER BY COMNtANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiIENTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	 AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [] NO 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES E] NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 El "I[-- 2rn 
ACTION AND -HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YES[-NOO-
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND' THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	 IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES WJ*uo [] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES n]*NO [ 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMRY 
1.-- NO H/S ISSUES 3. 03 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. []ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. Co HARDWARE -ACCEPTS RISK -4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
[U-FMEA CHANGE RECOM.ErDED 
EXPLANATION/COMIMENTS: 
1. Leakage of helium will cause a class 2 alarm.
 
Gross leak detection' should occur first.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANtLYS1S - SREITEs 102 
SU!SYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -IU1060-1 tV:0 /"/iZ 
.ASSFMFLY :PRFSSURIZATION ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: 
.P/N RI :MC2 q-0421-0001/-O002 CRIT. h-D : 
•P/N VENDOR:5760009-101,576GOC-1 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF Si 
.•OUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL LO X 00 X 00 X LS 
:ONE REQ'D PER TANK NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINIM, 
AFTER FIRST FAILURLi: 2 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFLCI: 
.PRESSURE DECAY IN PRESS- SYSTEM Vt2P-1115C AND HOURS 
.1116C (TANK ULLAGE) REFERENCE DOCUMESNTSZ 
MJC-70-C CC 1-0 lE 
.GPOUNO TURNAROUND? ............. YES SCY-2-Sm-C-IL$,2-2 
.TEST PORT FOR GROUND CHECKOUT AND BACK CHECK VS70-421U01 
PREPARED BY: APPRDVED 5Y:
 
DES R GONZALEZ DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
*ITEM': VALVE, PRESS. RELIEF ­
* CRCKNG PRESS 315 PSIG, FULL OPEN 340 PSIG, RESEAT 31C P IG (RV 
I11/102).
 
.FUNCTION:
 
RELIEF VALVE PROVIDED TO PREVENT RISE OF TANK AND LINE PRESSURES 10
 
LEVLS WHICH COULD EE DETRIMENTAL TO SUbSYSTEM.
 
.FAILURE MOOE: EXTERNAL LEAK 
* LEAKS OVERBOARD TIHRU EELLOWS & ORIFICE.
 
.C USE (S):
 
GALVANIC CORROSION, IMPROPER INSIALLATION/HANDLING, FATIGuE UR
 
STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEm (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (C)CRaW/VEhICLE:
 
(&FS) SU2ZYSTEM DEGRADATION - HELIUM LEAKS OVERNOARD Al -,A'FE CONTR-LLI-E.
 
6Y ORIFICE. (C&L') NO EFFECT UNLESS LEAK IS EXCESSIVE.
 
.CORRECTING ACTION: 
MONITOR SYSTEM FOR hELIUM LOSS.
 
.REMARKS/HAZAKOS: 
NO HAZARD IDENTIFIED.
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-I01060-2 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Relief Valve FAILURE MODE Burst Disc Ruptures 
1. 	)OES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES NO U 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?
 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES No
 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES DJ NO 0 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR. IMPLEMENTING ALTER;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO W0 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER bY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIE;ITING ALTERNATE
 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE NODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES n NO [o
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES ] NO [x]
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 E5 *1D 2W 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A ]YESS]i,OE 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIONl AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES -*u D 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREII/VEHICLE? 	 YES x*NO 1 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMtIRY 
1 . 0 	 NO H/S ISSUES 3.E] NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. [] 	HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHA:" hS BELOW 
f--Flight Detectability 
FEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/CO;NMEITS: 
1. May see discrete drop in RCS quantity. V42Pl115C, l1l6C will give class 2 caution 
and warning alarm. 
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFLCTS ANALYSIS - ORBIThR ICZ
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO C3-2F -101060-2 REV:G1/Oi/7, 
.ASS .icLY :PRES SuRIZATION AbORT: C:,IT. FUNC: 
.P/N RI :MCZ84-0421-0001/-0002 (2II. HwD: 3 
.'/N VENDOR:5760c09-1OI,57oO010-I02 MISSIONS: 11F VF X FE uF Si 
.OUANTITY : PHASE(S): PL X LO X OL, X 00 X, LS 
:ONE REQ'D PER TANK NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAiNING 
AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 2 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-PASS C-PASs 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. NO TIME TO EFFIC1: 
IMMEDIATE 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: 
MJC'70-COC 1-01 L 
.'3RGUND TURNAROUND? ............. NO 	 SD?2SH-0iO3-2
 
VS7O-'2 1001
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED FY: 
DES R GONZALEZ DES 
REL R DIEHL RE L 
.ITEM: VALVE, PRESS. RELIEF -
CRCKNG PRESS 315 PSIG, FULL OPEN 340 PSIG, RESEAT 21C PSIG (RV 
1C1/102). 
.FUNCTION:
 
RELIEF VALVE PROVIDED TO PREVENT RISE OF TANK AND LINE P.ESSURES Fu 
LEV LS WHICH COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO SUBSYSTEM.
 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
 
* 	 BURST DISC RUPTURES.
 
•CAU 'S(S) 
R*GULATOR PRESSURE SURGE, INCORRECT PRESSURE SETTING, FATIGUE. &xLCSS 
PRESSURE CYCLING, VIE, M'AT'L DEFECT PROP TEMP RISES. 
.htFECT(S): 	ON (4)SUESYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREW/VHICijz? 
(A,3) LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (LEAKAGE OR OPEN MODE)(m.AN P.PPT PfKUVIEsA 
REDUNDANCY). (C,D) NO EFFECT. 
.CCRRECTING ACTION: 
MONITOR SYSTEM FOR POTENTIAL HELIUM LOSS OR PROP, TANK PRESSUR-
DECREASE. REPLACE VALVE AFTER LANDING. 
.zREMARKS/HAZARDS: 
NO HAZARDS IDENTIFIED. 
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*HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-1 01060-3 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-OOI6A 
ITEM Relief Valve 	 FAILURE NODE Fail,; n Rjzrd­
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOIIATICALLY YES NO C 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
Ia. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE AISWERS TO GUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES -. 10 U 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES NO W 
(EITHER BY COMItIANDItIG HARDUARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES LI NO [ 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiENTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAMI LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES NO 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? . 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES uO E-I 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [ *iE] 2E-
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHARGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YES[UNO] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIO3 AMD THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTIOrf? 
8. 	IF THE ANSUER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES U*NO U 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES (fI*NO El 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SE-E BELOW)
. .- . . . - . - - - - .- -. ------ - - . . . -..--- - -- ­-. -. ..-- - 	 -- - - - --

CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMKARY 	 .
 
1.D NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.*Q NO SOFTWARE DETECTION S. D]ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW
 
2.[ HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6.0 RECO14ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
D-IFMEA CHANGE RECOrIMEN"DED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Over pressurization will cause class 2 alarm; >312 psi. (GAX) 
V42PI115C, 1116C. 
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SHUTTLE FAILURE M'ODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -10106-3 SEV:OI/C4/7, 
.AtSSEMSLY :PKESSURIZAI1ION ABORT: CIT. FUNC: 
.P/N RI :MC 28 4-0421-0301/-C.G02 CkIf. ,Mu: 
.P/N VENDOR:576009-1O1,5760010-102 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF $P'M 
.fUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL LO X,00 X &D X LS 
:UNE REQ'D PER TANK 	 NUMBER OF SUCCESS PAThS R-,AAINING
 
AFTER FIRST FAILUKE:
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A
 
:FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TImE TO EFFECT:
 
.
0 RESSURE RISE IN HELIUM SYSTEM V42P-1115C AND SECONCS
 
.1i11C (TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE) REFERENC OCCbMNTS:
 
MJ070-CCCI-u1E
 
:G.OUND TUPNAROUND?..............YES SD72-Sh 10-:-,
 
.TURNAROUND rEST PORI PROVIDED VS70- 210O01
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY-
DES R GONZALEZ DES 
REL R DIEHL REL 
.ITEM VALVE, PRESS. RELIEF 	 -
CRCKNG PRESS 315 PSIG, FULL OPEN 34(0 PSIG, RESEAT 310 PSIG (kV
 
il/102).
 
*FUNCTION: 
RELIEF VALVE PROVIOED TO PREVENT RISE OF TANK AND LINE PRESSURE'z 10 
LEVELS WHICH COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO SUESYSTEM. 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BURST
 
* OR bURSTS AT A HIGHER THAN NOMINAL PRESSURE.
 
.CAUSE(S):
 
IMPRO.PER INSTALLATION OR HANDLING ;AMAGE THAT CAUSLS DISC 10 STiC., 
PIECE PART FAILURE, PRESSURE BUILD UP ON REVERSE SlID. 
.EFF-CT(S): ON (A)SUESYSTEM S&)INrTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREw/VEhICLt: 
(A) NO EFFECT UNLESS MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCUR. (B) DEGRADATION Of 
* NT&RFACE- SUBSYSTEM. PROP TANK ULLAGE PRESSURL MAN INCRE&Sc AUVc 
WORKING PRESSURE LIMITS. (C,D) NONE SEE (A) A3OVL. 
.CCfRRECTING 	 ACTION: 
CLOSE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES, HOWEVER RELIEF CCULD BE CLM'PLETED bY 
FIRING THRUSTERS.
 
.REYARKS/HAZARDS: 
NO PAZARDS, UNIT IS STANDBY - BACKUP FOR REGULATOR FAILURES. NO 
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. 
OF 	 POOR 
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.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101060-4 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control 	 FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-O016A 
ITEM Relief Valve 	 FAILURE MODE flpn I nw 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES ] NO 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES fl NO LI 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS T6 OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEAIEVALUATION OF YES fl *NO n 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO M 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES fl NO W]
FAILURE rODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIE;iTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [ NO WX 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COIBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES El NO M-
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *1- 2[0 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FiMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A flYES :NOf 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES [J*NO 5 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES rf*NO 5j 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) . 
CHANGE/RETENTION PATIOONALE SUMMARY 
1.0l NO H/S ISSUES - 3. INO SOFTWARE DETECTION .5. [ ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELC 
2.[D HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK -4.l DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOV 
In-Fl ight Detectability 
E]FMEA CHANGE RECOM-1MENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Leakage of helium will cause an oxidizer/fuel imbalance of 12.6 percent. May get a 
gross leak detection alarm. 
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBITER IOL 
SI'I-SYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO Q3-2F -101060-4 REV:§I/C4/l', 
• kSSEBLY :PRESSURI ZATION ABORT: CRI. FUNL. 
.P/N RI -,CZSA-O4+l-CCOi-OCG2 C IT. Iw: 
.P/N VENOOR:5760C9-101,5760I-I2 MISSIONS: hF VF X Fu. OF 
.iUtNTIfY :2 PHASE(S): PL LU X O0 X DO X LS 
:ONE REQ'D PER TANK NUMBER CF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING 
AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 2 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A- E- C­
:AILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. NO lIME TO EFF3CT: 
.tnLESS EXCESSIVE PRESSUR E DROP IS EVIDENT IN SECONES TO DAYS 
STAN KA ,E REFERENCE DUCLMcNTS: MJ070--001-C 15 
.GROUND TURNARCUND? ............. NO SD72-SH-O 0-Z
 
.SA".E AS FLIGHT VS70-4201i
 
PREPARED BY: APFROVED 6Y:
 
DES R GONZALEZ DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
ITEM: VALVE, PRESS. RELIEF -
CRCKNG PRESS 315 PSIG, FULL OPEN $40 PSIG, RESEAT ?iC PSIG (RV 
iI/102).
 
FUNCTION: 
RELIEF VALVE PROVIDED TO PREVENI RISE OF TANK ANLO LINE PRESSURES TO 
LEVELS WHICH COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO S~dSYSTEM. 
.FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRATIC OFERA- (F) 
STION, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, OPEN BELOW NOMINAL CRAC.&ING PRESSuJRt. 
:CAUSE (S ) 
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTUR'AL 
FAILURE OF POPPET. 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION tD)CRLW/VEHICLC­
(A) LOSS OF HELIUM OR PNOPELLANT VAPORS OVERBOARX. (B) INAEiLIIY Ib 
P kESSURIZE PROPELLANT TANKS IF LEAK IS EXCESSIVE. (C) POTENTIAL 
ABORT IF EARLY IN MISSION, WOULD REQUIRE PRIUR FAILURE (BURST ISC 
OpEN). (0) NONE.
 
.CCRfECTING ACTION:
 
* NONE. 
SN EARKS/HAZ AR0lS: 
W*(UL9 REQUIRE aURST DISC FAILURE bEFORE LEAKS OVERBOARO. NO ' cjLONUANLY 
PROVIDEC. 
Q)RIGINAL PAGE ISOF rO0R QUALITY 
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HARDWAREiSOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101060-5 
SUBSYSTEM - Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NU.1BER SD75-SH-1OO6A 
ITEM Relief Valve 	 FAILURE ,'ODE Fails to Open 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFT'WARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES E] NO E) 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
Ta. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE-HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMIATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES fl NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO CUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATIOI OF YES ] *N0 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO nx 
(EITHER BY CO;:IANDIUG HARDWARE ACTION OR WI.IPLEM°ENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES [] NO [ 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMoMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR II'fPLEIIE;ITING ALTERATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES fl NO WFAILURE?AOTHERINDUCE 
THIS o 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
5. 	CAN FAILURE MODE,, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES D NOE 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *1E] 2EX 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FM1EA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE. ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A DYESE]OU] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	 IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
OCCURRENCE? 	 E*flOA. 	 CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER YES N 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES r]*NO Li 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETEN4TION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.l NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. Q NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. CACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. [] HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.M-DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECO11MENDED CHANGES BELOW 
fIFMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/CO.MENTS: 
1. Over pressurization will cause a class 2 alarm, V42P1115C, 1116C. 
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - OkfITEk 102 
SUSSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FME4 NO C3-2F -131*'bt-3 EV://7ART: 	 FRC:.ASSE%'i3LY :PRESESURIL7kION 	 'OIT. 
.P/N I : MC 284-C421-0O d1/-0302 	 C-,IT. H4LA 
=

.P/N VENDOR:5760009-11,573O0l0-102 MISSIONS: H VF A FE u4 SX 
.QUA"TITy :2 	 PHASE(S): PL X LU X CC X CO X LS
 
:ONE REQ'D PER TANK 	 NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS RENAUN1NG
 
AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 0
 
REDUNDARCY SCREEN: A- p- C­
:FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT:
 
.TANK PRtSSURE MUITOR V42P-I16CIII5C,12ICC, SECONDS TO DAYS
 
.132CC 	 REFERENCa_ DOCUMNTS: 
NWJC70-C00 li-U 
.GOUND TURNIAROUND?............YES SD72-SH-1G13-2 
.SAM& AS FLICHT VS70-421001 
PREPARED BY: APPR'VED BY:
 
DES R GONZALEZ 
 DES
 
REL 	 R DIEHL REL 
.ITEI: VALVE, PRESS. RELIEF-
CRCKNG PRESS 315 PSIG, FULL OPEN 340 PSIC, RESEAT --1( PSI (RV 
11C1/132). 
.UNCTION: 
RELIEF VALVE PROVIDED TO PREVENT RISE OF TANK AND LINE PFzSSURES T' 
LEVELS WHICH COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO SUBSYSTE:. 
.F4ILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN1 - (F) 
* AT NOMINAL CRACKING PKhSSURE 
.C .USE(S):
 
CLN'TAMNINA1ION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, POPPET GALLIh. 
.*FFCT(S):ON (A)SUESYSTEM (E)INTERFACES (C)MISSXON (U)CR'-_W/vrL1L.:
 
(A) LOSS OF RELIEF PATH. 	 (B5,) NONE. (C) POfENlIAL M,.iSSION LOSS
 
(ABORT DECISION) IF EARLY IN MISSION WOULD REQUIRE 2 P,1Ore FAILU-S.
 
.CE RECTING ACTION:
 
FIPE ALL THRUSTERS NON-PROPULSIVELY.
 
•*" MpgK/HAjARDS :
 
POTENFIAL TANK RUITURE ON 3RD ORGER FAILURE NO OTHER RELIEF PAIi i-GR 
SYSTEM. 
o4 Poop 
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-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-I 01070-1 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FNEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM __ Ell 1. Oukic Disconnect. HeI ium FAILURE MODE Failq Open, Cap Ieaks 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES [ NO fl 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION I[NRESPONSE)?. 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES fl NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? - ­
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATION OF YES E] -NO E5 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO F1 
(EITHER BY CONANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO [
FAILURE, 1:ODE (EITHER GY COMNN.ANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIE;ITING ALTERIATE 
PROGRAM1 LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES E] NO Q 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? I . 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES E] NO El 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUITLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [ *l 25-
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A 5YESI NO 0 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND, THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES W*N0 E] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES I]*0 LI 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE. BELOW)
 
.--- - -------------------------- - - --- - ----- - - - ---- - --

CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMPARY 
1.-- NO H/S ISSUES 3.E NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6.- RECO ,%'ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
In-flight detectability 
M]FMEA CHANGE RECOMUENDED 
- - ----------- - - - - -- - - -- ---------- ---- - - -- --------- - - - --
EXPLANATION/COMLMENTS: 
1 & 2. V42Pll1OC, V42Pl112C, V42P113C and V42P1114C will detect the failure when the
 
pressure, drops t9 500 psi and issue a class 3 caution and warning -lert.
 
Gros's leak indication should occur fi-rst. (12.6% A)
 
6. 	Capped quick'disconnect provides one redundant success path;
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBI FER 102
 
SUbhYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMLA NO 03-2-101070-1 -mEVUI/lt/7c 
.PSSEMELY :PRESSURIATION ABORT: CR11 . FUNC: I 
.P/N RI :MC276-0C17-O4C2/O4C3 CRIT. HaC: I 
.P/N VLNDOR:7572000-0402/C403 MISSIONS: HF VF X EF CF SM 
.QUANTIFY :2 PHASE(S): FL X LO X JO X DC X LS X 
:ONE REO'D PER TANK NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING 
AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 
ReDUNDANCY SCREEN: t-N/A C-N/A C-N/A 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. NO 	 TIML TO EFFoCT: 
SECONUS 10 DAYS 
REFERENCt DCCUML-NTS: 
h:J 7G-GCC 1-91lc 
.GPDUNO TURNAROUND?.............YES SY?2-Sr-OiG$-2 
.VISUAL INSPECTION PRIUR TO LAUNCH 	 VS7-42i001
 
PREPARED BY: APPKOVED 6Y: 
DES C SCARLEFT DES --------
RSL R DIEHL REL 
.ITEM: DISCONNECT, QUICK FILL
 
* ELIUM WITH SPRING LOADED POPPET AND STRUCTURAL END CAP (4/4"). (ML
 
105/106)
 
.FUNCTION:
 
PROVIOES HELIUM TANK FILL POINT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS AND LUADING
 
SERVICING.
 
.FAILURE MODE: FAlLS OPEN, CAP 	 (S)
 
* 	 LEAKS IN EXCESS OF ACCEPTABLE RATE.
 
.C 	 Us_(S): 
VI6RATIUN, AND LOOSENING OF THE RETAINER NUT, IMPkCPER HANDLI-,,C
 
YECHANICAL SHOCK. 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (6)INTERFACES (C).ISSION 	(D)C&EW/VSH1CLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF REDUNOANCY. (B) NONE. (C) POTENTIAL L4UNCH UtLAY
 
(MISSION LOSS) IF DETECTED. (0) POSSIBLE LOSS OF C"=W/Vt-hICL- IF
 
FAILURE OCCURS PRIOR TO ET SEPARATICN.
 
.CORRECTING ACTION: 
REPLACE OR TIGHTtN END CAP ON GROUNO. NONE AVAILBLE 	IN FLIGHT.
 
* 	 EMAR KS/HAZARDS: 
EECAUSE STRUCTURAL CAP IS LOADED OVER THE DISCONNECT, THIS FAILURE MOO 
IS VARY REMOTE IN FLIGHT. 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -101070-1 REV:12/O8/78
 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CRIT. FUNG: 1
 
.P/N RI :MC276-0C17-0402/0403 CRIT. HOW : I
 
.P/N VENDOR:75372000-0402/0403 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF Sm
 
.QUANTITY 	 :2 PHASE(S): PL X LO X O X 0O X LS X
 
:ONE REQ'D PER TANK
 
REDUNDANCY 	SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A
 
.PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY:. APPROVfD BYt/tNASAJ±. 
.DES C SCARLETT DES Y .g.J ffk SSM 
.REL R DIEHL REL 4.T G 
', ROVED WITH CHANGES 
See Section 13.
.ITEM: DISCONNECT, QUICK FILL 
* 	 HELIUM WITH SPRING LOADED POPPET AND STRUCTURAL END CAP (1/4-f. (MD 
105/106) 
.FUNCT ION: 
* 	 PROVIDES HELIUM TANK FILL POINT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS AND LOADING
 
SERVICING.
 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, CAP IS) 
. LEAKS IN EXCESS OF ACCEPTABLE RATE. 
.CAUSE(S ): 
VIBRATION, AND LOOSENING OF THE RETAINER NUT, IMPROPER HANDLING, 
MECHANICAL SHOCK. 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES IC)MISSION (DCREh/VEHICLE: 
(A) LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. (B) NONE. (C) POTENTIAL LAUNCH DELAY
 
(MISSION LCSS) IF DETECTED. (D) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW-/VEHICLE IF
 
FAILURE OCCURS PRIOR TO ET SEPARATION.
 
-DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C'INSPECT'ION (0'FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(A) CAP SEAL DESIGN DETEPHINED TO BE ADEQUATE TO PRECLUDE LEAKAGE. 
DESIGN FACTOR OF SAFETY IS 2.0 X 4000 PSIG MAX WORKING PRESSURE. CAP 
PLUS COUPLING CONSTITUTES DUAL SEALING. ALL RETAINER NUTS ARE PROPERLY 
TORQUED TO PRECLUDE LOOSENING. (B) SEALS ARE EXPOSED TO OVER 600 CYCLES 
DURING DEVELOPMENT- COUPLINGS ARE SUBJECTED TO 600 OPERATIONAL CYCLES 
IN QUAL TEST. ALL CAPS AND COUPLING LEAK TESTED FOR 3 MIN. AT PRESSURES
 
UP TO 1.25 MAX WORKING PRESSURE DURING ACCEPTANCE TEST. TURNAROUND LEAK
 
CHECKS PERFORMED BEFORE EACH FLIGHT. RANDOM VIBRATION PERFORMED DURING
 
QUAL PROGRAMO 68 MINUTES IN TWO AXES AT ANTICIPATED MISSION LEVELS.
 
(C) TURNAROUND INSPECTION INCLUDES VISUAL INSPECTION ALL COUPLINGS THAT 
HAVE BEEN USED DURING TURNAROUND FOR DAMAGE PLUS INSPECTING FOR LEAKS
 
DURING LEAK CHECKS. ALSO, PROPER BLEED SCREW TORQUE IS VERIFIED PRIOR
 
TO REINSTALLATION OF ANY CAPS THAT HAVE BEEN REMOVED. SUPPLIER AUDIT
 
CONDUCTED 4-5-T7 VERIFIED THAT SUPPLIER INSPECTION CONTROLS RAW MATERIAL
 
PARTS IDENTIFICATION, MFG PROCESSES, CONTAMINATION CONTROL, AND STORAGE
 
ENVIRONMENTS. (D) NEW DESIGN FOR SHUTTLE APPLICATION. NO FLIGHT
 
FAILURE HISTORY
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: 0.2 	 SD75-SB-0003 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-l 01070-2
 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FNEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Quick Fill Disconnect, He. FAILURE MODE Fails Closed/Ground OPS 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES NO [j 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES [ NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES ]*NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [ NO Q
(EITHER BY COM1tANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO LI 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR ImPLEiIE;1TING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE ,ARDWARE OR *YES D HO []
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT .*YES ED m -] 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 ED *i[J 2-1 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTIWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YES[]i;OE] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE AISWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES: 
A. 	CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES UJrNO F1 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREN/VEHICLE? 	 YES -]*;O -] 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARi 
1.-- NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. EACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. F DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. E0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELO'. 
r- FMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. 	Out of Scope. Ground operations only.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - OROITE 1C2
 
SUsSYSTEM :FWS - REACIION CONTROL FNEA NO 03-2F -101070-2 mtV: C1.".,,/7. 
.SSEILY ; PRES SURIZA TION AbORT. CPIT. FuNC: 
.P/N RI :MC276-CO17-04f.2/0403 CR IT. HW- : 
.PIN VENOR:75372000-0402/0403 MISSIONS: HF VF X -F UF SM 
.,UANvTITY 2 	 PHASE(S): PL X LU S 0i Lb 
:ONE REQ'D PER TANK NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATr!S REMAiNING 
* 	 AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 0 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A L-N/A C-N/A 
.PAI,,LURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. N/A TIME TO FEFF-_CT. 
IM"MED IATE 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: 
MJU7-COQI,-2 lB
 
O TURNAKOUND?.............YES SD72-SH,-C103-2 
.G$S FILL RATE AND HELIUM PRESSURE VS70-421001 
PREPARED EY: 	 APPROVED !Y:
 
Des C SCARfLETT 	 DES 
REL 	 R DIEHL REL
 
.I1E., DISCONNECT, QUICK FILL 
HELIUM WITH SPRING LOADED POPPET AND STRUCTURAL LND CAP (1/4"). 1 Lu 
i05/1 06) 
.FUNCTION: 
PROVIDES HELIUM TANK FILL POINT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS AND LOADING 
SERVICING. 
.FATLURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW - (F) 
.	 FAILS CLOSED OURING GROUND FILL OPERATIONS
 
.*C 	USE(S):
VIBRATICN/IMPROPER HANDLING WHICH CAUSES FILIER/POPPT CA,iAb IN 
DISCONNECT.
 
.EFFECT(S): UN (A)SUBSYSTEM (2)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (0)CREw/VEHIOLt.
 
(A) LOSS OF OR REDUCED rELIUM FILL CAPABILITY. (B) NaJONL. (C) LAUNLn
 
* DELAY. (D) NONE.
 
*CVRRECTING ACIION:
 
* 	REMOVE/REPLACE FILL VALVE OR ATTEMPT TO RECOUPLE.
 
.R EMARKS/HAZAROS-
NONE. NO REDUNOANCY PROVIDED FOR THIS ITEM IN THIS MUDE.
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101080-1
 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA 'UMBER S075-SH-OO16A 
ITEM Purge Quick Disconnect, Propellant FAILURE MODE External Leakage Duhinq Flight 
1. 	 DOES- THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES 110 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORNATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTwARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FNEA EVALUATION OF YES , *NO [ 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO ff­(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR ThE SOFTWARE TO COMPEiSATE FOR THIS *YES [] NO1 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIE;TING ALTERNATE
 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	 AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE NODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [ NO 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO [] 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *1- 2D 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHARGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTIO, IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A nYESr-,OE 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES L*1O 0 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES Ei*w1O f-I 
*EXPLANATIO:N REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETE;ITIOi PARTIONALE SUMI-;ARY 
Il E] NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. F- NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 5 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. ] DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW, 
FWFMEA CHANGE RECOM ENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMEnTS: 
1. Per backup flight system program requirements document MG038103, once a pre-set delta
between the propellant quantities is reached a class 2 caution and warning light and tone
 
will be annunciated. Also primary flight control requirements FSSR 0026A except OPS 1,6.
 
2. 	The above statement indicates in-flight detection.
 
6. 	Capped quick disconnect provides one redundant success path.
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I 
SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - UR6iTER 1C-
SUEYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -lulGbc-1 *EV:12/UL/t 
.ASSEMELY :PRESSURIZATICN ABORT: CGRIT. FUNC: 
.P/.N RI :MC276-0018 GRIT. h.w: 
.2/N VENDOR:7t3O00GC MISSIONS: HF VF x FF CF Sm 
.QCUANTITY :14 PHASE(S): PL LO X CO , ED X LS 
:TWO INLETS AND FIVE NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINIrsG 
:OUTLETS FOR EACH PROP AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/,t 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. NO TIME TO EFFECT: 
SECONCS IU UAYS 
REFERENCL DOCUM'SNTS: 
,v.JC70-CC 1-QIL 
. R .' TURNAROUND?..............Y2S.,72-SH""-2--­
*VlSUAL INSPECTIcN VS7O-421ubl 
PREPARED BY: ,PPROVED 6Y: 
DES C SCARLETT DES 
REL R DIEHL REL 
*ITEM: DISCGNNECT, QC(, PURGE, Jv
 
VENT, PROPELLANT WITH STRUCTURAL END C4P AND SPRING LOAC'D POPPET
 
* F UNCTION: 
TO ALLOW GROUND PURGE OF PROPELLANT TANKS AND ASSOC1IT3D
 
MANIFCLDS/LINES/T-RUS FJRS AFTER LANDING F PROPELLANT TANKS FILL, UXAIN 
£ VENT 
- *FAILURE MCOE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (S) 
• DURING FLIGHT
 
.CAUSE(S):
 
VIBRATION AND LOOSENING OF THE RETAINER NUT, STRUCTURAL FAILUaL, PIECE
 
DART FAILURE MECHANICAL SHOCK, IMPROPER GR&JND HANDLING.
 
*EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUbSYSTEM (b)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (W)CRK-w/VEHICLt.
 
(A) LOSS OF PROPELLANT FIRST OROER FAILURE FOR LOOSE RETAINSR N4UT. (L) 
POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION IF FUEL REACTS WITH COMPLEMENTARY UXIuIZEK (OK 
EXTREME HEAT LURING RE-ENTRY).(C) POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSIO\ LUE TO FLUIL 
SLPARATION. (D) POSSIbLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FAILURE OCCURS P\,IUR 
TO ET SEPARATION.
 
.CORRECTING ACTION:
 
NCNE AVLILASLE - IN FORWARD 'MIDULE, CRITICALITY IS LESS SEV5RE iF AFT
 
MODULES OPERATIVE 
.,'VEMARKS/HAZAR DS :
 
POTENTIAL CORROSION OF SURROUNDING COMPONENTS. STRUCTURAL CAP
 
CO\!SIDERED AS STRUCTURE. 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -101080-1 REV: 12/08/ 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: 1 
.P/N RI :M C276-O018 CRIT. HOW: I 
.P/N VENDOR:76306000 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM 
.QUANTITY :L4 PHASE(S): PL LO X 00 X 0O X LS 
:TWO INLETS AND FIVE
 
:OUTLETS FOR EACH PROP 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/t 
APPROVfD BYI(NAS5J}UJI:PREPARED BY: APPROVED BAY* , ., 

.DE C DES "/Z'/Ic 55 .
SCARLETT -­
. REL R DIEHL REL .... /; 
.RELRE
 
AQ AIED WITH CHANGES 
See Section 13.0
.ITM: OISCONNECTt QCK, PURGE, 
VENT, PROPELLANT WITH STRUCTURAL END CAP AND SPRING LOADED POPPET 
(1/2")3. (MO liT,118,123,124,127137438,147T,161,162,163,164). 
. FUNCTION: 
TO ALLOC GROUND PURGE OF PROPELLANT TANKS ANC ASSOCIATED 
IANIFOLDS/LINES/THRUSTERS AFTER LANDING & PROPELLANT TANKS FILL, DRAIN 
S VENT 
.FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (S)
 
DURING FLIGHT 
.CAUSE(S):
 
VIBRATION AND LOOSENING OF THE RETAINER NUT, STRUCTURAL F&ILURE, PIECE
 
PART FAILURE M4ECHANICAL SHOCK, IMPROPER GRCUND HANDLING. 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSICN (D)CPE',/VEHICLE:

(A) LOSS OF PROPELLANT FIRST ORDER FAILURE FCR LOOSE RETAINER NUT. (B) 
POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION IF FUEL REACTS WITH COMPLEMENTARY OXIDIZER (OR 
EXTREME HEAT DURING RE-ENTRY).(C) POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO FLUID 
SEPARATION. (0) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FAILURE OCCURS PRIOR
 
TO ET SEPARATION.
 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(A) CAP SEAL DESIGN DETERMINED TO BE ADEQUATE TO PRECLUDE LEAKAGE. 
DESIGN FACTOR OF SAFETY IS 3.0 X 710 PSIG M4AX WORKING PRESSUREO CAP 
PLUS COUPLING CONSTITUTES DUAL SEALING. ALL RETAINER NUTS ARE PROPEPLY 
TORGUED TO PRECLUDE LOOSENING- (B) SEALS ARE EXPOSED TO OVER 500 CYCLES
 
DURING DEVELOPMENT. COUPLINGS ARE SUBJECTED TO 600 OPERATIONAL CYCLES
 
IN QUAL TEST. ALL CAPS AND COUPLINGS LEAK TESTED FOR 3 MINUTES AT 
PRESSURES UP TO MAX WORKING PRESSURE DURING ACCEPTANCE TEST.
 
TURNAROUND LEAK CHECKS PERFORMED BEFORE EACH FLIGHT. RANDOM VIBRATION
 
PERFORMED DURING QUAL PROGRAM. 68 MINUTES IN TWO AXES AT ANTICIPATED
 
MISSION LEVELS- (C) TURNAROUND INSPECTION INCLUDES VISUAL INSPECTING
 
ALL COUPLINGS USED DURING TURNARCUND FOR DAMHAGE PLUS INSPECTING FOP, 
LEAKS DURING LEAK CHECKS. ALSO, PROPER BLEED SCREW TORQUE IS VERIFIED 
PRIOR TO REINSTALLATION OF ANY CAPS THAT HAVE BEEN REMOVED. SUPPLIER 
AUDIT CONDUCTED 4-5-77 VERIFIED THAT SUPPLIER INSPECTION CONTROLS RA. 
MATERIAL PARTS IOENTIFICATION, MFG PROCESSES, CONTAMINATION CONTROLt AND 
STORAGE ENVIRONMENTS. (D) NEW DESIGN FOR SHUTTLE APPLICATION NO
 
FLIGHT FAILURE HISTORY.-

ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY -a.3 
49 SD75-SHI-0003 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101080-2 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-O01 6A 
ITEM Purge Quick Disconnect, Propellant FAILURE MODE Fails Closed/Ground Ops. 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES ] NO 0 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES ] mO 2 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES ] *NO [ 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;.ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO El 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEHENTING ALTERNIATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A-RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES ED nO 0 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES [ NO L 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 *I1] 20)

ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A ]YES-,OE 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIOff AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES E]* O [ 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES [0*NO E 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARI 
1.0 NO H/S ISSUES 3.Fl1 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. [ ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.0-] HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.0 DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. - RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
FIIEA CHANGE RECOHME;;DED 
EXPLANATIOM/COMIMENTS: 
1. 	Out of scope/ground operations only.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MOCE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBITER 102
 
SUSBYSTEM :FWD - REACTICN CONTROL FMEA NO 03-ZF -1010c0-2 RLV:,JD/Cb/-; 
.ASSEMULY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CIT. FUNL: 
.P/N RI :hC276-0018 CRIT. hqDt: : 
.P/N VENDOR:76O6O00 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF CF SM 
.LUANTITY :14 PHASE(S): PL X LO OS DO LS 
:TWO INLEIS AND FIVE NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAIJING 
:OUTLETS FOR EACH PROP AFTER FIRST FAILURE: I 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A E-N/A C-.N/A 
.FA1LUPE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. N/A 	 TIME TO EFFECT: 
I MNEU IA T E 
REFERENCE CUCUM5NTS : 
MJ07L)OCi-GiE 
.GPOUND TURNAROUND?......... YES D72-SH-OC­
.GSE ECUIPME,T FLOW RATE AND TANK OUTPUT VSTOC-42±OC1 
.PRESSURE VA2F-1-10OC, 1310C 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: 
DES C SCARLETT DLS 
REL k DIEHL REL 
:ITEM: DISCONiJECT, QCK, PURGE, 
VENT, PROPELLANT WITH STRUCTURAL ENE CAP AND SPRINt LOADED PO)PptT
i1/2"). (MD 1ITh11,13,14,127,IBT,13&,47,,16tl ,)6,itA). 
.FUNCTION: 
TO ALLOW GROUND PURGE OF PROPELLANT TANKS AND ASSOCIATEDMANLFLL/LINES/JISRUSTERS AFTER LANDING G PROPELLANT 	 TANKS FILL, URAIN 
C VENT 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (F) 
* DURING GROUND OPERATIONS 
.C 1,21SF (SI: 
CUINTAMINATiON PIECE PAR1 SIRUCTURAL FAILuRE, MECHANICAL SHOCK. 
.EFFECT): ON (A)SUESYSTEM (E)INTLRFACES (C)MISSION (U)CRW/VEHIOL: 
(A) LOSS OF PURGE FUNCTION. (B) NO EFFeCT. (C) POTENTAL LAUNCH 
* DELAY. (D) NONE.
 
.COR, RECTING ACTION
 
. ATTEMPT TO REMOVE 6LOCKAGE (BACK-FLOW) OR REMOVE COUPLING AND REPLAC­
.P EMARKS/HAZARDS:
 
NONE. NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR TmIS ITEM.
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101090-1 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER 
ITEM 	Test Quick Disconnect, Propellant FAILURE MODE Ext. Leakage/Flight 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES E] NO f 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES El NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FNEA EVALUATIO11 OF YES E*NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES NO ] 
(EITHER BY CONHANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR ThE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES l NO n]
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDIRG HARDARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIE;ITING ALTERNATE
 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE hARDWARE OR *YES [] NO nX 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT Nl.*YES O 
OTHER FUICTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (COuSIDER CREW *0 El *I1 2E] 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHARGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A n-]YES[i!OE] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION| AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANS4ER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES VI*11O -n 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES E]*NO F-I 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
2.F-R 	HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. 1- DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. E RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW1 
FLIFNEA CHANGE RECOMNENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMME ITS:
 
1 & 2. V42PlllOC, V42PI1l2C and V42PI113C will detect the failure and issue class 3 alarm
 
(system management blue light on crew-cockpit glare shield) at <500 psia.
 
Gross leak indication is quicker (class 2).
 
6. 	Capped quick disconnect provides one redundant success path.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBITER 1C2
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWO - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -101090-1 RCV:i±/OV/71 
.ASSEM5LY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CRI. FUNC: 1i 
.P/N RI :ME27 6-0032 CRIT. HwL: 3 
.P/N V&NDOR:RR42670-5&7,R642500-1&3 MISSIONS: HP vF X FF OF Siv 
.OL-A'NTITY :14 PHASE(S): FL LO X O0 A DO X LS 
:SEVEN REL'O FOR EACH NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING 
:PROPELLANT AFTER FIRST FAILURE: I 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN : A-PASS b-FAIL C-PAS­
.FAILURE DEfcCTAELE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIMlE FO z$FLCT: 
.HELIUM TANK PRESSURE V42P-ltlOC,1112C,11I3C SECONDS Id OAYS 
.1 lleC 	 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:
 
* 	 MJC7O-O"O1!-C1B
 
.;POUNO 	TURNAROUND? ............. N/A SD72-SH-,103-2
 
VS70-4210C01
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY:
 
LIE S C SCARLETT DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
.IlEM: DISCONNECT, OUICK, TEST
 
'
 P1. (1/41 ) WITH SPRING LOADED POPPET AND STRUCTU.RAL CAP. (mO IUI,102,
 
103,104,1GY,iC8 ,1O9,11O,111,1i2,11$,114,177 E 173).
 
. FUNCTION: 
TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO THE HELIUM SUPPLY SYSTEM AT VARIOUS POINTS IN Thc 
SYSTEM: (I) RELIEF VALVES/BURST DISCS (2) REGULATORS (3) Cr.ECV, VALVES. 
PRfVIDES FOR C/O OF PRESSURIZATION SUB-SYS COMPON:ENTS. CJMPUNt-NT 
INPUTS E OUTPUrTS ARE ACCESSABLE AT HE SERVICE PANEL. 
.FAILUk MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 	 (S)
 
* DURING FLIGHT
 
.CAUSE(S):
 
VIBPATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE (POPPET, SEAL), NftCHANILAL
 
SHOCK.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYS'TEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSIO. 	(D)CRLW/VEHICLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURANT. (SECOND ORDER FAILUKR). (5) LUSS OF 
PROPELLANT FEED CAPABILITY. (C) POTENTIAL LOSS GF MISSIUN oUE Tu 
FLUID LOSS. (D) NONE. (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALIlY EFFtCTS - POT-NIIAL 
LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IF THE LOSS 
OCCURRED BEFORE ET SEPARATION. 
.CORRECTING ACTION:
 
* UTILIZE AFT MCDULES TO ORIENT VEHICLE FOR ENTRY AN COMPLETE A3CR1.
 
.R EMAS KS/H AZAR DS :
 
NONE.
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3 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
FHEA NO 03-2F -LO1090-1 REV:11IO9/SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL 
CRIT. FUNC: I.
ABORT: 

CRIT. HO: 

.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION 

.P/N RI :ME276-0032 

MISSIONS: HF VF X F F OF SM

.P/N VENDOR:RR4267O-5&7t,R642900-t&3 
.QUANTITY :14 PHASE{S): PL LO X CO X DO X LS 
- :SEVEN REQ'S FOR EACH 
* 	 :PROPELLANT
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: 4-PASS B-FAIL C-P4
 
.PREPARED BY: APPROVED B 	 APPR VED ( 1NSA,
,..ES C SCARLETT DES ssI
 
.REL R DIEHL REL R
 
S? 	RbVED WITH CHANGES
 
See 	 Section 13.0 
.ITEM: DISCONNECT, QUICK, TEST 

PT. (1/4") WITH SPRING LOADED POPPET AND STRUCTURAL CAP. (MID 10i,102,
 
103104,1O7, tO8,IO9.I0,111,IiZ,113,114,177 & 178).
 
.FUNCTION:
 
AT VARIOUS P,]ITS IN THE
TO 	PROVIDE ACCESS, TO THE HELIUM SUPPLY SYSTEM 

SYSTEM: (I) RELIEF VALVES/bURST DISCS (Z) REGULATORS (3) CHECK VALVES4 
PROVIDES FOR C/.o OF PRESSURIZATION SUB-SYS CCNIPONEMTS. CC'APONENT 
INPUTS & OUTPUTS ARE ACCESSAGLE AT HE SERVICE PA-:EL. 
.FAILURE MODE* EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 	 (S)
 
DURING FLIGHT 
.CAUSE(S)
 
* 	 VIBRATIONv PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE (POPPET. SEAL), MECHANICAL 
SHOCK.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)W41TERFACES (C}MISSION (DICREW/VEHICLE:
 
* 	 (A) LOSS 3F HELIUM PRESSURANT. (SECOND ORDER FAILURE). (3) LOSS OF
 
PROPELLANT FEED CAPABILITY. (Cl POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
 
FLUID LOSS. (0) NONE. (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS - POTENTIAL
 
LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IF THE LoSS 
OCCURRED BEFORE ET SEPARATION.
 
SDISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN (B)TEST [C).INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTUP>
 
(A) DUAL SEALING SURFACES ON CAP WILL PRECLUDE FAILURE. EACH SEALING 
SURFACE INOEPENDANT OF rHE OTHER DESIGN 9URST PRESSURE IS TWO TIES GPER 
PRESSURE-. (SI EACH COUPLING PROOF TESTED TO AT LEAST 1.5 OPER PRESSURE 
& LEAK TESTED FOR L5 MIN DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING. (C) AUDIT CONDUCTED 
ON IL-3-T6 VERIFIv THAT SUPPLIER INSPECT. INCLUDES VERIFI. OF RAW MAT'L. 
PARTS MFG, IDENTIFICATION, AND PROTECTION, ASSY OPERATIONS, NOE EXAM OF 
WELDS, BRAZES . AND MATSL AND EQUIP 	CONFORMANCE. TURNAROUND INSPECTION
 
INCLUDES VISUALLY INSPECTING ALL COUPLINGS THAT HAVE BEEN USED FOR 
DAtPAGE AND LEAKAGE. ALSO, PRCPER AHC CAP TORQUE IS VERIFIED UPON 
ANY CAPS THAT HAVE BEEN REMOVED. (0) 14 NON-FLIGHTREINSTALLATION OF 

EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURES EXPERIENCED ON LM/SM RCS DUE TO PROCESS
 
DEFICIENCIES. 
5 
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101090-2
 
SUBSYSTEM _Fwd. Reaction Control 	 FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-OOl6A 
ITEM Test Quick Disconhect, Propellant FAILURE NODE Fails Closed/Ground Ops 
FLIGHT DETECT (i.e., 	 tO1. 	 DOES.TTHE SOFTWARE THIS FAILURE MODE AUTOMATICALLY YES [] NO 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?
 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES 0 m 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FHEA EVALUATION OF YES ] *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D No FE­
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR ThE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES [] NO FE 
FAILURE i:ODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIE;ITIG ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES D NO 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
S. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMIBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 EJ *ifJ 2W-
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE. ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A F]YESDNiOE 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. 	 CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES ]*O 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES 0*iO .] 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
-- - - ------------ - - - --EO---------------------­--	 - -- - - .
 
CHANGE/RETENTIO: RATIONALE SUMMARY 
.	 NO H/S ISSUES 3.[D NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. -ACCEPTANCERATIONALE BELOW
 
2.M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. ] RECOIMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
F-IFMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMIMENTS: 
1. 	Out of scope - ground operations only. 
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - OR3I3IR 1',2
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -101090-2 REV:C3/ b/: 
.A SSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CRiT. FUNG: 
.P/N RI :NE276-0032 CRIT. rL'. 
.P/N VENDOR:RR42670-5&7,R64290O-1&3 MISSIONS: -iF VF X FF UF SM 
.0UANTITY :14 PHASE(S): PL X LO CO DO LS 
:SEVEN REa'D FOR EACH NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING
 
:PROPELLANT AFTER FIRST FAILUkE: 

REDUNUANCY SCREEN: A-PASS 9-N/A C-PAS',
 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. N/A TIME TO EFFECT:
 
SECONOS to HOURS 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: 
MJ"70-O I-O1EB 
*(8-OUND TURNAROUND?..............YES D72-SH-u03-2 
.,vU PRESSURE KEAD-OULT V42P-IZiOCIII2C,ili3C, VS70-421i31 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY:
 
UES C SCARLETT DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
.Em,: DISCONNECT, GUICK, TEST 
Pl. (1/4") WITH SPRING LUADED POPPET AND STRUCTURAL CAP. (mD l(L,102, 
1S3,1O4,l7iC8 ,109t1O,11l,112,113,i14,177 & 172 ). 
.FUNCT ION: 
TG PROVIDE ACCESS TO THE HELIUM SUPPLY SYSTEM AT VARIOUS POINIS IA ThE 
SYSTEM: (1) RELIEF VALVES/BURST 5ISCS (2) REGULATOSS (3) CriECK VALvhS. 
PROVIDES FOR C/O OF PRLSSURIZAIION SUB-SYS COMPDNLNTS. COiPONENT 
INPUTS & OUTPUTS ARE ACCESSABLE AT HE SERVICt PANEL. 
.FAILURE MODE.t FAlLS CLOSED (F)
 
OURING TURN-AROUND/GROuND OPERATIONS 
.CAUSE(S)
 
CONTAMINAIlON, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE (POPPEI, SEAL). 
. FFECT(S): ON (A)SUCSYSTEM te)NTERFACES (C)MISSlON (0) CRE,/VErtlLE: 
(A-) LOSS OF TESI/CHECKOUT DATA. (B) INCNEASEC G-RUND EQUIPMENI 
SREOUIREMENTb. (C) POTENTIAL MISSION LAUNCH CELAY. (I) NONE. 
.CVRxECTING ACTION: 
* TEST AT ALTERNATE POINT (IF AVAILABLE) OR REMOV_ AND REPLACE COUPLING. 
.REM ARKS/HAZANDS 
5NONE.. 
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-- -- -- -- -- ------------------------------ - -- -  - ---- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANAL.YSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-101095-1
 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Helium Quad Check Valve FAILURE MODE Fails Open 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES ] NO ID 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?
 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 2 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE AHSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO nx 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES LI NO E 
FAILURE I-ODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiENTING ALTER.IATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE hARDWARE OR *YES []NO []
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES El NO DX 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 El *il 2fW-
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E]YESEr]O 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	 IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES Wl*NO fl 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES rf*O F] 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMRY 
1.[3 NO H/S ISSUES 3. F NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 5 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE -BELOW 
2. [] HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. [ DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. [ RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOWll 
FHFMEA CHANGE RECOMIKEN;DED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. 	Series redundant.
 
6. 	Series redundant.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - CRBIIER 102
 
SUSSYSTEM :FD - REACTION CCNTRUL FMEA NO C3-2F -101095-1 RtV:11/a.v/7t 
.ASSzM5LY :PrESSURIZTION ABuR1: CRIT. FUNC.: 
.P/N Ri :MC 284-0481-C O1/-OO02 CRIT. [HWC': 

.P/N VMNDO:RSC1O5CO-31/-O11 MISSIONS: -F VF X FF OF SM 
.nUANTITY 	:2 PHASE(S): PL LO X O0 x DO X LS
 
:ONE PER HELIUM SUPPLY NUMBER OF SUCCESS PAThS REMAlI.NNG
 
* 	 AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 
REDUNDA."'CY SCREEN: A-N/A s-N/A C-Ni/A
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN PLIGHT?. NO 	 TIME TL- EFFECT:
 
MINUTES
 
REFEREhNCE OCUMENTS:jMJ ('70-0 ,0l-Cl
 
.GROUND TURNAROUND? ............. YES 	 SD72-Sh-G1O?-2
 
.GOUND TEST PORTS 	 'S70-42001
 
PPEPARED BY: 	 APPROVED B': 
DES R SURKHART DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
.ITEM: VALVE,QUAD,CHECKHE 
. (CV 101/102)

* cUNCT ION:
 
TO PRECLUDE PROPELLANT VAPORS FROM MIGRATING TO kEGULAT5?S (FKOM THE
 
PROPELLANT TANK).
 
.FAILJRE MODE: FAILS OPEN 	 (F) 
* OR FAILS TU REMAIN CLCSED (INTERNAL LEAKAGE).
.CAUSE (5):
 
CONTAMINATION, VIRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, McChAN1CAL 
SHOCK, VIBSATION. 
- .-- FECT(S): ON (A)SUSSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (hJCREW/VEdiCLE. 
(A) LOSS OF REDUNDANCY-SERIES VALVE WILL PROT-OT R$,ULATORS FRUM 
VAPORS. (6,C,D) NO EFFECT UNLESS MULTIPLE FAILURtS UCLUN. (t) 
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECT - POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION L!F RLGULATURS 
WITH PROPELLANT VAPORS IF BOTH CrECK VALVES ARE OPEN. 
.CORRECTING ACTION:
 
. NONE AVAILABLE.
 
.R EcM ARKS/HAZ AROS:
 
NO HAZARDS
 
AC1ION OF PRfOPELLANT VAPORS AND CONTAMINATION. 
ORIGINAp± PAQ 9S 
OF POOR QUALITY­
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.HARD'WARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-l01095-2
 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control 	 FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Helium Quad Check Valve 	 FAILURE MODE Fails Closed 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e.. AUTOMATICALLY YES E] NO []
 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IR4RESPONSE)?.
 
Th. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO10
 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES E] *NO 0 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO M 
(EITHER BY COMANDIIG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS x *YES [J NO ] 
FAILURE N-:ODE-(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiE;ITING ALTEPIATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MOOE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES NO
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES [] NO " 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *ir 2LJ 
ACTION AND,HARDWARE/SOFI WARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHAN'GE TO FMEA CRITICALITY.
 
7. 	IF CREW ACTIO71 IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A fYES[INO5]
 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	 IF THE ANS'ER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES -NiI*NO 

B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? . YES fI*NO ] 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATiONALE SUMMARY 
1.0 NO H/S ISSUES- 3.F0 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.[M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK -4.-- DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. D RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
fl-FMEA CHANGE RECOrENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
 
1 & 2. Upon using the thrusters, tank ullage pressure will decay until <200 psi which 
will give a class 2 caution and warning alarm. 
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SHuTTLE FAILURL MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBIIPER ICZ 
SU3SYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -101395-2 XcV.il/O/7: 
. SSEN LY :PRESJRIZA1ION A5ORT. CUIT. FUNC: 1k 
.P/Ni RI :MC264-0481-0O01/-0002 CRIT. FiU: 3
 
.P/N VENDOR:KSGIC500-)OI/-O11 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF Sm
 
.Q UANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL LO X 0 X .)02X LS
 
:ONE PER HELIUM SUPPLY NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS R'zMAiNING 
AFTER FIRST FAILURE: I 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS S-FAIL C-FAII 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. NO TIME TO EFFELL: 
.DLl'S TO SMALL P THE LEAKAGE IS NOT DETEC- MINUTES 
.TASLE REFERL-NCF: DOCUMtPTS: 
'JC7C-Ot:)1-o1 b 
.SROUND TURNAROUND?..............YES SD72-Sh-71-5-2
 
.SAME AS FLIGHT INSTRUMEN TATION VS70-t42£OI1
 
PRE-PARED EY: APPROV&D BY: 
D=S R BURKHART DES 
REL R DIEHL REL 
.lITEM: VALVE,QUAD,CHECKHE 
* (CV 101/102) 
.FUNCTION: 
F3 PRECLUDE PROPELLANT VAPORS FROM MIGRATING TO XEGULATGRS (FROM T1HE
 
PROPELLANT TANK).

*FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (F)
 
* RESTRICTED FLOW. 
*CAUSE (S) : 
PIECE PART STRUCTL AL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ALCELERATIiN.
 
.eFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSILN (O)CRL-./VcHXCLL: 
(* ) LOSS OF REDUNDANCY - PARALLEL PAIH PROVIDES PRESSURA&T FEED. 
(2,C,) NO EFFECT U\ILESS MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCUR. (u) NO t1FF'CI. 
(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICAL EFFECTS - IF FAILURE OCCURS BFUR" ET SEPARATlLN 
,LOSS OF DOWN FIRING THRUSTERS WILL PREVENT ET StPARATION -NO RESULl IN 
LOSS OF CREW/VEH'ICLE. 
CORRECTING ACTIrN:
 
* ,JONE (SLOWDOWN MAY BE USED AFTER SECOND FAILURE). 
.* EMARKS/HAZfRDS:
 
MINI1U1 DELTA CRACKING PRESSURE FOR CRACKING IS NECESSARY REDUIREMt NT
 
TO MINIMIZE SYSTEM PRESSURE DROP TO TANKS.
 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
 
OF POOR QUALITY
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3 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
03-2F -101095-2 REV:I1/Iu/78
SUBSYSTEM :FND - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 
CRIT. FUNC: IR
ABORT: 

CRIT. HOW 

.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION 

.PIN RI :MC284-0481-00011-0002 

.P/N VENDOR:RS010500-00L/-Ol1 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM
 
:2 PHASE(S): PL LO X 00 X DO X LS
.QUANTITY 

* :ONE PER HELIUM SUPPLY
 
8-FAIL C-FAIL
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS 
/// APPRO\EkJ Byl/NASA:APPROVED

.PREPARED BY: 

"° 
.DES R BURKHART DES .aZ-J -..... 
.REL R DIEHL REL C2'-i ...... R>\ & a 
*&POVED WITH CHANGES 
See SectiOn 13.0 
.ITEM: VALVEQUAO,CHECK,HE 

. (CV 101/102)
 
.FUNCTION:
 
TO PRECLUDE PROPELLANT VAPORS FROM MIGRATING TO REGULATIJPS (FROM THE 
PROPELLANT TANK),
 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (F)
 
. RESTRICTED FLOt.
 
.CAUSE(S):
 
. PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, ACCELERATIOI.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (CIMISSION (D)CREW/VEHTCLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF REDUNDANCY - PARALLEL PATH PROVIDES PRESSURANT FEED. 
MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCUR. (D) NC EFFECT0
(B,C,) NO EFFECT UNLESS 

IF FAILURE OCCURS BEFOPE ET SE"&RwTInN
(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICAL EFFECTS ­
,LOSS OF OW;N FIRING THRUSTERS WILL PREVENT ET SEPARATION AND RESULT IN 
LOSS OF CREI/VEHICLE.
 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (CIINSPECTION (D)FAILU?E HISTORY:
 
(A) VALVE SEAT MATERIAL tIILL NOT STICK CAUSING A FAILURE TO CTEN AND 
IS ONLY 5 PSI. (B) CHECK VALVE TOSPECIFIED MAXIMUM CRACKING PRESSURE 
BE CERTIFIED FOR 100,000 CYCLES WITHOUT CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE 
(PARALLEL -CHARACTERISTICSIALSOP WILL CHECK OUT EACH VALVE ELEMENT 
SERIES) AFTER EACH FLIGHT. VALVE SUBJECTED TO 48 MAIN OF 10.6 GRMS 
(C) AN AUCIT CONDUCTEORANDOM VIBRATION PER AXIS DURING QUAL PROGRAM. 

CETIFICATIOq
ON I-6-78 INDICATED THAT SUPPLIER QC VERIFIED RAW M&T'L. 
TO SATISFY SHUTTLE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS, VERIFIED PROTECTION OF DETAIL 
PARTS FROM DAMAGE DURING MFG AND TEST, IN-PROCESS INSPECTION VERIFIED 
MFG TRAVELER SEOUENCES. TURNAROUND INSPECTIQN TO INCLUDE MONITORING
 
(D NO FAILURE
FUNCTIONAL TESTS TO VERIFY FLOW AND CHECK FOR LEAKAGE. 

HISTORY. THIS IS A NEW DESIGN FOR SHUTTLE USE.
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*HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-1 02106-1
 
SUBSYSTEM .Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Propellant Line Flex Assy. FAILURE NODE External Leakage 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES [ NO D 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION II RESPONSE)?­
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES fl NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATIO!I OF YES [*11 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO El 
(EITHER BY CONMADI;IG HARDWIIARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFT'.,'ARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES fl NO W 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIENTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES NO f]
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES U NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0R *1 2F-
ACTION AMD HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION4)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YES[jNO[] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIOU AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES ] *NO ] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES @]*NO LI 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
- -- -- -- -- -:- --- - --- ---- -- ---- - --- --- - --- ----------- -- --
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.F-NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.Ql NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. J HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. O]RECO14ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
[FFMEA CHANGE RECOtIhEINDED 
EXPLANATION/COMNENTS: 
1. V42Plll5C, 1116C will give a class 2 alert once pressure drops to a pre-determined low.
 
Gross leak indication occurs first.
 
6. 	No redundancy-available.
 
7. V42Plll6C and V42P1115C goes to shared meter M2 and will show a large pressure drop for
 
worst case (large leak).
 
FMEA Change - add V42Pll16C to "failure detectable in flight".
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - OREITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWO - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -IC2106-i kc:il/l 9/7 
.ASSFM&LY 'PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: LRIF. FUN.c: I 
.P/N RI : CRIT. hWD: I 
*P/N VLNDORk*MC-27I-CO095 MISSIONS: hF VF X FF CF SM 
.$UANTITY :2 PhASE(S): F LO X 00 X bO X LS 
:ONE PER PROPELLANT NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS RLMAIN1;G 
AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-wit 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIM6 TO EFFECT: 
•D'ROPELLANT TANK PRESSURE V42P-131CC AND MANIFOLD SECONUS TO DAYS 
. RESSURE 1312C&1316C REFERENCE COCUm iNFS: 
V0iG-42 IC1 
.;ROUND IUPNARGUND?..............YES .J070-OCi-Ci 
. St, AS FLI6'HT INSTRUMEN TATION SO72-Sh-UI03-­
VS70--421 CCl 
PREPAFEC EY: APPROVcD EY:
 
DIES J. TAGGART DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL 
.1TEM: PROP LINE FLEX ASSY 
.FUNCT IN : 
TO PROVIDE PROPELLANT FEED TO APPROPRIATE PROPELLANT FEEDLINES. 
:FAILURE MODE: EXIERNAL LEAKAGE (5) 
.0 USE (S): 
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, FLOW, FATIGUE, IMPROPER INSTALLATION (WELD) 
.EFFECT(SJ: ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (EtINTbRFACES (C)MISSION (O)CRE,/V:IICLL: 
(A) LOSS OF PROPLLLANTS. tB) POTENTIAL CORROSION FROM FK<QE
 
PROPELLANTS IN MODULE. (C) POTENTIAL MISSI1N LOSS OR ABORT UCISION.
 
(D) POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS U- Cs
 
FUNCTION 1-EFORE ET SEPARATION.
 
.CURRECTING ACTION:
 
ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE AND INITIATE ABORT IF REQD.
 
R EAQKS/HAZAPRDS:
 
PUTENTIL HAZARD OF FIRE/EXPLOSION FRCOM FREE PROPELLANTS. SOME LEAK
 
POINTS MAY NOT BE ISOLATABLE (I.E. BEFORL/UPSTREAM OF TANK ISOLATION
 
VALVES) NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR LINES. SEE HAZARD NO. 1YXX-,3'2--.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FEA NO 03-2F -102106-1 REV:11I09/78 
.ASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: CRIT. FUIJO: I 
.P/N RI * CR IT. HOa: I 
.P/N VENOR;.C271-0095 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM 
.QUANTITY 2z PHASE(S): PL LO X 00 X DO X LS 
:ONE PEP. PROPELLANT 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A ?-N/A C-N/A 
v APPROVED
 
.DES J. TAGGART DES _.S L
 
.PREPARED BY: AP l!5D / 
.REL R DIEHL REL L5'e
 
Y VED 14ITH CHANGES
 
See Section 13.0

.ITEM: PROP LINE FLEX ASSY 

.FUNCTION:
 
* TO PROVIDE PROPELLANT FEED TO APPROPRIATE PROPELLANT FEEDLINES.
 
.FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (S)
 
:CAUSE(S):
 
MECHANICAL SHOCK. VI'RATION. FL01, FATIGUE, IMPRoPER l'iSTLLATIC4 (I',ELD)
 
.EFFECT(SD: ON IAiSUBSYSTEM (B)INTERCACES (C)MISSION (D)CPEw/VEHICLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF PROPELLANTS. B) POTENTIAL CORRCSION FROM' FPEE
 
PROPELLANTS IN MODULE. (C) POTENTIAL MISSEON LOSS OR ABOPT DECISION.
 
(03 POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREi./VEHICLE IF FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF RCS
 
FUNCTION BEFORE ET SEPARATION.
 
.DISPOSITION E PATIONALE (A)DESIGN CB)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(A) STRUCTUR4L MARGIN OF 2.0 HILL MINIMIZE FAILURE MODE POTENTIAL. (B) 
PROOF TESTED TO 1.5 TIMES VORKING PRESSURE AND 65 MINUTES flF RANDODM 
VIBRATION AT ANTICIPATED MISSION LEVELS. (C) TN PROCESS INSPECTIONS 
X-RAY OF WELDS & PENETRANT INSPECT. TURN ARCUND INSPECTION INCLUDES 
MONITORING FUNCTIONAL TESTS DURING PRESSURIZATION CYCLE FOR EVIDENCE OF 
LEAKS AND DAMAGE. SUPPLIER INSPECTION DEEMED TO RE SATISFACTlRY BASED 
ON SURVEY CONDUCTED ON 4-20-77. (0) NO FAILURE HISTORY FOR THIS 
SPECIFIC DESIGN.
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S D7l5-S -0003 
•HARDWARE/SOFTwARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-l02108-1
 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FMIEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Feedlinp and Fittings FAILURE NODE External L'eakage 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES LD NO -
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION Il RESPONSE)?-
Ta. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORPIATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONIS 1 ANDIla CONSISTENT WITH THE FEA EVALUATION OF YES SNO 0-
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES NO 
(EITHER BY COMMANDIG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER,;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPEriSATE FOR THIS *YES fl NO [ 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEILEiTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE IODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES El NO P]
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES 5] NO E4 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 Ej *1] 2E] 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMIEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED i/A DYESW-NiOE] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTIOn? 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES []*NO I] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES {*NO 5 
*EXPLANIATION REQUIRED (SEt BELOW) 
. . --. . .---
- - - ­
. . . .

--- . -. . .----
. .- . -.- - .
 
. . . . . . . .- . .-
.-

CHANGEIRETEUTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 	 . 
1.D NO HIS ISSUES 	 3.E NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. E ACCEPTANCIE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. [] HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. -3 DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0l RECOIM-ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
[]FMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
 
1. V42P1ll5C, lll6C will give a class 2 alert once pressure drops to a pre-determined low.
 
Gross leak indication occurs first.
 
5. 	No redundancy available.
 
7. V42PlllSC and V42Plll6C goes to shared meter M2 and will show a large pressure drop for
 
worst case (large leak).
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBITER 1L2
 
SUPSYSTEM :FWC - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -102128-1 REV: 12/Oz j/! 
.ASSEMELY :PROPELLANT FEED. ABORT: CRIT. FuNG: I 
.p/N RI :VO-O7-42101 CRIT. hWb: ] 
.P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM 
.QUANTITY :1 PHASE(S): PL LO X 05 X DO X LS 
:ONE SET PER PROPELLANT NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAvI1!JG 
* 	 AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 0 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A s-N/P C-N/A 
.FkILURE DETECTAFLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT: 
.PROPELLANT IANK PRESSURE V42P-1310C AND MANIFOLD SECONZS TO DAYS 
.PRESSURE 131ZC 6 131C REFERENCi DOUCUMiNTS: 
V070-.2 IC 01
 
.GROUND TURNAROUND?..............YES MO07-COCI-ZIb
 
.SAME AS FLIC-T INSTRUMEN TATION SG72-Sh-0103-2
 
VS7O-4210l1
 
PREPARED BY: 	 APPROVED BY:
 
DES A SIEGELIN 	 DES
 
REL 	 R DIEHL ReL
 
raTm: FEEDLINE AND FIITINGS 
* FROM TANK TO I) TANK 	VALVES TO 2) MANIFOLD VALVUS, TO !,) Th.uSTERS.
 
*FUN CT ION: 
TO PROVIDE FEED TO APPROPRIATE PROPELLANT COMPONENTS FO, THRUSTEE 
OPERATION - 3 AXIS ACCELERATION CONTROL AND ROTATIONAL CON'TIOL. 
.FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 	 (S)
 
CAUSE(S:) 
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION/FATIGUE, STRuCTURAL FAILURE,, IMPROPER
 
INSTALLATION (WELD). FLUID FITTING SEAL FAILURE.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUbSYSTEM (S)XNTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREW/V HICLE:
 
(A) POTENTIAL LOSS OF PROPELLANTS. (9) POTENTIAL CORROSION FROM hRcE 
PROPELLANTS IN MODULE. (C) POTENTIAL MISSIUN LOSS OR AESKI DCISIwN. 
(C- POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF LEAKING PROPELLANT EXPLCD5S CUE 
TO CONTACT WITH CATALYTIC AGENT OR HEAT SOURCE WiTh LUBSEOUI;T LOSS it 
FORWARD MUDULE OR IF LOSS OF PROPELLANT PROHIBITS T SEFARATIUN. 
.CC.RECTING ACTICN:
 
* ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE AND INITIATE ABORT IF REQ'D­
.REMARKS/HAZARDS:
 
POTENTIAL HAZARD OF FIRE/EXPLOSION FRO1 FREE PROPELLANTS. SOME LEAK
 
PCINTS MAY NOT BE ISOLATABLE (I.E. &EFORE/UPSTRAM OF TANK ISCLPTIC-N
 
VALVES) NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR LINES. SEE hAZARD NO. IYXX-030 -OL.
 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
66 OF POOR QUALITY 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -102108-1 REV:12/08Y
 
.ASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT FEED. ABORT: CRIT- FUNC: L
 
.P/N RI :VOTO-421001 CRIT. HOW: L
 
./N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM
 
.QUANTITY 1 PHASE(S): PL LO X CO X DO X LS
 
:ONE SET PER PROPELLANT
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/
 
PRV jrA 4 I/ 9A P P R 0 IN S4 
.PREPARED BY: AP P R(NADJY 
.OES A SIEGELIN IDES SWM _. '-"_a' -­
.REL R DIEHL REL RE
 
DB 4L._,,*. 
kMPROVED WITH CHAIGES
 
See Section 13.0

.ITEM: FEEDLINE AND FITTINGS 

* FROM TANK TO 1) TANK VALVES TO 2) MANIFOLD VALVES, TO 3) THRUSTERS. 
*FUNCTION: 
TO PROVIDE FEED TO APPROPRIATE PROPELLANT COMPONENTS FOR THRUSTER 
OPERATION - 3 AXIS ACCELERATION CONTROL AND ROTATIONAL CONTROL. 
.FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (S)
 
:CAUSE(S): 
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION/FATIGUE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, IMPROPER 
INSTALLATION (WELD). FLUID FITTING SEAL FAILURE. 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREW/VEHICLE: 
(A) POTENTIAL LOSS OF PROPELLANTSO (B) POTENTIAL CORROSICN FROM FREE
 
PROPELLANTS IN rODULE. (C) POTENTIAL MISSION LOSS OR ABORT DECISION.
 
(D) POTENTIAL LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF LEAKING PROPELLANT EXPLODES DUE 
TO CONTACT WITH CATALYTIC AGENT OR HEAT SOURCE ;IITH SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF 
FORWARD MODULE OR IF LOSS OF PROPELLANT PROHIBITS ET SEPARATIONS
 
.OISPOSIION f RATIONALE CA)OESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HrSTORY
 
(4) FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 4-0 WvILL MINIMIZE FAILURE POTENTIAL. DYNATUBE
 
FITTINGS HAVE DUAL SEALS. WELD CONSTRUCTION REDUCES JOINTS & POSSIBLE 
LEAK PATHS. FASTENING CLAMPS AND TUBE BEND DESIGN ALLOWS DEGREE OF 
MOVEMENT WHICH HELPS PREVENTING LEAKS. (B) POST INSTALLATION TEST AND 
OPERATIONAL CHECKOUTS WILL VERIFY SYSTEM INTEGRITY. ALL LINES SUBJECTEC
 
TO PROOF TEST OF L-25 X MAX OPERATING PRESSURE OR 1.1 X SURGE (TRANSIT)
 
PRESSURE WHICHEVEP IS GREATER. PERFORMED TUBING CERTIFICATION PER
 
"ORBITER TUBING VERIFICATION PLAN S75-SH-0205". (C) IN-PROCESS INSPECT
 
INCLUDES NOT & CHECKS DURING INSTALLATION. TURNAROUND INSPECTION
 
INCLUDES MONITORING FUNCTIONAL TESTS DURING PRESSURIZATION CYCLE FOR
 
EVIDENCE OF LEAKS- VISUALLY INSPECT FOR DAMAGE WHERE ACCESSIBLE.
 
HARDWARE INSPECTION IN ACCORDAtNCE WITH PLANNING RQliTS APPROVED BY NASA
 
(0) MINOR FAILURE HISTORY-CORROSION AND FAB PROBLEMS REPCRTED DURING
 
APOLLO PROGRAM AND CORRECTED WITH APPLICABLE TMO/TPC REQUIREHENT.
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- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---- --- - --- ---- - --- --- - --- ---- - --------
HARDWARE/SOFTIARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-102120-1 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-OOO6A 
ITEM AC Mntnr Operated Valvp (Tank) FAILURE MODE Failq clned 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWfARE DETECT THIS FAILURE NODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES NO L 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION I;NRESPONSE)?. 
Ta. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES [ NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AD la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES [ *;NO []
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO [(EITHER BY CO:MANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IW.'PLEIMIENTING ALTERN:ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES [] NO [
FAILURE Nf:OOE. ITTXER, BY CO.MANDING HARDWARE ACTIOn OR IMPLEIIE;TING ALTERIATE 
PROGRAftI LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES El NO I
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
I_
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT YES ] NO
 
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *l1] 2nlACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTIWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YESE Of] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
S. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES *NO 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES FJ*NO D 
•EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEk BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION. RATIONALE SUMLARI 
1.0l NO H/S ISSUES - . . - 3. F NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. C[ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELCW 
2: HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.r3 DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. [] RECO.1ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
f-FMEA CHANGE RECOrZIENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
 
1. 	"RCS JETS" light on caution and warning panel.
 
6. 	The manifolds are in parallel (2legs) giving one redundant path.
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SH'JTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS-- ORBITER ic:
 
SUESYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL PMEA NO 03-ZF -100120-i sEV:xi/ic/7 
.ASSEMLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: ABORT, CRIT. FUNC: iP 
.P/' RI :MC23A­C430-0007/-OQS RTLS CRIT. hw: 2 
.PIN VENDR:5750025/575GC26 MISSIONS: hF VF X FF 5F S­
.OU TITY . 
:IWO REQ'D PER PROP TANK PHASE(S): PL LO X OG X DO LS NUMBER (F SUCCESS PAThS k&MAINI2,G 
- AFTER FIRST FAILURE: I 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS s-PASS C-PAS
 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIMt TO EFF5CT:
 
.THRUSTER CHAM5ER PRESS., MANIFOLD PRESSURE MONITO S±0N2S
 
.A V2P-1212-1216,1312- 1316,1521-1502 RE.ERENCc DLuMENT$
 
MJO7G-COCIl--01 
.S'ROUND TURNAKOUND?............. ES S2-S-1-L 
.SAMt- AS FLIGHT VS70-t2iuOi 
PREPARED BY: APPRUVED BY: 
DES R GONZALEZ ELS 
REL R DIEHL REL 
.ITB,.: VLV, AC MOTCR OPERATED ­
"TANK (Q 1/2"). (LV 161-164).
 
:FUNCT ION: 
1) PROVIDES ISOLATION OF TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS. 2) PROVIUES 'AC-UP 
SHUT-OFF/ISOLATIN OF PROP MANIFCLDS AND ASSOCIAfED IHkUSIEr.S' 
COGPONENTS. EI-SIABLE, (TANK PRESSURE-'t5 PSI). AC MOTOR DRIVLN 3 
PHASE (2 OF 3 WILL ACTUATE VALVE) 115 TO 200 VOLTS 4'O hZ. 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED (F)
 
*OSITION - INCLUDES RESTRICTED FLUW 10 LEVEL THAI DOES NuT .LLOU iFROPEN
 
MIXTURE RATIO.
 
. AUSE (S) 
VIBRATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE. PREMATURE PWER TZ MUTUK, ELECKICAu 
SHORT. 
.-FFECI(S;: ON (A)SUSSYSTEM (B)INTLRFACES (C)MiSSION (D)CRE,/VEMILLE
 
(A) LOSS 6F PROPELLANT FLOW IN TWO MANIFOLDS AND SuESEQUcN L,)SS hF 
THRUSTER FUNCTION (THRUSTER SURN-ThRU DUE TO OXID RICH MIX1URLl. (0) 
POSSIBLE bURN-THRU PROPOGATION. (C) LOSS OF MISSICN. AiORT OtCSIbi.N. 
{D) POTENTIAL VEHICLE DAMAGE FROM COLLISION WITH KR&'DEVCUS TARGGcf, 
AFTER SECOND FAILURE. CRIT I FOR RTLS ABORT. 
.CORRECTING ACTION: 
UTILIZE REMAINING FORWARD THRUSTERS IN COUPLE RITH APPROPRIATE AFT 
THRUSTERS FOR BRAKING. DE-ORBIT WITH AFT M-DOLES 
.REMARKS/HAZARDS: 
POTENTIAL HAZARD OF EXPLOSION IF OX VALVL FAILS. SEE PARKER FMEA 0 KNR
 
5750023.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :FWO - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -102120-1 REV:11/10/7 
.ASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: ABORT, CRIT. FUAIC: Ia 
_P/N RI :MC284-0430-0007/-0008 RTLS CRIT. HOb: 
.PIN VENDOR:5750025/!Th0026 MISSIONS: HF VF X. FF OF SM
 
.QUANTITY :4 PHASE(S): PL LO X O0 X 00 LS
 
* ;TWO REQ'D PER PROP TANK
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS &-PASS C-PZ 
:PREPARED BY: APPROVEDBY:.,' APPRO'V D (NASO) 
,.DES R GONZALEZ DES SS 
.REL 	 R DIEHL REL .fI. . R..4.-L -" . 
* ROVED WITH CHANGES 
* See Section 13.0 
AC MOTOR OPERATED ­
.ITEM: VLV, 
* 	 TANK (1 L/2")_ (LV 161-164). 
*FUNCTICN: 
1) PROVIDES ISOLATION OF TANKS FROM MANIFOLDS. 2). PROVIDES BACK-UP 
SHUT-OFF/ISOL TION OF PROP MANIFOLDS AND ASSCCIATED THRUSTERS' 
COMPONENTS. Sr-STABLE, (TANK PRESSURE-245 PSI). AC MOTCR DRIVEN 3 
PHASE (2 OF 3 WILL ACTUATE VALVE) 115 TO 200 VOLTS 400 HZ. 
.FAILURE 	 MODE: FAILS CLOSED (F) 
POSITION - INCLUDES RESTRICTED FLOWm TO LEVEL THAT DOES N4OT ALLOW PROPER 
MIXTURE RkTI3o. 
.CAUSE(S):
 
VIBRATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE. PREMATURE POWER TO MOTOR, ELECTRICAL
 
SHORT,. 
.EFFECT(S): ON CAISUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (CIMISSION (D)CREI-/VEHlCLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF PROPELLANT FLOW IN ThO MANIFOLDS AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF
 
THRUSTER FUNCTION (THRUSTER BURN-THRU DUE TO OXID RICH MIXTUREIo (B)
 
POSSIBLE BURN-THRU PROPOGATION. (C) LOSS OF MISSION. ABORT OECISICN.
 
(D) POTENTIAL VEHICLE DAMAGE FROM COLLISION WITH RENDEVOUS TARGGET,
 
AFTER SECOND FAILURE. CRIT I FOR RTLS ABORT.
 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (O)FPMLURE HISTO-Y: 
(CA) VALVES ARE ALWAYS OPEN. DUAL SERIES SWITCHES WILL PPECLUDE SINGLE 
FAILURE PREMATURE ACTUATION. SHORTED RPC WILL NOT CLOSE VALVE. (B) 
EACH VALVE IS SUBJECTED TO ACCEPT TEST VIBRATION. VALVE IS SUBJECTED TO 
4 8 MIN OR RAMOOM VIB IN EACH AXIS AT ANTICIPATED MISSION LEVELS AND AM 
ENDURANCE TEST EQUIV. TO 100 MISSIONS DURING THE QUAL TEST PROGRAM.
 
EACH VALVE SUBJECTED TO PROOF PRESSUPE CF 1500 PSIG. MORE THAN 4 X
 
WORKING PRESSURE- (C) AUDIT CONDUCTED 7-1-76 VERIFY SUPPLIER INSPECTION
 
CONTROL OF PARTS ID AND PROTECTION, MFG PROCESSES, ELECT rERMINATIONS.
 
TURNAROUND INSPECTION INCLUDES MONITORING TEST TO VERIFY ELECTRICAL 
POWER TO VALVE FOR EVIDENCE OF SHORT CIRCUITY. (0) NO FLIGHT FAILURE
 
EXPERIENCE.
 
SfD75-SB-0003
 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-102150-I 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Quick Disconnect 	 FAILURE MODE External LeakaQe 
1. 	DOES-THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES gl NO jj
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE AUSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FHEA EVALUATION OF YES -NO 0 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES i NO ](EITHER BY COMMAUDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO []
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR INPLEIIE;ITING ALTERNIATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE NODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES l NO Ox 
INDUCE AOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES U NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 E] *1 - 2E]
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE HIODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A f]YES]NOf] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	 IFTHE ANS'WER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES [A*fUO f] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES D *NO E 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTI Or: RATIONALE SUMMLARY 
1.0 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.F_1 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5.Q ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.P HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M- DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW, 
FX FMEA CHANGE RECOMMEN:DED 
EXPLANATION/COMMEITS: 
1. 	The tank pressure drop (worst case/full open) will be detected by V42Plll5C, 1116C;
 
unless regulated the gross leak indication will detect it. Also measurements 1313C, and
 
1314C appear obsolete and should be removed from the FMEA.
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ShuTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORITtk 102 
SUESYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -102150-1 AEV:12/Lb/7
.ASSLMILY :PROPELLANT ABORT: CR14. FUNC: I
 
.P/Nl RI :1MC27b-O018 
 CRI4. HWD: I 
.P/N VENOOR:763010LC MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SI 
.QJANTITY :6 PHASL(S): PL LO X 00 X DO X LS
* NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINIiG 
:TmREE REQ PER PROPELLANT AFTER FIRST FAILURE: P I
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: 
 A-NA B-N/A C-N/A
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT:
.LOSS OF TANK PRESSURE VA2P-1310C, SECONDS TO DAYS 
.1312C, 1313C 1314C, 1315C TANK TEMP REFERENC- DOCUMrNTS:
 
.1300 AND 1400 
 MJC7O-CC1-Oc1b 
.GPJLUND TURNAROUN 9............. N/A S072-sN-0103-2 
VS70-41001 
PREPARED BY: 
 APPROVED bY: 
DES C SCARLETT DES 
REL R DIEHL REL 
.ITM: DISCONNECT, QUICK, FILL 
* PRPELLANT, SPRING LOADED POPPET 1 SFRUCTURAL CAP (M0119-126).
*CUx.CT ION: 
TO PROVIDE FOR DRAINING, VENTING, ANC BLEEDING PROPELLANT TANKS. IN 
BOTH HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL VEHICLE ORIENTAT'IO'N. 
.FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (S)
 
* 'URING FLIGHT 
.CAUSE(S): 
VISRATION, AND LOOSENING OF RETAINER NUT, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL F-AILURE, 
AECHANICAL SHOCK. 
.EFfECT(S): ON 
(A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION CD)CREW/VEHICLE:
(A) LOSS OF PROPELLANT OVERBOARD (1ST ORDER FAILUR- FOR LOOSE RETAINING 
SNUI). (6) POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION IF FUEL REACTS Wlih CXIDIZEK ("N6
ORDER) OR EXTREME HEAT DURING RE-ENTRY. (C) POSSIbLE LOSS OF MISSIUN 
DUE TO FLUID LOSS. (C) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEriICLE IF FAILURE OCCLRS 
PkIOR TO ET SEPARATION. 
.C(S'RRECTING ACTIeN: 
* INITIATE AEORT OR RESCUE OPERATIONS.
 
.REMARKS/HAZARDS: 
POTENTIAL HAZARD FROM FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND FREE PROPtLLANIS. SEE 
hAZARD 1YXX-0302-O5. 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
72 OF POOR QUALIT 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :PWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -102150-1 REV:12/08/78
 
.ASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: 1
 
.P/N RI :MC276-0018 CR IT. HOW: I
 
.P/N VENDOR:76301000 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM
 
.OUANTITY :6 PHASE(S): PL LO X CC X DO X LS
 
;THREE REQ PER PROPELLANT 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A
 
.. PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: APPROV4D BY 3 NASA) O 
.DES C SCARLETT DES . - SS _. 
.REL R DIEHL REL R
 
WITH CHANGES 
.ITEM: DISCONNECT, QUICK, FILL See Sectcn 3.0 
* PROPELLANT, SPRING LOADED POPPET & STRUCTURAL CAP (MO119-126).
 
.FUNCT I ON :
 
* TO PROVIDE FOR DRAINING, VENTING, AND BLEEDING PROPELLANT TANKS. IN
 
BOTH HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL VEHICLE ORIENTATION. 
.FAILURE MODE; EXTERNAL LEAKAGE {S)
 
. DURING FLIGHT
 
.CAUSECS):
 
VIBRATION, AND LOOSENING OF RETAINER NUT, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
 
MECHANICAL SHOCK.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTFM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CPEV./V=HICLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF PROPELLANT OVERBOARD (1ST ORDER FAILURE FOR LCOSE RETAINING 
NUT). (B) POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION IF FUEL REACTS WITH OXIDIZER (2ND 
ORDER) OR EXTREME HEAT DURING RE-ENTRY. (C) POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION 
DUE TO FLUID LOSS. (D) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREI/VEHICLE IF FAILURE OCCURS 
PRIOR TO ET SEPARATION. 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)rAILURE HISTORY: 
SA) CAP SEAL DESIGN DETERMINED TO BE ADEQUATE TO PRECLUDE LEAKAGE. 
DESIGN FACTOR OF SAFETY IS 3.0 X 710 PSIG MAX WORKING PRESSURE. CAP 
PLUS COUPLING CONSTITUTES DUAL SEALING. ALL RETAINER NUTS ARE PROPERLY 
TORQUED TO PRECLUDE LOOSENING. (B) SEALS ARE EXPOSED TO OVER 500 CYCLES
 
DURING DEVELOPMENT. COJPLINGS ARE SUBJECTED TO 600 OPERATIONAL CYCLES 
IN OUAL TEST. ALL CAPS & COUPLINGS LEAK TESTED FOR 3 MIN. AT PRESSURES 
UP YO 1.25 MAX WORKING PRESSURE DURING ACCEPTANCE TEST. 
TURNAROUND LEAK CHECKS PERFORMED BEFORE EACH FLIGHT. RANDOM VIBRATION 
PERFORMED DURING QUAL PROGRAM. 68 MINUTES IN TWO EXES AT ANTICIPATED 
MISSION LEVELS. (C) TURNAROUND INSPECTION INCLUDES VISUAL INSPECTING 
ALL COUPLINGS-THAT HAVE BEEN USED DURING TURNAROUND FOR DAMAGE PLUS 
INSPECTING FOR LEAKS DURING LEAK CHECKS. ALSO, PROPER BLEED SCREW 
TORQUE IS VERIFIED PRIOR TO REINSTALLATION OF ANY CAPS THA r HAVE BEEN 
REMOVED. SUPPLIER AUDIT CONDUCTED 4-5-77 VERIFIED THAT SUPPLIER
 
INSPECTION CONTROLS RAW MATERIAL PARTS IDENTIFICATION, MFG PROCESSES, 
CONTAMINATION CONTROL, AND STORAGE ENVIRONMENTS. (D) NEW DESIGN FOR
 
SHUTTLE APPLICATION. NO FLIGHT FAILURE HISTORY.
 
A , SD75-SE-003 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-102150-2 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Quick Disconnect FAILURE NODE Fails Closed/Ground Ops 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES ] O 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
Ia. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES wO Q 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND Ia CONSISTENT WITH THE FNEA EVALUATION OF YES *O
 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO LI 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMETING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El No El 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiIENTIENG ALTERiIATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE NODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES El NO E0
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES wO EO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0[] *1E] 2E1 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY.
 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION1 IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YESLINOO 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED -CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. 	CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES []-NO f1 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREII/VEHICLE? YES CI*NO 1 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY
 
1. -- NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.Fl NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 5 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. - HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. E DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOiIENDED CHANGES BELOW 
--FMIEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
Out of scope - ground operations only. 
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORSi rER 10n 
SUSSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -102150-2 REV±6/27/?, 
.ASSEMELY :PROPELLANT 	 AEORT: CRIT. FuNC:
 
.P/N Pi :MCZ7T.-OOls 	 CRiT. IvD: 3 
.P/N VENDOR:76Z01000 MISSIONS: HF VF X F OF S.. 
.UANTITY :6 PHASE(S): PL X LO 00 DO LS 
* NUMBER OF SUCCcSS PATh.S REMAINING 
:THREE REQ PER PROPELLANT AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 0 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-N/A C-PASZ 
.FAILURE 	 DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. NA TIME TO EFFECr: 
SECONDS TO HOURS 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:
 
mJ 070-C0(11-Olb
 
G TURNAROUND? SD72-Sh-0103-2
.OUND .YES 
._G.UND EQUIPMENT FLOW RATE READ OUT VS70-421CI 
PREPARED BY: APPRO 10 eY: 
DES C SCARLETT DES 
REL R DIEHL ROL ­
:1TEM: DISCCNNECT, QUICK, FILL
 
* OPELLANT, SPRING LOACED POPPET E STRUCTURAL CAP (MDIS-±Z6).
 
SFUNCTION:
 
TO PROVIDE FOR GRAINING, VENTING, AND BLEEDING PRGPELLANT UPN.KS. IN
 
O3Tm HORILONTAL AND VERTICAL VEHICLE ORIENTAlION.
 
.- AILURE MOOE: FAILS CLOSED (F)
 
CURING GROUND OPERATIONS
 
.CAUSifS):
 
CUNTAMIINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE IMPROPER HANDLING.
 
ABFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CRtw/VEhICLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF FILL CAPABILITY. (B) INCREASED GROUND OPERAQiUNS
 
REOUIREENTS. (C) LAUNCH DELAY. (D) NONE.
 
.CCRRECTING ACTICN: 
* REMOVE AND REPLACE FILL VALVE OR ATTEMPT RECUNNECTION.
 
.REMARKS/HAZARDS:
 
MENE. 
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-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-l02170-1 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-OO16A 
ITEM flflSnlpnnid inpri'Atd Vml y FAILURE MODE Falc CIncnd - Premature Operation
Vernier (hurster Mianifto d 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE M4ODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES NO U 
IANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
ka. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES [ NO 0 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATIO'I OF YES *0O 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES fl NO 0 
(EITHER BY COIWINLDING HARDWARE ACTION OR INPLEMEUTING ALTERATE PROGRA, LOGIC)? 
3a. IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES f NO [
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMtANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIENTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAN LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE NODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES E] NO nX 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? -
THIS MODE, WITH *YES NO 

OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
5. 	CAN FAILURE IN COMBINATION SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT , ­
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *1M 2fE] 
ACTION ARD HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION4)? NOTE CHANGE TO FHEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A YESrnXNO(_ 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES E* NO fl 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES j]*NO [] 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/ RETENTION' RATIONALE SUMMARY 
l.] NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.5 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. [1ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. f2 HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.- DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. EORECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
f]FMEA CHANGE RECOMMEINDED 
EXPLANATION/COMINENTS: 
1. 	 Manifold status on CRT and panel talk back is available. 
6. One failure is all that cain occur since there is no redundancy. The Shuttle can
 
tolerate this failure since .it is a criticality 3.
 
7. The measurements V42X1332X and V42X1232X are downlisted and available for CRT callup.
 
2 
SIUITLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORSITE:R 2CL 
SUSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -IG217C-1 KcV: 12/vCt/7. 
.A$SMFLY :PROPELLANT FEED AbORT: CRIT. FUNC: 
.P/%M I :RMC28,*- 042-0O11/-OO12 CRIT. hWd: z 
.P/N VENDOR:7395-OO11/-OQXZ MISSIONS: HF VF X [F CF SA 
.I--'rTITY 	 :2 PHASE(S): PL LO OG X Lm LS
 
ZONE RE'D PER PROPELLANT NUMSER OF SUCLESS PAT'HS rEMAININb
O AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 
 0 
R 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES 
AMANIFLD POSITN INDICATOR V42X1232E 
*'t2XI332E 
DUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-PASS -FAII 
TIME TO EFFECT: 
SECONDS 
REF RENC- DCCUM&NTS: 
.G..UC TURNAROUND?.............YS 
.SA-'_ AS FLIGHT 
MJ C70-C 0 1-01 
SD72- Sh-S I C -2 
VS70-421601 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY:
 
DES R BURKHART DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
.ITEW: VLVE,C SOLEN OPERATED-
VERNIER THRUSTER MANIFOLD, (1/4") 91-ST'ABLE, SOLENOID J 1VCN 2 VDC. 
(Lv 157-152)
 
.FUNC1 ION: 
TU PROVIDE ISOLATION OF PROPELLANT MANIFOLD AND ASSOCIATED VERNILR 
THfRuSTERS i) SUBSEQUENT I0 DUWNSTREAM FAILURE(S) Z) PRIOR To SYSTEM 
ACTIVATION.
 
.hAILURG MODE: FAILSCLOSED-PREMATURE (F)
 
* OPERATION 
.CkuSS(S): 
IMPROPER ELECTRICAL SIGNAL (CONTINUOUS SHORT), PIECG PART FAILURE, 
CONTAMINATION, VIERATION.
 
'cPzfCT(S): GN (A)SUBSYSTEM (5)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (O)CR:3i\'VCHILe:
 
(A) LOSS CoF VERNIER THRUSTER FUNCTION. (B) NONE. (C) hCSSIIL' EARLY 
MISSION TER.INAIIOx. BECAUSE LARGE THRUSTERS INADECUAIE KUR SMALL RATE 
ATTITUDE hOLD. (D) NONE. 
.CORRECTING ACTION:
 
ATTEMPT TO UTILIZE LARGE THRUSTER IN AFFECTED AXIS TO MAINTAIN S'MALL
 
DA SBAN D. 
.RE ARKS/HAZ ARDS: 
POTENTIAL FOR COLLISION WITH OR LOSS OF PAYLOAD/SATELLITE. SEL 
CONSOLICATED CONTROLS FIMEA # 73895 FMEA 1. 
ORIGINQAL E IS 
OF POOR QUALQ., 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CRBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FD - REACTION CONTRCL FMEA NO 03-2F -102170-1 REV:I2/O8/7
 
.ASSEMBLY :PRODELLANT FEED ABCRT: CRIT. FUNC: 2 
.P/N RI :.4C284-0420-0011/-0012 CRIT. HOW: 2 
.P/N VENDOR:73895-O0II/-O012 MISSICNS: HF VF X FF OF SM 
.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL LO 0 X DO LS 
:ONE REQ'O PER PROPELLANT
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-PASS C-FPA 
.PREPARED 
.DES 
BY:-
R BURKHART 
APPRCVEDA 
DEIt_ 
Y: APPRJ/EDR 
S 
(INA?): i5) 
.REL R DIEHL REL .... 
.ITEM: VLVE,DC SOLEN OPERATED -
VERNIER THRUSTER MANIFOLD, (1/4m) SI-STABLE, SCLENCID O0 IVEN 28VOC. 
(LV 157-158) 
.FUNCT IGN: 
TO PROVICE ISOLATION OF PROPELLANT PANIFOLD AND kSSDCIATEC VERNIER 
THRUSTERS 1) SUBSEQUENT TO CC ,NSTREAM FAILURE(S) 2) PPIOP TO SYSTEM 
ACT IVATION. 
.FAIL.UE MODE: F&IL CLOSED-PREMA7URE CF,) 
* P,_ RA T ICN
 
.rCSE.( S) : 
IMPRCPER -L ECTR IAL SIGN AL (CC ;TINUCUS SrCP), PIECE P-P =AILURE,CONTA .IA I..ON,' VIBRATIC.J
 
.tFECT(S): ON (A)SJBSYST M (B)IN-E;FACES (C)MISSION (D)CzEc/VEHlCLE:

(A) LCSS 3F VERNIER THRUSrER FUNCTION. (3) :CNE. (C) D::SSIBLE EARLY 
MISSIZN TERMINATICN. BEC4USE LARGE THRUSTERS INADEQUATE FCR SMALL RATE 
ATTITUDE HCLD, (2) NONE.
 
.DISPOSITICN & 4ArICNALE (AIDESIGN (5)TEST (C)INS0 ECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY:
 (4) SERIES CONTRCL CITCUITRY :ROVIDED TO MINIMIZE FAILURE YODE, 100 
MICRO-N FILTER IS ORCVIDED. MEDIA HAS BEEN FILTERED TC 25 MICRON PRIOP 
TO ENTERING TANK. SPECIAL EWPHASAS PLACED ON THE DESIGN AND LAYCUT OF 
SOLENOID 7IRING TO OPECLUDE SHORTS. (B) QUAL TEST INCLUDES 48 MINIUTES 
PER AXIS OF R-.OO40 VIBRATION AT ANTICAPTED MISSION LEVELS AND LIFE 
TESTING CONSISTING OF 2000 CPEPATING CYCLES. ITEM IS USED DURING SYSTEM 
EVALUATION AT 'vHITE SANDS TESTING. CC) PJRNAVOUND INSPECTION INCLUDES 
MONITORING TESTS TO VERIFY ELECTRICAL POnER TO SCLENGID VALVE FOR 
EVIDENCE OF SHORT CIRCUIT, SUPPLIER AUDIT CONDUCTED 8-31-77 VERIFIED 
SUPPLIE INSPECTION EXCERCISED CONTROL OF PARTS ID, PARTS PROTECTION, MFG 
PROCESSES, CONTAMINATION CONT-ROL, AND CORROSION PROTECTICN VERIFICATIC'I.
 
(0) FAILURES ON APOLLO WERE MOSTLY DUE TO CONTAMINATICN RESULTING FROM
 
IN-HOUSE PROCESSING.
 
0 3
 78fo 4 SD75-5-00
-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-1 11110-1
 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FNEA NUMBER SD75-SH-OO16A 
ITEM 
. 
Tank Assembly and Propellant 
Arq-irition flpvi-p 
FAILURE NODE Large Rupture 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES [] NO U 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE THAT THE SOFTWARE *YES 1INFORMATION FLIGHT COULD 	 NO [] 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? ­
2.-	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO GUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATION OF YES -NOSIC 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [ NO (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLENEILTING ALTER;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR ThE SOFTWARE TO CONPENSATE FOR THIS *YES nl NO [
FAILURE NODE iEITHER GY COMMA.NDING HARDWARE ACTION OR ImPLEIIEI-ITINIG ALTER.IATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE NODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES El HO 0 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? -	 . 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES 0
NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE CAN TOLERATE if]HARDWARE FAILURES THE SHUTTLE (CONSIDER CREW *0 *l 2[D 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A flIYESFiNOEj 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE AIS'4ER TO EITHER I OR 3 ISYES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES W *NO F1 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES Fl*NO E] 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE. BELOW) 
- - --- -------	 - - - "-- --­- -- - --- - .-- - - - - .------- -	 - -
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARi 
I. --] NO H/S ISSUES -	 3. NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. QACCEPTANCIE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.T DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6.' 0RECO114ENDEO CHANGES BELOW 
In-Flight Detectability
 
X FEA CHANGE RECOMMEINDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. 	V42PlllSC, 1ll6C will give a class 2 caution and warning alert.
 
Gross leak indication will detect failure.
 
If an internal rupture occurs and helium reaches the thrusters you will get a "fail off" light
 
from redundancy management.
 
6. 	 There are no redundant.tanks.
 
8b. Backup flight system same as primary.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORbITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO O-2F -1111C-1 REV12/19/7:
 
A SS. LY :PRCPELLANT FEED ASORT: CRIr. FUNC: I
 
.D/N RI :MCZ82-G%)61-0O01/0002 CFIr. hW. : I 
.P/N VENOOR:85C3320COu-0C9/OIO MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF Sm 
.QUANTITY :2 PL X X O LSPHASE(US): LO - SU X A 
:OiE0 REQ'D NUMBER OF SUCCESS Pa.THS RmAININ'G 
:PER PROPELLANT AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 0 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-"/A P--N/A C-N/A 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES JIME 10 EFFECI: 
.MC NITCR TANK PRESSURES V42P13IOC,1312C,1316C, SCONCS 
. II6C ., REFERENCE DaCUMENITS: 
MJOO-0001-0CI 
.GPOUND TURNAROUND? .............. YES SU72-sH-0103-Z 
.SA,"ML AS FLIGHT VSY-421 !O1 
PREPARED BS: APPROVED SY: 
DE S R BEMIS O2LS 
REL R DI EHL REL 
*IiM: TANK ASSY, PROPELLANT
 
INCLUDING PROPELLANT AtUQUISI[ION DEVICE AND COMPARTMENT (TK
RKRIE,:. 

103 ). 
. FUINCTION: 
TO STORE/SUPPLY PROPELLANT TO REACTION CONTROL ENG1NkI MANIFULDS. 
NOMINAL STORAGE PRESSURE 245 PSIG + OR -15 (1.5 SAFE1Y FACTOk). 
.PAILUR£ MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE - (S) 
T'NK WALL CRACK OR RUPTURE WHICrl PROPOGATES AROUND TA%:< 
.CAUSE IS) 
VIbRATION, OVERPRESSURIZATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRESS UROSI'"C 
FATIGUE. 
.EFFCT(S): ON (A)SU SSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (,)CREW/VEILL'L 
* 	 (4) LOSS OF PROPELLANT SUPPLY FOR MODULE THRUSTERS. (8) PST-lrIIAL 
* 	 FIRZ/XPLOSON AND CERIAIN CONTAMINATION OF SUBSYSTEMS IN KCS 
COMPARTMENT. (L) LOSS OF MISSION. (0) POTENTIAL LUSS UF CRE4;/VEICLL 
Fr4OM EXPLOSION AND/CR LACK OF PROPELLANT. 
.CCRRECTING ACTION:
 
* 	 NONE AVA.ILABLE 
*R EMAR KS/HAZARDS:
 
POTENTIAL HAZARD FROM FIRE, EXPLOSION DUE TO FREE FUEL IN U!GLULE.
 
REFLRENCE HAZARDS IYXX-C302-02 AND 1YXX-032-O4.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :F11O - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-ZF -111110-L REV:1IIOY/­
.ASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: I 
.P/N RI :MCZ82-OC6I-0001/002 CRIT. HO: 1 
.P/N VENOOR:855C3320OO00-OO9/OLO MISSIONS: HP VF X FF OF SM
 
.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL X LO X 00 X DO X LS
 
* :ONE REQ'D

* :PER PROPELLANT
 
: 
 REDUNDANCY SCREEN: 
 A-N/A B-N/A C-N/: 
:PREPARED BY: APPRO' O BY: APPROaEPD 
.DES R BEMIS DES ,- k' 
.REL R DIEHL REL W_.2.4'n.. .... EAF -OED
WITH CHANGES
 
.ITEM: TANK ASSY, PROPELLANT See Section 13.0 
INCLUDING PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEVICE AND COMPARTMENT BAZRIERC (TK 
103).
 
.FUNCTION: 
TO STORE/SUPPLY PROPELLANT TO REACTION CONTROL ENGINE MANIFOLCS. NXNIIAL 
STORAGE PRESSURE 245 PS1G +*OR -iS (1.5 SA5ETY FACTOR). 
.FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILUFE - (S) 
* TANK W.ALL CRACK OR RUPTURE 'iHICH PROPOGATES ARCUNO TANK 
.CAUSE(S): 
* VIBRATION, OVERPRESSURIZATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRESS COROSICN, 
FATIGUE.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (CIMISSICN (O)CRE'm/VEHICLE: 
(A) LOSS OF PROPELLANT SUPPLY FOR MODULE THRUSTERS. (9) POTENTIAL 
FIRE/EXPLOSION AND CERTAIN CONTAMINATION OF SUBSYSTEMS IN RCS 
COMPARTMiENT. (C) LOSS OF MISSION. CD) POTENTIAL LOSS OF CRl/V 'HICLE 
FROM EXPLOSION AND/OR LACK OF PROPELLANT. 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (AJDESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (DIFAILURE HISTORY: 
( A) DESIGN FACTR OF SAFETY IS 1.5 MIN. DEVELOPMENT TESTS INCLUDE iELD 
CYCLE LIFE (800 CYCLES), FRACTURE MECHANICS, FORGING EVALUATION, AND 
TUBE SNAGING. (B) TANKS SUBJECTED TO RADIOGRAPHIC, FLUORESCENT 
PENETRANT, PROOF PRESSURE (1.33 MAX OPER PRESSURE), AND EXTERNAL LEAK 
TESTS DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING. TANKS SUBJECTED TO 90 DAY PROPELLNT 
EXPOSURE, 800 PRESSURE CYCLES 48 MINUTES PER AXIS OF 3.9 GRMS RANDOM 
VIBRATION AND BURST PRESSURE DURING QUAL PROGRAM. (C) TURNAROUND 
INSPECTION INCLUDES MONITORING FUNCTIONAL TEST DURING PRESSURIZATION 
CYCLE FOR EVIDENCE OF LEAKS VISUAL INSPECT WHERE ACCESSABLE FOR 
DAMAGE. AUDIT CONDUCTED 11-L-76 VERIcIEO SUPPLIER INSPECTION CONTROL OF
 
MATL IDE4TIFICATION PARTS PROTECTION ,FG PROCESSES, CORROSION PROTECTION
 
PROVISIONS, NOE EXAM OF WELDS AND STORAGE ENVIRONt1ENrS. (0) NONE [NEW
 
DEVELOPMENT ITEMI.
 
Sf75-SH-0003
 
.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-11ll10-2 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Tank Assembly and Propellant AcquisitioFAILURE NODE Small Crack - Fxtprnal I nakage
DoVi c9 
I. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMAViTICALLY YES [ NO [
ANUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION INRESPONSE)?.
 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES fl NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FI.EA EVALUATION OF YES E]*NO ]
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERN:ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR ThE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO [J
FAILURE NODE (ETTHER BY COPUALDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiIEUTINiG ALTERnATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES fl NO W 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES N NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 W *fl] 2E]
ACTION AND HARDARE/SOFlWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A F-YESE]NOFl 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES t]*NO F1 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES U]*NO [ 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
. .	 . . . . . . - -.. ---.- _ -" . _ . . . . 7_ --.  .- . . - -. 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.0 NO H/S ISSUES - - - -. . 3.fl NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. DQACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELCW 
2,FM HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISk 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6.D RECOIENDED CHANGES BELOW 
S-Fl ight Detectability
 
R FMEA CHANGE RECOI*IENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. V42PlllSC, 1116C will give a class 2 caution and warning alert.
 
Gross leak indication will detect failure.
 
If an internal ruputre occurs and helium reaches the thursters you will get a "fail off" light
 
from 	redundancy management.
 
6. 	There are no redundant tanks.
 
8b. Backup flight system same as.primary.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - t-ITEK 102 
SUS SYSTEM : -WD - REACTION CONTROL FMEaA ND 03-2F -111110-2 REV:12/16/7 
.4SSfMBLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: CN1I. FUNG: 2 
.?/N RI :MC282-0061-OCC1/0002 CPIT. hi, 0 2 
.P/N VEDDR: 55C3320000-CO9/C1C MISSIONS: HF VF X Fr CF SM 
.OUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL X LO X CO X DO X LS 
,:ONE rEQ'O NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING
 
:PER PROPELLANI AFTER FIRST FAILURE:
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-\/A -N/A C-N/A
 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFL-Cl:
 
.MONITOR TANK PRESSUPE V4ZP-I310C,13I2CI316,C DAYS
 
.1 1.16C REFERLNCE DOCUMLNTS: 
* t4J&7C-CCC1-ItE 
.GIGUNDU TURNAROUND?,............. YES 5072-SH-G1 03-2 
.Am AS FLIGHT AND VISUAL OBSERVATION VS70-'t2ICOi 
PREPARED pY: APPROVEU BY: 
DES R BEMIS OS_-
REL R DIEHL REL 
ITEM: TANK ASSY, PRCPELLAN[ 
iPJCLU§_ING PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEVICE AND COMPARTMENT EAIkA. (IN
103 ). 
. FUNCT ION: 
* O STORE/SUPPLY PROPELLANT TO REACTION CONTROL -NGINE MNIF-GLDS. 
NOMINAL STORAGE PRESSURE 245 PSIG + OR -15 (1.5 SAFELIY FAfrAR). 
.FAILURE MODE: EXIERNAL LEAKAGE - (S) 
TANK CRACK OR FLAW tHICH ALLOWS A LIMITED AMOUNT OF PRJPELLANT TO LcpVti 
THE TANK. 
.CAUSr (S) : 
VIORATION, STRESS CORROSIUN, PRESSURE CYCLES, FATIUUL O' FLANGL S:AL 
FA I LURE. 
' 

.EFFECT(S) * C N (A)SUESYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSID [EO)CARW/VchICLz: 
(A) LOSS OF A QUANTITY OF PROPELLANT AND HELIUM TO AN 5'xllNT bPENZENT 
ON SIZEAND LOCATION OF LEAK. (B) CONTAMINATION GF SUR&UUNLI NG AREA AND 
SUBSYSTEMS. (C) LOSS OF MISSION. (0) POTENTIAL EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE IF IGNITION SOURCE PRESENT (SECOND FAILURe.1. 
.COR8SCTING ACTION:
 
CLOSE HELIUM PRESSURIZA ION ISOLATION VALVE TO MINIIMIZE AMCJUNT OF 
PROP-ELLANT/HELIUM LOST.
 
.REMARKS/HAZARDS: 
PUTENTIAL HAZARD FROM FREE PROPELLANT IN MODULE. NO REDUNDANICY PRjI D 
FOR THIS ITEM. REFERENCE HAZARD IYXX-0302-05. 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -1111I2-2 REV:I1/12/Th
.ASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: CRIT. FUC: 2
.P/N RI :MC282-OG61-001/0002 CRIT. HOD;: 2 
.P/N VENDOR:855C3320000-O09/oIO MISSIONS: VF X FF SMHF SF 

.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL X LO X CO X DO X LS
 
:ONE REQ9 D
 
:PER PROPELLANT
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A
 
.PREPARED BY: APPRO-Y: 
 APPRD ) NA 
.DES R BEIS DES /-_. -r..4. 
.RLR DIEHL REL RE 4C..-
V)ROVED WITH CHANGES
 
.ITEM: TANK ASSY, PROPELLANT See Section 13.0
 
INCLUDING PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEVICE AND COMPARTMENT BARRIER. (TK
 
103).
 
.FUNCTION:
 
TO STORE/SUPPLY PROPELLANT TO REACTION CONTROL ENGINE MAE:IFOLOS. 
 NOMINA
 
STORAGE PRESSURE 245 PSIG 4- OR -15 (1.5 SAFETY FACTOR).
-FAILURE MOrE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - (S)
TANK CRACK OR FLA6 'iHICH ALLOWS A LIIITED AMCUNT OF DROPELLANT TO LEAVE 
THE TANK.
 
.CAUSE(S):
 
VIBRATION, STRESS CORROSION, PRESSURE CYCLES, FATIGUE OR 
FLANGE SEAL
 
FAILURE,
 
.EFFECT(SI: ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CRE/VEHCLE:

(4) LOSS OF A OUANTITY OF PROPELLANT AND HELIUM TO AN EXTENT DEPENDENT 
ON SIZEAND LOCATION OF LEAK. (B) CONTAMINATION OF SURROUNDING AREA AND 
SUBSYSTEMS. (C) LOSS OF MISSION. (D) POTENTIAL EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE IF IGNITION SOURCE PRESENT (SECCND FAILURE).

.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY:
 (A) DESIGN FACTR OF SAFETY IS 1.5 MIN. DEVELOPMENT TESTS INCLUDE WELD
 
CYCLE LIFE (B00 CYCLES), FRACTURE ME:HANICS, FORGING EVALUATION, AND
 
TUBE SWAGING. (B) TANKS SUBJECTED TO RADIOGRAPHICr-FLUORESCENT
 
PENETRANT, PROOF PRESSURE (1.33 MAX OPER PRESSURE), AND EXTERNAL LEAK
TESTS DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING. TANKS SUBJECTED TO 90 DAy PRCPELLANT 
EXPOSURE, 800 PRESSURE CYCLES, 48 MINUTES PER AXIS OF 3.9 GRMS RANDOM 
VIBRATIO, AND BURST PRESSURE DURING QUAL PROGRAM, (C) TURNAROUND 
INSPECTION INCLUDES MONITORING FUNCTIONAL TEST DURING PRESSURIZATION
 
CYCLE FOR EVIDENCE OF LEAKS. 
 VISUAL INSPECT WHERE ACCESSABLE FOR
 
DAMAGE. AUDIT CONDUCTED 11-1-76 VERIFIED SUPPLIER 
INSPECTION CONTROL OF
 
MATL IDEBTIFICATION PARTS PROTECTION MFG PROCESSES, 
CORROSION PROTECTION 
PROVISIONS, NDE EXAM OF WELDS AND STORAGE ENVIRONMENTS. (D) NONE (NEW 
DEVELOPMENT ITEML. 
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SD75-I-OOO3 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANAL.YSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-111110-3 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER S075-SH-0016A 
ITEM 	Tank Assembly and Propellant FAILURE MODE Restricted Flow 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES Q NO ]
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION II RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES [ NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FHEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTIARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO E 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPAbILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES [] NO [I
FAILURE MODE (EITHER 6Y COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIENTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE hARDWARE OR *YES D NO 10 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT .*YES OinO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 D *1[] 2[ 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E]YESmUOE 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES [*O FI 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES 0*NO E3 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE.DELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMAR 
I.i] NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.El NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. EACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. HARDWARE ACCEPTS RiSK 4. f-l DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
nIFIEA CHANGE RECOMME ;DED 
EXPLANATION/COrIMENTS: 
1. "Fail Off" detection in RCS RM.
 
6. 	No redundant tanks.
 
-7....No correcting-action -_abort -­
8b. Same as primary. 
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SHUTTLE FAILURE NODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - OR1IIER IC2
 
SUESYSTEM :FWO - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -1llili-3 RSV:12/18/h 
.ASSEMSLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: CKII. FUN- I 
.P/N R! :MC282-0061-00OI/0002 CRII. HWC: I 
.P/N VENDOR:55tC33200OC-GC9/0lC MISSIONS: HF VP X FF uF sm1 
.OLANTITY :2 	 PHASE(S): PL LC A uO A DC X LS
 
:ONE REQ'D NUMBER OF SUCCESS PAThS REMAINING 
:PER PROPELLANT AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 0 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A E-N/A C-N/A 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT: 
."NGINE PERFORMANCE SECONDS TO DAYS 
REF EREC CCUMENT$:
 
MJ070-COGI-C1b
 
.,ROUNV TURNARUND? ............. NOC-2
 
VS7--4?lGCI 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED EY* 
DES R bEMI S 0;S 
REL R DIEHL REL 
.1m': TANK ASSY, PROPELLANT 
INCLUDING PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEVICE AND COmPARTMENI &AIER. TK
 
103 ). 
*',l	4 T ION: 
TO STORE/SUPPLY PROPELLANT TO REACTION CONTROL ENGINE ,1ANIFOLOS. 
NOPINAL S'ThRAGE PRESSURE 245 PSIG + OR -U (1.5 SpFETY FACIOR). 
S.FAILIE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW - (S) 
SrUCTURAL FAILURE UF PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEvICE WHICI-, 2LOCKS R 
RETARDS RATE GF FLOW OF PROPELLANT INTO TANK OUTLET. 
.CAUE(S): 
VIESATILN, MECHANICAL SHOCK, EXCESSIVE FLOW RATES DUE TL ExCESSlvZ GAS 
I\ THiRUSTER MANIFOLD. (SEE FAILURE MOOE NO. 4 O.v NEXT PAGLl. 
.EFFECT(Sl: ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTLRFACES (C)MISSION tD)CREW/VfrILL: 
(,A) LOSS O9 FULL PROPELLANT FLOW CAPABILITY/HELIUM INGESTION. Ib) .0. 
(C) LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF PROPELLANT. (U) 'O4 .. L.S;E FAILUr& 
OCCURS WHEN MCDULE REwUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
 
.CCRr.crING ACTION:
 
• NCNE AVAILABLE - CLOSE DOWN FRCS AND ABORT MISSION. 
*REPMARKS/HAZARDS: 
*CCMIPLETL LOSS OF FRCS USAGE THEREFORE 4LL ATTIUUE CONTROL MUST OE 
ACCOMPLISHED BY ARCS. 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
 
OF POOR QUALITY
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FHEA NO 03-2F -111110-3 REV: LI/I0/76 
GRIT. FUNC: I

.ASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: 

.P/N RI :MC282-0051-O001/0002 GRIT. HDhf: I
 
HF VF X FF OF Sm"

-P/N VENDOR:855C33200O0-009/O1O MISSIONS: 

.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL LO X 0O X DO X LS
 
:ONE REQ'D
 
- :PER PROPELLANT
: 
 REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-NIA B-N/A C-N/A
 
APPROVE BY,4.AS.)
.PREPARED BYZ APPROY 
.DES R BEMIS DES -­
.REL R DIEHL REL 
* PPOVED WITH CHANGES 
.ITEM: TANK ASSY, PROPELLANT See Section T 
INCLUDING PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEVICE AND COMPARTMENT BARPIER. (TK 
1031.
 
. FUNCT ION:
 
TO STORE/SUPPLY PROPELLANT TO REACTION CONTRCL ENGINE MANIFOLOS. NOME[NA
 
STORAGE PRESSURE 245 PSIG + OR -15 (1.5 SAFETY FACTOR).
 
.FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW - (S)
 
STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEVICE 'WHICH BLOCKS OR
 
RETARDS RATE OF FLOW OF PROPELLANT INTO TANK OUTLET.
 
.CAUSE(Sl:
 
VIBRATION MECHANICAL SHOCK, EXCESSIVE 5LO RATES DUE T.0 EXCESSIVE GAS
 
IN' THRUSTER MANIFOLD. (SEE FAILURE MODE NO. 4 ON NEXT PAGE).
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (AISUBSYSTEM 4BIINTERFACES (CPISSION CD)CREI,/VEHICLEX
 
(A) LOSS OF FULL PROPELLANT FLOWi CaPABILITY/HELIUM INGESTION. (B) NONE, 
(C) LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF PROPELLANT. (0) NONE UNLESS FAILURE
 
OCCURS WHEN MODULE REQUIRED FOR ET SEPARATION.
 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (DIFAILURE HISTORY:
 
(A) 1.5 DESIGN SAFETY FACTOR. DEVELOPMENT TESTS VERIFY WELD CYCLE LIFE, 
SCREEN REPAIR METHOO, SCREEN CYCLE LIFE AND SCREEN FLO,. (8) PROPELLANT 
ACQUISITION DEVICE COMPONENTS,. SUBASSEMBLIES AND TANK ASSY INTEGRITY 
TANKS SUBJECTED TO PROPELLANT
 
EXPOSURE, 200 EXPULSION CYCLES, 48 MINUTES PER AXIS OF 3.9 G"'AS RANDOM
 
VERIFIED BY PERFORMING BUBBLE POINT TEST. 

VIBRATION AND BWRT PRESSURE DURING QUAL PROGRAH. (C) TURNAROUND 
INSPECT INCLUDES MONITOR FLOi DURING FUNCTIONAL TESTS. AUDIT CONOUCTER 
11-1-76 VERIFIED SUPPLIER INSPECTION CONTROL OF MATL IDENTIFICATION 
PARTS PROTECTION MFG PROCESSES, CORROSION PROTECTION PROVISIONS, NOE 
EXAM OF WELDS AND STORAGE ENVIRONMENTS. 
(0) NONE (NEN DEVELOPMENT ITEM).
 
SD75-SH-O003
 
- --- -- -- -- -- --- ---- - -- ---- - --- ---- - -- ---- - --- ---------
*HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-111110-4
 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-OOI6A 
ITEM Tank Assembly and Propellant Acquisition FAILURE MODE Loss of Gas in PropellantDeviceArqaigii-in 	 n evi re 
- 1. "DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES 2 O0 
. ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
Ta. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES fl NO
 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE A:NSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATION OF YES ] *NO R 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO [
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEM1ENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO CONPENSATE FOR THIS *YES [I NO m3 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY CONANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEHE;|TING ALTER.NATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVE RSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES fl o]
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES LI NO L 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0E *I] 2F-

ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY.
 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YESUNO ]

TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIO AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
S. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES W'*NO 5] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES 5]*o M 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEt BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.0- NO H/S ISSUES 3.fl NO SOFTWARE DETECTION S. DQACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.f' DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECO114ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
r]FMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED
 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
 
1. 	"Fail Off" detection in RCS RM.
 
6. 	No redundant tanks.
 
7. 	No correcting action - abort.
 
8. 	Same as primary.
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SHUITLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - URITER 102
 
SUEY$TEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -111110-4 XEV:1Z/15/,
 
.ASSEMELY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: CRiT. FUNL: 2
 
.u/N R1 :rMC282-CC-61-OCXI/O002 C!"11. HAU: 2 
.P/N VENDOR:,55C33;200C-OOV/O1? MISSIONS: -F VF X Fr OF IM 
.QUANTITY :2 ,PHASE(S): PL X LC \-UC X DO X LS 
:ONE RE'D NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING
 
:PER PROPELLANT / ,t ' AFTER FIRST FAILURE:
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN.: A--N/A 5-N/A C-N/A
 
.9PILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES lIME TO EFFECT:
 
.5NGINE PERFCRMANCE AND C HAMBER PRESSUKE.V42P0541 SECONDS
 
FRF5RLNC& DOCUMcN1 1. 
MJO7C-bO0 1-C iEf 
SGROUND TURNAOUND?............. 	 0SD72-SH-C10B3-2
 
VS70-421CG1
 
PREPARED EY: APPROVED bY:
 
DES R BEMIS ocS
 
REL R DIEHL RcL
 
r.1T4:TANK ASSY, PROPELLANT 
*IXCLUING PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEVICE AND COMPARTMENT BARRIEK. (lK 
10). 
.FUNCTION:
 
T STORE/SUPPLY PROPELLANT TO REACTION CONTROL ENGINc 'IANIFULDS.
 
NOMINAL STORAGE PRESSURE 245 PSIG + OR -15 11.5 SAFETY FACLOR1.
 
SoCFILURE MODE: LOSS OF GAS RETENTION IN (S)
 
* PROPELLANT ACCUISIT1ON DEVICE (PAC).
 
.CAUSE(S)}
 
* V RATTCN, SHOCK, PROPELLANT CONTAMINATION tLt-lEMCAL Of, DIKT)
 
.SFFECI(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM b)INTLRFACES (C)MISSION (LJCKt/Vcr.ICL-.
 
(A) 	EXCESSIVE GAS FLOW TO THRUSTERS COULD CAUSE TANK 6ARRIER FAiLUlt. 
E) POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THRUSTERS IF UNDETECTEU. (C) A.OKT blCISION. 
(0) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FAILURE OCCURS PRIOR TU LI 
SEPARATION.
 
.CORPECTING ACTION:
 
* 	 SrUT DOWN FRCS AND ABORT MISSION. 
.REMARKSiHAZAROS 	 :
 
IF UNDETECTED, THE THRUSTERS COULD BE DAMAGED WHICH CJULD CAUSE &WIRY
 
UNCERTAINTY.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :FWO - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -111110-4 ThV:l1/1O/
 
SASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: CPIT. FUNC: 2
 
.P/N RI :.4C282-0061-OOO1/0002 CRIT. H).: 2
 
.P/N VENDOR:855C3320000-009/OtO MISSIONS: HF VF X CF OF SM
 
.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL X LO X CO X DO X LS
 
:ONE REQ'D
 
:PER PROPELLANT
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A 8-N/A C-NI 
.PREPARED BY: AP PROVE5aY: APPR 1 (NA 
.DES R BEMIS DE 5 SS~i-m 
.REL R DIEHL REL RE 
RVED WITH CHANGES
 
ITEN4: TANK 4SSY, PROPELLANT See Section 13.0
 
INCLUDING PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEVICE AND COM PARTMENT PAPRIER. (TK
 
103).
 
.FUNCT ION:
 
* 	 TO STORE/SUPPLY PROPELLANT TO REACTICN CONTROL ENGINE ANIFCLOS. N, IM 1 4 
ST3RAGE PRESSURE 245 PSIG O (L.5 FACTOR).R -15 SAFETY 
.FAILURE NODE: LOSS OF GAS-RETENTION IN (S) 
. PRGPELLANT ACQUISITIJN DEVICE (PAD). 
.CAUS Ef S): 
VIBRATION, SHOCK, PROPELLANT C.NTAMINA TION (CHEM ICAL Cr IRT). 
.EFFECT(S: 3N (AISUBSYSTEM (BI)NTERFACES (C)MISSION (O)CREH/VEHTCLE: 
(A) EXCESSIVE GAS FLOW TO THRUSTERS COULD CAUSE TANK BAQRIER FAILURE.
 
(3) POTENTIAL DA,4AGE TO THRUSTERS 'IF UNDET=CTED. (C) ABCRT DECISIO;:.
 
(D) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF FAILURE OCCURS PRIOR TO ET
 
SEPARATION.
 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN (S)TEST (C)INSPECTION (O)FAILURE HISTORY:
 
* 	 (A) DESIGN FACTR OF SAFETY IS 1.5 MAIN. OEYELOPHENT TESTS INCLUDE IELD 
C'YCLE LI FE (800 CYCLES) FRACTURE MECHANICS, FORGING EVALUArINc,, AND 
TUBE SWAGING. (8) PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEVICE COMPONENTS, 
SUBASSEMLIES AND TANK ASSY INTEGRIrTY VERIFIED BY PERFCRMING BUBBLE POINT 
TESTS. TANKS SUBJECTED TO PROPELLANT EXPOSURE? 200 EXPULSION CYCLES, 4? 
MINUTES PER AXIS OF 3-9 GRMS RANDOM VIBRATION AND BURST PRESSUR DUPI>G 
QUAL PROGRAM. (CI TURNAROUNO INISPECTION INCLUDES PERIODIC BLUBLE POTT 
QHECKS OF fL.P.AD. AUDIT CONDUCTED 11-1-76 VERIFIED SUPPLIER INSPECTIQ:l 
CONTROL 0FF MATL IDENTIFICATION PARTS PROTECTICN MFG PROCESSES, CROSICN, 
PROTECTION PROVISIONSt NOE EXAM OF WELDS AND STCRAGE ENVIRCN)AiENTS. -­
(0) NONE (NEW DEVELOPMENT ITEM). 
_0041s 	 S D75 -SH -00039O
 
•HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-121308-1 
SU6SYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD7S-SH-NfllA 
ITEM Flex Line and Fitings 	 FAILURE MODE External Leakage
 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE M4ODE (i.e., AUTOtATICALLY YES 0 NO U 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES C NO? IJ 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANISWERS TO GUESTIONS 1 AND .la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATION OF YES -'NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? ­
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES NO 
(EITHER BY COMMANDIG HARDIWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR ThE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES fl NO ED 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER UY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMIPLEIE;1TING ALTERIIATE 
PROGRAJI LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES El NO 10 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES 0 NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6.: 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTFLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 fl *if- 2F 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FiMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A [UYES NO[ 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	 IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES M *NO U 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREWIVEHICLE? 	 YES Em*NO f 
*EXPLANATION 	 REQUIRED (SEt. BELOW) 
--------- - - - .....------ - -.--- ----- -------- -- ----
--- - --- ----- -.--
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY -- .
 
I.fl NO 3. SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. El ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW
H/S ISSUES 	 0'N  
2. M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6.0 D RECO.4ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
[-FMEA CHANGE RECOIMEDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. V42Plll5C, 1116C will give class 2 alarm.
 
Gross leak detection applies.
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SHUiTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - UOREITEk 1C2
 
SUESYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTR.JL FMEA NO 03--F -12130B-1 RcV/:I1/1O/7z 
.ASSEMELY :THRUSTER AE0RT: Ci. FUNC: 1 
.P/N kI ,"C271--O064 CGIT. H1U: I 
.•/N VENDOR,:i7413-TiRU 74717 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF 1F / SM 
.QUANTlCY :_r PHASE(S): PL X LO X UG A 00 X LS A 
:ORE FUEL AND ONE OX]DIZ. NUMBER OF SUCLESS PAThS KEMAINING 
:PER THRUSTER AFTER FIRST FAILLIRE: 2 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-;N/A B -N/A C-N/A
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME T-0 EFFECT: 
-vtNIFOLD PRESSURE V-_4 
 SECONDS TO DAYS 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: 
MJ7O-CICC-i£m 
.GFtOUND TURNAROUND?..............YES SD72-Sh-1C-2 
.VISUAL INSPECTION VS70- 21CCI
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: 
DES J. TAGGART DES 
RE'L R DIEHL REtCC 
.I!EM: LINE ASSEM., FLEXIBLE 
AND FITTINGS. 
* FUNCTION: 
TO PROVIDE COUPLING BETWEEN PROPELLANT SUbSYSTEM AD FORWARD RCS
 
PRIMARY AND VERNIER THUSTER. 
.FAILUPE MODE: EXIERNAL LEAKAGL - () 
* UPTURE OF LINE OR COUPLING.
 
.CAJSE (S):
 
* F,-IGUE, SHOCK, VISRATlON, HANDLING.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (AISUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES C)MISSION (D)C-E/VEnICLc:
 
(A) LOSS OF PROPELLANTS TO EXTENT OD- LEAK SIZE. (B) INCRLAS'D-tNLC 
CONTPROL & USE OF ALTERNATE THRUSTERS. (C) POTENTIAL M4ISi,N 1fi&MllATG! 
PPIUR TG PLANNED TIME. (D) NO EFFt:CT AFTER ASCENT UNLSS LzAK IS 
EXCESSIVE & RESULTS IN IGNITION WITH REACIANT ( ND ODkR FAILUR=) VUklIv(G 
A RTLS ABORT THE LOSS UF A MANIFOLD RESULTS IN THE LOSS UF (',l' DOWN 
FIRING THRUSTERS VrHiCH RESULTS IN GRIT 1. DURING ASCENT TrhE FAILUkE
 
rANNOT BE cETECTED AND ISOLATED WHICH RESULTS IN POSSI-Lt LOSS GF
 
VEHICLE.
 
.CCRRECTING ACTION: 
* ISOLATE TrIRUSTER AT MANIFOLD. 
.Q EtiARKS/HAZARDS.: 
POTENTIAL HAZARI2 FROM FREE FUEL IN MODULE. 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
 
OF POOR QUALITY
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CRBITEQ 102 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -121308-1 REV:I/I3/ 
.ASSEMBLY :THRUSTER ABSRT: CRIT. FUNC: I 
.P/N RI :=C'i27-0084 CRIT. HD#n: I 
.P/N VENDOR:74713-THRU 74717 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF 3F X Sm 
.QUANTITY :30 PHASESl: PL X LO X 00 X DO X LS X 
* 	 :ONE FUEL AND ONE OXIO[Z.
 
:PER THRUSTER
 
REDUNDANCY 	 SCREEN: A-NIA G-N/A C-'I 
.PREPARED 
.DES 
.REL 
BY: TGAT 
J. TGAT 
R DIEHXL 
APpjf 
DE 
RE 
O,BY :/ APPROI'ED [3 IN A)-J 
ssm y 
R 
ED WITH CHANGES 
.ITEM: LINE ASSEt, 
* AND FITTINGS. 
FLEXI3LE SeeSection 3. 
.FUNCTION: 
TO PROVIDE 	COUPLING BET1hFEN PROPELLANT SUBSYSTEM AND FOR.ApO RCS 
PRIMARY AND VERNIER THRUSTER. 
.FAILURE MCDE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE - (S) 
RUPTURE OF 	 LINE OR COUPLING. 
.CAUSE(S):
 
FATIGUE, SHOCK; VIBRATION, HAtDLING. 
.EFFECT(SI: ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (,3INTEP.FACES (C),MISSION (OICREW/VEnICLE:
 
(4) LOSS OF PROPELLANTS TO EXTENT OF LEAK SIZE. () INCREASED GN&C 
CONTROL & USE OF ALTERNATEF THRUSTERS. (C) PCTENTIAL MISSION TER.mI.NATIG: 
PRIOR TO PLANNED TIME. (D) NO EFFECT AFTER ASCENT UNLESS LEL( IS 
EXCESSIVE a RESULTS IN IGNITION WITH qEACTANT (2ND ORDER FAILURE) OUP '1G 
A RTLS ABORT THE LOSS OF A PANIFOLD RESULTS IN THE LOSS CF TWO DC N
 
FIRING THRUSTERS WHICH RESULTS IN CRET 1. DURING ASCENT THE FAILURE 
CANNOT BE DETECTED AND ISOLATED WHICH RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 
VEHICLE. ­
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGI (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (DIFAILURE HISTORY: 
* 	 (A) DESIGN BURST PRESSURE IS UP TO 3 TIMES THE MAX OPER PRESSURE OF 700 
PSISO PROOF PRESSURE IS UP TO 1.5 TINES THE MAX OPER PRESSURE. THE 
DESIGN ALLOWS SUFFICIENT MOVEMENT TO PRECLUDE EXCESSIVE STRESSES DURING 
INSTALLATION AND OPERATION. LINES CAN BE ISCLATED AT THE MAN I F OLD IN 
CASE OF LEAKAGE- (B) POST INSTALLATION TEST AND OPERATICNAL CHECKOUTS
 
WILL VERIFY SYSTEM INTEGRITY. ALL LINES SUBJECTED TO PROOF PRESSURE
 
DURING ATP 	 AND RANOCH VIBRATION AT ANTICIPATED M4ISSION LEVELS OURING 
QUAL TESTING0 LINES ARE ALSO TESTED DURING SYSTEM1 EVALUATION AT WHITE 
SANDS TEST 	FACILIT-Y. (C SEE F4iEA/CIL 102136-1. (0) NO HISTORY OF
 
FAILURE IN 	 FLIGHT. (NEW DEVELOPMENT ITEM FOR MANNED FLIGHT APPLICATION. 
93S0314 	 S D75 -SiOO-0 00 3 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 03-2F-121311-1
 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control 	 FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Injector Plate 	 FAILURE NODE Improper Mixture Ratio 
1. 	 DOES-THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES [ NO 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORmATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES iO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT HITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES M *'O ] 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWIARE TAkE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO L 
(EITHER BY COHVIANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO CONPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO l 
FAILURE M1ODE (EITHER 6Y COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION! OR IMPLENE;ITING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE NODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES ] No W 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES l NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDUARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 0 *if- 2W] 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED II/A 5YES0;!O[E 
TO SIGNAL THE N1EED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. 	 CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES 5<o 51 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES n5*110 
*EXPLANATIO:I REQUIRED (SEE BELOW.) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SU,'IrwRi 
NO ISSUES1 . 1 H/S 	 3. fl NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 2 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOI 
2. 00 HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. E DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHA'JGES BEL.OW 
5FPFEA CHANGE RECOM 'E.DED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. "Fail Off" in RCS RM if sufficiently blocked. 
9
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SHUfTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - OxCITER 102 
SJzSYSTEM :FWt, - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -12131!-1 REV:tlI/4/-. 
.ASSEBLY :THRUSTER, FRINARY AUORr: ABORT CRIT. FuNC: 1A 
.P/N RI :MC467-OO2S RTLS cRir. hW: 
.P/N VENDOR:X3c86a MISSIONS: HF VF X t-F CF S 
.5UANTITY :14 PHASE(S): PL LO X 0&L X DO X LS 
:ONE INJECTOR PROVIDED FO NUMBER OF SUCCESS PA IHS REMAIN.vG 
:R EACH PRIMARY THRUSTER AFtER FIRST FAILURE: 2 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN. A-F IL b--MAL C-FAIl 
.FAILU.E DETECIABLE IN FLIGHT?. NO IlMa 16 &FFhCT: 
SECONDS
 
REFERENCE OOCUMENTS:
 
MJU'70-CYO I-CIA
 
.SROUND TURNAROUND?.............NO 	 SD72-SH-31oj-2 
VS 70-421001 
PREPARED eY: APPRUVED LY'
 
DES W SEARCY DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
•.1.E: INJECTGR, PLATE 
.FUNCTION:
 
TO RECEIVE FUEL AND OXIDIZER FROM ThRUSIER INLET VALVES AND PiROVILt
 
DOUBLET MIXING AT l.bO OX TO FUEL (WEIGHT) RATIO FOR A HYPLRGULIC
 
REACTION WHICH PRCDJCES 525 POUNDS OF THRUST AT 7C,OO0 FEET. ALSLI
 
CONTROL CtAMBER WALL COOLING.
 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DELIVER PROPS (F) 
AT PROPER MIXTURE RATIO AND FAILS TO PROVIDE ADEQUAlc COOL1Nu OF Im& 
C(3,:3USTOR WALL. 
.C 	URiE(S):
 
CGNTAMINATION, PLOCKED ORIFICES. 
.EFFECT(Sj: ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION 	(O)CREW/VErICLS:
 
(A) LOSS OF ONE THRUSTER IN A GIVEN AXIS. L3) GN&C CONTRL SI'1thlN 
REQUIRED. (CD)NO EFFECT. (E) POSSIBLE LOSS CF VEHICLE IF FAILURt 
OCCURS BEFORE ET SEPARATION. DOWN FIRING THRUSTERS REQUIREU FOR SI 
S EPARAT ION. 
.C3_RRECTIN& ACTICN: 
SWITCH IL REDUNDANT ThRUSTER IN AFFECTED AXIS. ISCLAIE MANIFOLD 
CONTAINING FAILED THRUSTER. 
.R E	MARKS/HAZARDS:
 
POSSIBLE LOCAL HOT SPOT RLSULTING IN COATING DAAAGE OR COM5uSTUF buRN
 
THROUGH.
 
ORIGINAL PAQg I$
 
OF POOR QUALITY
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -121311-1 REV:14/78 
.ASSEMBLY :THRUSTER, PRIMARY ABORT: ABORT CRITC FUNC: ipR 
./N RI :-C467-0028 RTLS CRIT. HDs: 
.P/N VENDOR;X30888 MISSIONS: HF VF'X FF OF Sq 
.QUANTITY :14 PHASE(S): PL LU X 00 X DO X LS 
:ONE INJECTOR PROVIDED FO
 
* .R EACH PRIMARY THRUSTER
: REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-FAI B-FAIL C-FAIL 
.PREPARED BY: APPRrOV59 Y'~> APPRO ED NAS 
.DES W SEARCY DES SM4 
*REL R DIEHL PEL Z R~t 
DELETE 
See Section 130
.ITEM: INJECTOR, PLATE 
*FUNCTION: 
TO RECEIVE FUEL AND OXIDIZER FROM THRUSTER INLET VALVES AND PROVIDE
 
DOUBLET MIXING AT 1.60 OX TO FUEL (WEIGHT) RATIO FOR A HYPERGOLIC
 
REACTION WHICH PRODUCES 825 POUNDS OF THRUST AT 70,000 FEET. ALSO
 
CONTROL CHIAMBER WALL COOL!NR. 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DELIVER PROPS (F) 
AT PROPER MIXTURE RATIO AND FAILS TO PROVIDE ADEOUATE COOLING OF THE 
COMBUSTOR WALL.
 
.CAUSE(S):
 
CONTAMINATION, BLOCKED ORIFICES. 
,EFFECTS): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM tB)INTERFACES (CIMISSION (D)CREW/VEHICLE:
 
. (A) LOSS OF ONE THRUSTER IN A GIVEN AXIS. (B) GNEC CONTROL SWITCHING
 
REQUIRED. (CvD) NO EFFECT. (E) POSSIBLE LCSS OF VEHICLE I.F FAILURE
 
OCCURS BEFORE ET SEPARATION. DOWN FIRING THRUSTERS REQUIRED FOP ET
 
SEPARATION.
 
.DISPOSITION f RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (BITEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(A) 75 MICRON FILTER PROVIDED UPSTREAM TO PRECLUDE CONTAMINATION 
FUEL HAS BEEN FILTERED TO 25 MICRONS PRIOR TO ENTERING TANK. ACOUSTIC 
CAVITIES PRECLUDE OCCURRENCE OF COMBUSTION INSTABILITY IN THE EVENT OF 
POOR DISTRIBUTION- {B) TOTAL FLOW & FLOV, DISTRIBUTION CHECKED BY WATER 
FLOW TEST AND VERIFIED BY BURN TEST DURING THRUSTER ACCEPTANCE TESTS. 
(C) FIBER OPTICS USED TO VISUALLY INSPECT INJECTOR HOLES FOR EVIDENCE
 
OF BURRS AND CONTAMINATION PRIOR TO ASSEMBLY AUDIT CONDUCTED ON 9-2-76 
VERIFIED THAT SUPPLIER INSPECTION CONTROLS RAW MATL VERIFICATION, PARTS 
PROTECTION, MFG FAB AND ASSY OPERATIONS, CONTAMINATION CONTRL,COkROSION
 
CONTROL PROVISIONS AND STORAGE ENVIRONMENTS. TURN AROUND INSPECTION TO 
INCLUDE USE OF OPTICS INSPECTION WHERE ACCESSABLE FOR EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE
 
G SYSTEM FLUID SAMPLINGS FOR DETECTION OF CONTAMINATION. (D) NO
 
FAILURES OF THIS TYPE ON APCLLO
 
s:oD7S-SI-OOOS
 
A/KUWXK /,r I WkLt ANKiAYI GIL-i4LFI 03-2F-121312-1 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM 	 Thrust Chamber FAILURE MODE Burn Through 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES a NO B 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
Ia. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES M NO 2 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES W] *NO 0 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO [] 
(EITHER BY COMIIANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMIENTING.ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IFNOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES LI NO []FAILURE N:ODE (EITh ER CY COMMANII~NG HARDW ARE ACTIONI OR IMPLEHIENTIl"G ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES fl NO [] 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO -
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 D *1 2M 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)?, NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A D]YESJ-!OE] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES 0*'O U
B. ',WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES '*NO 
*EXPLA.NATION REQUIRED (SEE FELO11) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SU;-';:RY 
1.f NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.F NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. n ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. [ HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHrGES BELOW 
EC FMEA CHANGE RECOMMEN.DED 
EXPLANAT ION/CO11EENTS: 
FMEA change - Measurement numbers V42XI541X through V42XI556X should be listed as V42P1541A
 
through V42P]556A.
 
1. RM uses thurst chamber pressure transducers to sense the low pressure in question and
 
give a "fail off" in RCS RM.
 
7. The thrust chamber measurements are downlinked,
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-SHUTTLEFAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - OR3ITER IC2
 
SUESYSTEM :FkU - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -121312-I REV:11/1t/7 
.4SSEMeLY :THRUSTER, PRIMARY ABORT: CIT. FUNC: 
.PiN RI :MC 6T-0028 CRIT. HWD: i 
.P/N VENDOR:XC95S MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM 
.QUANTITY :14 PhASE(S): PL LC: X O0 X DO X LS 
* :ON" PER THRUSTER NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS aEMlAINTNG 
*. AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 2 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A 
:FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT:
 
.INClPIENT BURN-THRU DETE CTORS V42X1541X THROUGH SECONDS
 
.V42XI556X PC TRANS DUCER IF LEAKAGE REFERENCE L.MtP"T­
.is GROSS cc MJO1O-OOO1-GI6B 
.GRJUND tURNAROUND ? .............YES S072-SH-O103-2 
.VISUAL EXAMINAT ION VS70-.21 Ol
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY:
 
DES W SEARCY DES 
REL R OIEHL REL
 
.ITEM: THRUST CHAMBER
 
* FROM INJECTOR T0 NOZZLE EXTENSION (COATED COLUMBIUM).
 
*FUNCTION.
 
TO CONTAIN HYPERGOLIC REACTION OF PROPELLANTS AN. TO EXPAN6 COMBUSTION
 
PRODUCTS TO PRODUCE THRUST THROUGH NOZZLE EXTENSION TO PROVIDE IMPULSL 
TO VEHICLE. 
.FAILURE MODE: OVERHEAI/BtRNTHROUGH (S) 
. DUE TO INADEQUATE COOLING. 
.CAU SE(S): 
bLOCKED (CONTAMINATED) COOLANT (FU-L) INJECTOR HOLES, POOR £UUNARY
 
FLOW CONDITIONS COMBUSTION INSTABILITY, SEPARATION OX FRACTURE UF
 
PROTECTIVE DISLICIDE COATING.
 
.EFFECT(S): OiN (A)SUBSYSTEM (b)INTERFACES, (C)MISSION (D)CREW/VEhICLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF A PRIMARY THRUSTER IN A GIVEN AXIS. (B) INCR&AS&U uNCC
 
CNIROL AUTHORITY REQUIRED. (C) POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSiO.N A*ORT 
DECISION. (D) POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE. CRITICAL SAMAG COULD OCCUR 
BEFORE FAILURE IS DETECTED. 
.CORRECTING ACTION: 
ISOLATE THRUSTER AND UTILIZE REDUNDANT THRUSTER IN AFFECTZO AXIS.
 
(AUTOMATIC FUNCTION].
 
.REMARKS/HAZPRDS: 
POTENTIAL HAZARD FROM ESCAPING HOT GASES IN MOLDULE AND PUTENrIAL 
PROPAGATION OF FAILURE IF NOT IgOLAIED IN A TIMELY MANNER. 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-ZF -121312-1 REV:I/10/8T
 
.ASSEMBLY :THRUSTER, PRIMARY ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: 1
 
.P/N RI :MC467-0029 CRIT. HOW: I
 
.P/N VENOR:X30958 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM
 
.QUANTITY :14 PHASE(S): PL LO X 09 X DO X LS
 
-ONE PER THRUSTER
 
0z 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B"N/A C-N/A
 
.PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY:// APPROVEL BYV NASA) 
-DES W SEARCY DES .... s - I-
.REL RDIEH-L REL 
EkAPPROVED WITH CHANGES
 
.ITEM: THRUST CHAMBER See Section 13.0
 
* FROM INJECTOR TO NOZZLE EXTENSION (COATED COLUMBIUM).
 
.FUNCTION:
 
TO CONTAIN HYPERGOLIC REA.CTION OF PROPELLANTS AND TO EXP4ND CCUBUSTION
 
PRODUCTS TO PRODUCE THRUST THROUGH NOZZLE EXTENSION TO PROVIDE IMPULSE
 
TO VEHICLE.
 
.FAILURE MODE: OVERHEAT/BURNTHROUGH (S)
 
* DUE TO INADEQUATE COOLING.
 
.CAUSE(S):
 
BLOCKED (CONTAMINATED) COOLANT [FUEL) INJECTCR HOLES9 POC BOUNDARY
 
FLOW CONDITIONS COMBUSTION INSTABILITY, SEPARATION OR FRACTURE OF
 
PROTECTIVE DISLICIDE COATING.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (5)INTERFACES (CIMISSION (D)CREY./VEHECLE:
 
(A) LOSS 3F A PRIHARY THRUSTER IN A GIVEN AXIS. (B) INCPEASED GN&C
 
CONTROL AUTHORITY REQUIRED. (C) POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSIONV ABORT
 
DECISION. (D) POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE. CRITICAL DAMAGE COULD OCCUR
 
BEFORE FAILURE IS DETECTED.
 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (DIFAILURE HISTORY:
 
INTEREETALIC DIFFUSSION LAYER FORMS AN INTEGRAL BOND BETWEEN THE
 
DISILICIDE COATING AND THE PARENT COLUMBIUM MATERIAL AND TENDS TO RESIST
 
SHOCK LOADING. 75 MICRON FILTER IN VALVE INLET UPSTREAM CF INJECTOR
 
HOLES WILL PRECLUDE ENTRY OF CONTAMINANTS. ACOSTIC CAVITIES DAMPEN THE
 
FREQUENCIES THAT EXCITE INSTABILITY. (B) SIMULATED THRUSTERS AND
 
THRUSTER NO. 5 VIBRATION TESTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY OF THE
 
DISILICIDE COATING TO WITHSTAND 2.0 G SQUARED PER HERTZ RANDOM VIBRATION
 
STRESSES. THRUSTER IS SUBJECTED TO RANDOM VIBRATION AT ANTICIPATED
 
MISSION LEVELS DURING THE QUALo PROGRAM. (C) COATING THICKNESS AND
 
QUALITY WILL BE CONTROLLED BY SUPPLIER INSPECTION PROCEDURE MPS 525
 
WHLCH REQUIRES CERTIFICATION THAT COATING PROCESS CONFORMS TO THE
 
PROCESS SPEC, VISUAL INSPECTION, VERIFICATION OF COATING THICKNESS AND A
 
SMOKE TEST THAT VERIFIES COAT INTEGRITY. TURNAROUND INSPECTION TO
 
INCLUDE VISUAL INSPECTION FOR EVIDENCE OF BURN THRUC (D) NO FLIGHT
 
FAILURE HISTORY\ (2) DEVELOPMENT FAILURES HAVE OCCURRED ON SHUTTLE
 
PROGRAM. ONE FAILURE DUE TO DOUBLET DESIGN WHICH HAS BEEN CHANGED AND 
ONU FAILURE DUE TO THIN COAT OF DISILICIDE COATING. THIN COAT STILL 
WITHSTOOD MORE FIRING TIME THAN IS NORMALLY SEEN BY THE THRUSTER IN 
NORMAL 100 MISSION LIFE. 
SS D75 S-0003 
- -- - - - ------ 
---- -- -- - --- 
- -- --- - -- --- 
- -- --- - --- 
--- - ---
0 
•lMKUWK/I 1,FWt7K AL.Ybtb it-,ILLKLISI 03-_2F-l'23j3'l 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-OOl6A 
ITEM Nozzle Extension 	 FAILURE MODE Burnl-Thru 
1. DOES THE FLIGHT SOFT'ARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES [] NO nX 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?.
 
Ia. IFNOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES n NO
 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES [ *NO 

IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES n NO E] 
(EITHER BY CONMRANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES VJ NO fl 
FAILURE t-'O-D- BY HARDWARE ACTION OR ImPLEiIE;1TING ALTERNATETTHE6 COMMANDING 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES . NO [
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE.LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO -

OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 El *1[] 2-W 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A -WYES[f]U!OOJ 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE ANISWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES fj*NO [] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES 1*NO [ 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
z--- ------------ --- -- ------------- ------ -- -- -- -- -- ------------­
-"CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.DE NO H/S ISSUES- 3.0 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.- X HARDWARE -ACCEPTS RISK -4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6.0RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
f-IFMEA CHANGE RECOMMEN'DED 
EXPLANATION/COMENTS: 
3a. Instrumentation is available for software redesign.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBITER 102
 
S SSYSTEM :FWO - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO o3-2F -121313-1 kEV:12/18/71 
.ASSEM&LY :THRUSTERPRIMARY ABORT: ABORT, CRIT. FUNC: i 
.PN RI :MC467-OC28 RTLS CRIT. HUG: I 
.P/N VENDOR:X3$672 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF UF Sri 
.QUANTITY :14t PHASE(S): PL LO X 00 X Do X LS 
:ONE PER THRUSTER NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHb REMAINING 
. AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 2 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. NO TIMr 10 EFFECT: 
IMMEDIATE 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: 
MJ070-GCOl-G1 E 
.GROUND TURNARCUNO?..............YES SD72-SH-0103-2
 
.VISUAL INSPECTION VSY0-42±COi
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: 
DES W SEARCY DES 
REL R DIEHL RhL ------­
.ITEM: NOZZLE EXTENSION, 
COATED COLUMBIUM (WITH INSULATION BLANKET). 
.FUNCT ION: 
TO PROVIDE FOR EXPANSION OF COMBUSTION GASES TO M>1 SuCH THAI ThL 
REPUIRED THRUST IS PRODUCED. 
.FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, (S)
 
. 3URN-THRU.
 
.CAUSE (S):
 
HIGH TEMPERATURE IN LOCAL SPOT DUE TO FILM COOLING FAILURE(CONfAMNAI&U
 
INJECTOR COOLAjNT HOLES) VIBRATION, SHOCK, WELD OR MATERIAL DLFELT.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSfSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISS!ON (O)CREw/V5HiCLS:
 
(4) LOSS OF A THRUSTER IN A GIVEN AXIS. (-3) INCREAS D GNC CUNTRUL 
AUTHORITY REQUIRED. (C) NO EFFECT. (D) NO EFFECT UNLESS FAILL.R" 
PROPAGATES-CRITI FOR RTLS ABORT IF THRUSTER IS ISOLATED AT MANIFUL 
LEVEL 
.CORRECTING ACTION: 
ISOLATE THRUSTER AT INLET VALVE OR MANIFOLD AND UTILIZE ALTERNAIE iN 
AFFECTED AXIS.. 
.REMARKS/HAZARDS:
 
POTENTIAL FOR FAILURE PROPOGATION TO ADJACENT THRUSTERS IF INSULATION
 
BLANKET DOES NOT PRECLUDE GAS/LIQUID ESCAPING. REFERENCE ,AZA.Ku
 
IYXX-0302-01.
 
IOOQuALr
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CCNTPOL FMEA NO 03-2F -1213t3-t REV: 1/j4/ 
.ASSEMBLY :THRUSTER,PRIIARY AORT: ABORT, CRIT. FUNC: I 
.P/N RI :MC467-0028 RTLS CRIT. HDh, I 
.P/N V6NDOR:X30872 MISSIONS: HF VP X FF OF SM 
.QUANTLTY 	 :14 PHASE(S): PL LO X GO X DO X LS 
:ONE PER THRUSTER 
C 
REDUNDANCY 	SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-'q/ 
.PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY: APPRO gD (NA A 
.DES SEARCY DES /sm SSM t.- ,,_ 
.REL P.OEL REL 'Ze97 	 4,,
 
N, 	ROVED WITH CHANGES 
.ITEM: NOZZLE EXTENSION, See Section 13.0 
COATED COLUMBIUM (WITH INSULATION BLANKET).
.FUNCT ION: 
* 	 TO PROVIDE FOR EXPANSION OF COMBUSTION GASES TO M>I SUCH -HAT THE 
REQUIRED THRUST IS PRODUCED. 
.FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILUREv (S)
 
, BURN-THRU.
 
.CAUSE S).
 
. HIGH TEMPERATURE IN LOCAL SPOT DUE TO FILM CCOLING FAELUPE(CONTAOINIATeO
 
INJECTOR COOLANT HOLES) VI6RATION, SHOCK, WELD OR MATERIAL DEFECT. 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTE'4 (BhINTERFACrS (C)MrSSION (D)CRE/VEHICLE: 
o 	 (A) LOSS 3F A THRUSTER IN A GIVEN AXIS. (B) INCREASED Gti C CCNTROL 
AUTHORITY RECUIRED. ,C) NO EFFECT. (D) NO EFFECT UNLESS FAILURE 
PROPAGATES-CRiTI FOR RTLS ABORT IF THRUSTER IS ISOLATED AT :ANIFOLO 
LEVEL 
.DISPOSITION E RATIONALE (A)OESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY 
* 	 (A) INTERMETALLIC DIFFUSION LAYER FORMS INTEGRAL 3OND TO RESIST SHOCKa 
COATING PROCESS CONTROLLED. INJECTOR DESIGN INCORPORATES ACOUSTIC 
CAVITIES WHICH REDUCED POSSIBILITY OF INSTABILITY. DUCTILE PROPERTIES 
OF C-103 COLWMBIUM PRECLUDES FRAGMENTATION OR CATASTROPHIC MODE OF 
FAILURE. (B) DEV VIBRATION TESTS DEMONSTPATE ABILITY OF DISILICIDE
 
COATING TO WITHSTAND 2.0 G SQUARED/HZ RANDOi VIBRATION. TEMP TESTS 
DEMONSTRATE EXCELLENT DUCTIBLE/SRETTLE QUALIFIES FOR COATED C-103 
COLUMBIBU,. CC) TURNAROUND INSPECTION TO INCLUDE VISUAL INSPECTION FOR 
EVIDENCE OF BURN THROUGH F WHERE- ACCESSABLE, USE OF FIBER-OPTICS NOE TO 
INSPECT FOR SURFACE FLAWS. SUPPLIER INSPECTION INCLUOES FLOU 0 ESCENT 
PENETRATE INSPECTION PRIOR TO COATING TO DETECT SURFACE DEFECTS AND 
X-RAY INSPECTION IS REQUIRED FOR DETECTION OF INTERN1,L DEFECTS. AUDIT 
CONDUCTED3 9-2-76 VERIFIED THAT SUPPLIER INSPECTION CONTROLS AN 'AATeL, 
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTSr MF4G PROCESSES, CORROSION PROTECTION, 
CONTAMINATION CONTROL AND ENVIRONlMENTS,. (D) 4 OCCURANCES OF BELL 
FAILURES CAUSED BY BRITTLE HETROGENEOUSSGRAIN STRUCTURE UE TO VISRATION 
F&TIGUE ON 	 APOLLO LM/SM, RCS ENGINES. 
102 O 	 SD75-S11-0003
 
It 	 'flUf1WtW1UL i LIiJyA ~LNL131 U3-2P-V131U1-1 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-OO16A 
ITEM Vernier Thruster FAILURE MODE Loss of Output 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES NO fl 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES E NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTEhT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES NO Li 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING,ALTER:ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST.FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO D 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIE;1TIUG ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [ NO D3 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES L-
El 1"O 
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDIWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 E] *1 2[
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTW,+ARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FIMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A W]YESX]:;OE
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIOI AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES U *NO 
B. WILL SFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES ]*,N0 f 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE CELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTIO" RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.0 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. f NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. E ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.EM IARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. E5 RECOMMENDED CIIA.NGES BELOW! 
F-IFMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COIMENTS:
 
1. RM uses thrust chamber pressure transducers to sense the low pressure in question and 
Qiwe afaiLof_"_jn RCS RM. . ........... 
... 
3. The GN&C RN program will automatically deselect a failed jet under certain conditions
 
(provided it is not inhibited). See FSSR "10" paragraph 4.1.7.1.6.3 for the conditions.
 
6. 	This failure can be tolerated ,since it is criticality 2.
 
7. 	The thrust chamber pressures can be downlinked1
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - OR3ITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWC - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -13131--1 AEV:11/14/7 
.ASSEMBLY :THRUSTER ASSY ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: 2 
.P/N RI :MCr+67-0029 CRlIT. hW: 2 
.P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X hF OF 1M 
.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL LO 010 X 0! LS 
:ONE REtQD PER SIDE NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS R!MAII4",,G
 
:(DOWN FIRING) AFTER FIRST FAILURE: C
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A E-N/A C-N/A 
:FAILURE DETECTAELE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME To EFFECT: 
.ThRUSTER CHAMBER PRESS V42P-1555A, 1556A IMMEDIATE 
REFERENC DOCUMENTS:
 
MJC'TO-GOOi-3I
 
.GROUNO TURNAPOUNOD?............. YES SD72-SH-0i03-2
 
.POSITION INDICATION VS7O-42 1(G0
 
PREPARED EY: APPROVLE Sy:
 
DES J TAGGART DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
:ITEM: THRUSTER, VERNIER
 
S( EN 157/15b).
 
.FUNO T ION: 
TO PROVIDE THRUST FOR LOW LEVEL ACCELERATIONS ASSOCIATED iTH FCINI1NG 
MANEUVERS AND THREE AXIS ATTITUDE HOLD. THRUSTER FIRES IN +ZLbIR-T1UN 
FSR + PITCH AND -Z ACCELERATION. INCLUDES INLET VALVE1 INJECIOK, 
THRUST CzIAXER, NOZZLE EXTENSION, HEATER, INSULAIIONt PRl-SS/TEMP 
XSDUCERS. 
.FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT (F)
 
* INLET VALVES/bLOCKED INJECTOR/STAND-OFF'S.
 
.CAUSE(S): 
CONT[4MINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, IMPROPER SULSNCI-

ACTUATION, VIBRATION
 
.EFFECTtS): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES {C)MISSION (D)CREW/VEhICLE:
 
(A)' LOSS OF VERNIER FUNCTION. (B) NO EFFECT. (C) POTEATIAL EAKLI
 
M ISSION TERMINATION. LOSS CF TIGHT DEA06AND ATTIUDE CONTROL. (Ol
 
NO EFFECT.
 
.CORRECTING ACTION:
 
UTILIZE LARGE THRUSTERS FOR ATTITUDE CONIRUL IN AFFECTLO AXIS
 
(INCREASED PROPELLANT QUANTITY DEPLETION)
 
.* EMARKS/HALARDS:
 
POTENTIAL HAZARD IF FAILURE OCCURS CURING CRITICAL MANEUVERS - 1IME
 
CRITICAL. NO REDUNDANCY IS PROVIDED FOR IHIS COMPONENT.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - OPSITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -131310-1 PEV:i1/14/TS

-ASSEMBLY :THRUSTER ASSY ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: 2 
.P/N RI :MC467-0029 CRIT. HD : 2 
.P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF Smi 
.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL LO CO X DO LS 
- :ONE REQ'D PER SIDE 
:(DOWN FIRING)
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A
 
.PREPARED BY: APPROVE BY: 6 APPROV1 D 
SDES J TAGGART DES . A--1-?Ae_.- SS-
REL R DIEHL REL .	 R )c W 
.ITEM: THRUSTER, VERNIER
 
* (EN 157/158).
 
.FUNCTION:
 
* 	 TO PROVIDE THRUST FOR LOW LEVEL ACCELEPATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH POINTING
 
MANEUVERS AND THREE AXIS ATTITUDE HOLD. THRUSTEP FIRES 
IN +Z DIRECTION
 
FOR + PITCH AND -Z ACCELERATION. INCLUDES INLET VALVE7 INJECTOR,
 
THRUST CH4MBER, NOZZLE EXTENSION, HEATER, INSULATION, PRESS/TEMP
 
XS DUC ER S 
.FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT 	 (F)
 
* INLET VALVES/BLOCKED INJECTDR/STAND-OFF'S. 
.CAUSE(S): I 
* 	CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, IMPROPER SCLENCID 
ACTUATION, VIBPATION 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM CB)INTERFACES (C)MISSION [D)CREW/VEHICLE:
 
( LOSS OF VERNIER FUNCTION. (C) POTENTIAL EARLY
CA) (B) NO EFFECT. 

MISSION TERMINATION., LOSS OF TIGHT DEADBAND ATTITUDE CONTPOL. (0)
 
NO EFFECT.
 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (BITEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FILURE HISTORY:
 
* 	 (4) VALVE INCORPORATES A 25 MICRON FILTER TO PRECLUDE CONTAMINATION. 
VALVE HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO PRECLUDE SELF GENERATED CONTAMINATES. 
SPECIAL EMPHASIS PLACED ON SOLENOID AND WIRING TO PRECLUDE SHORTS. (B)

PRE/POST FLIGHT CHECKOUT AND VALVE SIGNATURE TESTS hHEN MODULE REMOVED.
 
VALVE SUBJECTED TO RANDOM VIBRATION AT ANTICIPATED MISSION LEVELS DURING
 
QUAL PROGRAM. LENGTH OF TIME FOR VIBRATION TO EQUAL 100 MISSION LIFE 
EXPECTANCY. (C) AUDIT CONDUCTED 9-2-76 VERIFIEC THAT SUPPLIER 
INSPECTION CONTROLS RAW MAT'L, IDENTIFICATION OF PARTS, MFG PROCESSES,
 
CORROSION PROTECTION, CONTAMINATION CONTROL, AND ELECTRICAL
 
TERIENATIJNS. TURNAROJND INSPECTION INCLUDES MONITORING FUNCTIONAL TEST
 
DURING PRESSURIZATION CYCLE FOR EVIDENCE OF ERRATIC OPERATION. (D) NO 
FAILURE HISTORY APPLICABLE TO THIS FAILURE MODE. 
105 	 S D75 -SH -0 00 3
 
- -- --------- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---
*1~~ 	 ~t~invc~J rrI UI~ L~rGflFT 2F1-3l 310-3rc-tlln t 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd Reaction Control FMEA NUIMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Vernier Thruster FAILURE MODE Erratic Operatinn 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOtATICALLY YES E] NO nX 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION I| RESPONSE)?. 
Ta. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD. *YES j NO 2 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE AISWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATIO,'I OF YES N 0 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [ NO [ 
(EITHER BY COMIANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO n 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEjIENTING ALTERIATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES NO []
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES LI NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *1WXI 2E] 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FNEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A [YESEXUOE] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES E]*NO I] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES E]*NO B 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEt BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1E 	NO H/S ISSUES 3.(D NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. [ ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW
 
2. KJ 	HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. -RECO14ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
No In-Flight Detectability

rnRFMEA CHANGE RECOMME'DED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. 	May not be detected unless 3 consecutive low pressures.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWL - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -131310-3 REV:I1/iO/7 
.ASSEMbLY :rHRUSTER ASSY ABORT CRIT. FUNC: 2 
.P/N RI :MC467-O0 9 CRIT. KF : 2 
.P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF CF SM 
.QLANTITY :2 PHASE(S); PL LO GO X DO LE 
• 	 tONE REQ'D PER SIDE NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS REMAINING
 
:(DOWN FIRING) AFTER FIRST FAILURE:
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A
 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT: 
.THRUSTER CLHAMBER PRESS. INDICATION V4ZP-1555A IMMEDIATE 
*155bA 	 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:
 
MJOYO-GOOO-ClL 
*G.R-.CUND TURNAOUND?.............NO S072-Sh-0103-2 
VS7O-423CO1 
PREPARED BY: 	 APPROVED bY:
 
LES . TAGGART DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
:ITEM: THRUSTER, VERNIER 
* 	 (EN 157/158).
 
.. FUNCTION: 
TO PROVIDE 	 THRUST FOR LOW LEVEL ACCELERAIONS ASSOCIATED WITH POINTING 
MANEUVERS AND THREE AXIS ATT!TUD- HOLD. THRUSTER FIRES I: +1 DIRECT uN 
FOR + PITCH AND -Z ACCELERATION. INCLUDES lNLET VALVE, iNJJ'L-.TOR, 
THRUST CHAMr<ER, NOZZLE EXTENSION, HEATER, INSULATION, PRESS/IE;MP 
XSDUCERS. 
.FAILURE MOLe: ERRATIC OPERATION (F)
 
- LOW/HIGH THRUST Oh INTERMITTENT OPEKATION
 
.C6USE(S):
 
CONTAMINTIGN, IMPROPER SOLENOID ACTUATION.

*EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACiS (C)MISSION (LICREW/VLH1CLE: 
(A) LOSS OF VERNIER CONTROL E) INTERFACE SWITCHING OF PUWER AND 
GNC CONTROL TO LARGE THRUSTERS. (C) POSSIBLE EARLY MISSION TER:.IINATION 
BOTH VENIER THRUSTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE ISOLATED SUCH THAT TIGHT GEADAND 
ATTITUDE CONTROL wYOULD SE LOST. (D) NONE. 
.CCRRECTING 	 ACTION:
 
SHUT DOWN/ISOLATE FAILED THRUSTER AND UTILIZE LARGE 1HRUSTYR iN
 
AFFECTED AXIS
 
.R EMARKS/HAZARUS:
 
POTENTIAL HAZARD FROM COLLISION. NO REDUNDANCY IS PROVIU-E FOR THIS
 
CGMPONE NT .
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SHUTTLE CRITI.CAL ITEMS LIST - CRBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :F f0 - REACTION CONTPOL FMEA NO 03-2F -131.310-3 REV:I1/t3i 
.ASSEMBLY :THRUSTER ASSY ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: 2 
.P/N RI :MC467-0029 CRIT. HOd: 2 
.P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF C'F SM 
.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL LO 00 X 00 LS 
:ONE REQ'O PER SIDE 
:(DOWVN FIRING) 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/ 
.PREPARED BY: APPROVFU BY:y¢f APP9OV 0 BY/NA s) 
.DES J TAGGART DES . ZQJ_'?' t-- C .S 4S 
.REL R OIEHL REL S".4.caa .t.& ct..r 4 SSIAJLI...­
.rTEM: THRUSTER, VERNIER 
o 	 (EN 157/158),
 
,FUNCTION:
 
* 	TO PROVIDE THRUST FOR LGh LEVEL ACCELERATIONS ASSOrlATED 'I'H PCIITING 
MANEUVERS ANO THREE AXIS ATTITUDE HOLD. THRUSTER tIRES IN' Z DIRECTICN 
FOR -t- PITCH AND -Z ACCELERATION'. INCLUDES INLET VALVE, INJECTCR. 
'THRUST CHAYBER, NOZZLE EXTENSION, HEATER, INSULATION, PRESS/TEMP 
XSDUCERS. 
.FAILURE tOOE: ERRATIC OPEPATEON (F) 
* LOW/HIGH THRUST OR INTERMITTENT OPERATION
 
,CAUSE( S)
 
* CONTAVINATGNv IMPROPER SOLENCID ACTUATION.
 
.EFFECT!S1: ON (A)SUBSYSTEN (i)INTERFACES (C)'lISSTON (D)CREW/VEHICLE:
 
- (A) LOSS OF VERNIER CONTROL 9) INTERFACE SWITCHING OF PFOWER ,NO 
GN&C CONTROL TO LARGE THRUSTERS. (C) POSSIBLE EARLY MISSICN TERMINATIC' 
BOTH VENIER THRUSTERS WOULD HAVE. TO BE ISOLATED SUCH TH4T TIGHT OEADFLA4O 
ATTITUDE CONTRCL WOULD BE LOST. (D) NONE. 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (CH NSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY: 
* 	 (4) VALVE INCORPORATES 4 75 MICRON FILTER TO PRECLUDE CONTAMINATIO". 
VALVE HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO PRECLUDE SELF GENERATED CONTAMINATES. 
SPECIAL EIPHASIS PLACED ON SOLENMOlD AND WIRING TO PRECLUDE SHORTS. (B) 
PRE/POST FLIGHT CHECKOUT AND VALVE SIGNATURES TESTS WHEN ,ACDULE REMOVED. 
VALVE SUBJECTED TO RAN0O,.O1 VIBRATION AT ANTICIPATED MISSICN LEVELS CURING 
QUAL PROGRAM. LENGTH OF TIME FOR VIBRATION TO EQUAL 100 MISSION LIFE 
EXPECTANCY. (C) AUDIT CONDUCTED 9-2-75 VERIFIED THAT SUPPLIER 
INSPECTION CONTROLS RAW MAT'L, IDENTIFICATION OF PARTS, ,"FG PROCESSES, 
CORROSION PROTECTION, CONTA4MINATION CONTROL, AND ELECTQICAL 
TERMINATIONS- TURNAROUND INSPECTION INCLUDES MONITORING FUNCTIONAL TEST 
DURING PRESSURIZATION CYCLE FOR EVIDENCE CF ERRATIC OPERATION. (0) NO 
FAILURE HISTORY CONCERNING THIS FAILURE MODE. 
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-XHARUWARL /5OFWARE ANALYSI CHECKLIST 03-2F-131310-4 
SUBSYSTEM Fwd. Reaction Control FMEA NUMBER SD75-SH-0016A 
ITEM Vernier Thruster FAILURE MODE Burn-Thru 
I.. DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES NO jj
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWIARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 2 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FNEA EVALUATION OF YES X] *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTIARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES ] NO [J(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTUARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES fl NO J 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDUARE ACTION OR IMPLEIE;ITING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAII LOGIC)?
 
4. 	 AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE hARDWARE OR *YES [ NO [_

INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES [] O
 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 * F] 2[
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTIARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION1 IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E]YESW,;;OE]
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES V]E O 
B. WILL SFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES D 1].0 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW!) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUIIARs 
l. NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. E ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. [ HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. E RECOMM!E1ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
Fl EA CHANGE RECOMMEN DED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
 
1. The GN&C RM Program will automatically deselect a failed jet and issue an alert.
 
Detectable in thrust chamber but not in nozzle.
 
6. 	This is a criticality 1 failure and cannot be tolerated.
 
7. The thrust chamber pressures can be downlinked,
 
8B. Same as primary.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - ORBITER 1Ct2
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-ZF -131310-4- rEV:12/&8/7, 
.ASSErELY :THRUSTER ASSY ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: I 
.9/PN RI :MC467-0029 CRI1. hWD: I 
.P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM
 
.QUANTITY :_ PHASE(S): PL LO D0 X 00 LS
 
:ONE REQ'D PER SIDE NUMBER OF SUCCESS PALHS REMA1NING
 
* 	 :(DOWN FIRING) AFIER FIRST FAILURE: 2 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A C-N/A 
.FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT: 
SECONDS 
:MINOR LEAKAGE OR INCIPIENT FA1LUR L REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: 
MJCTO-OCQI-C16
 
.GROUND TURNAIWUND?.............YES SD72-SHr01C$-2
 
.VISUAL EXAMINATION VSYO-42iuOi
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY:
 
DES J iAGGART "DES
 
REL R DIEHL REL
 
.ITEM:, THRUSTL, VERNIER 
(EN 157/158).
 
.FUNCT ION:
 
TO PROVIDE THRUST FOR LOW LEVEL ACCELERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH POlINIING 
v.ANCUVERS AND THREE AXIS ATITUDE HOLD. THRUSTER FIRES IN +Z DIRUCTION 
FOR + PITCH AND -Z ACCELERATION. INCLUDES INLE1 VALVE, INjECTOR, 
THRUST CHAMEER, NOZZLE EXTENSION, HEATER, INSULATION, PRESS/TMP 
X SOUCERS. 
.FAILUKE MODE: OVERHEAT/URNThROUGH (F) 
:CAUSE (S): 
-MAX PRESSURE SPIKES, SURFACE DEFECTS IN ThE PROTECTIVE DISILICIUE 
COATING FOP CHAMBER WALL AND VIERATION. 
.EFFECT(S): CN (A)SUbSYSTEM ()INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREW/VEt-tICLE:
 
(A* LOSS OF VERNIER THRUSTER. (B) POTENTIAL DAMAGE. (C) FOTz'JTIAL
 
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION. (D) POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE. CRITICAL
 
DAMAGE COULD OCCUR BEFORE FAILURE IS DETECTED.
 
.CORRECTING ACTICN:
 
. ISOLATE FAILED THRUSTER AND USE OTHER THRUSTERS.­
.REMAR KS/HAZARDS ±
 
POTENTIAL HAZARD FROM ESCAPING HOT GASES IN THE MODULE AND POTENTIAL 
PROPAGATION OF FAILURE IF NOT ISOLATED IN A TIMELY MANNER. 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :FWD - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2F -131310-4 REV:12/08/78
 
.ASSEMBLY :THRUSTER ASSY ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: I
 
.P/N RI :MC467-0029 CRIT. HOW, 1
 
.P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM
 
.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL LO 00 X DO LS
 
:ONE REQ'D PER S1DE
 
:(DOWN FIRING)
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A
 
.PREPARED BY: APPROVE/Y: , APPROV OB NASA
.DES J TAGGART DES __ _ AJc? .< .,c.. SSM ,. 
DREL R DIEHL REL -70~tc~ 
"PROVED WITH CHANGES
 
.ITEM: THRUSTER, VERNIER See Section 13.0
 
. (EN 157/158).
 
.FUNCTION:
 
TO PROVIDE THRUST FOR LOWV LEVEL ACCELERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH POINTING
 
MANEUVERS AND THREE AXIS ATTITUDE HOLD. THRUSTER FIRES IN +Z DIRECTION
 
FOR + PITCH AND -Z ACCELERATION. INCLUDES INLET VALVE, INJECTOR,
 
THRUST CHAMBER, NOZZLE EXTENSIONt HEATER, INSULATION, PRESS/TENP
 
XSDUCERS.
 
.FAILURE MODE: OVERHEAT/BURNTHROUGH (F)
 
.CAUSE(S):
 
MAX PRESSURE SPIKES, SURFACE DEFECTS IN THE PROTECTIVE DISILICICE
 
COATING FOR CHAMBER WALL AND VIBRATION.
 
tEFFECTIS}: ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSION (D)CREI/VEHICLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF VERNIER THRUSTER. (B) POTENTIAL DAMAGE. (C) POTENTIAL
 
- EARLY MISSION TERMINATION. (D) POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE. CRITICAL
 
DAMAGE COULD OCCUR BEFORE FAILURE IS DETECTED.
 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(A) INTERMETALIC DIFFUSSION LAYER FORMS AN INTEGRAL BOND BETUEEN THE
 
DISILICIDE COATING AND THE PARENT COLUMBIUM MATERIAL (C-103) AND TENDS
 
TO RESIST SHOCK LOADING. [B) PRIOR TESTS CONDUCTED ON THE RI-i THRUSTER
 
HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY OF THE DISILICIDE COATING TO !,ITHSTAND
 
IMPACT LEVELS AND THERMAL STRESSES PRODUCED BY TEMPERATURES IN EXCESS OF
 
2900 DEGREES F. TORCH TESTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE INSENSITIVITY OF THE
 
RB12A COATING TO THERMAL SHOCK. (C) AUDIT CONDUCTED 9-2-76 VERIFIED
 
THAT THE SUPPLIER INSPECTION CONTROLS RAW MAT'L, IDENTIFICATION OF PARTS
 
MFG. PROCESSES, CORROSION PROTECTIONCONTAMINATION CONTROL, AND
 
FLOURESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTION PRIOR TO COATING TO DETECT SURFACE
 
FLAWS AND X-RAY INSPECTION IS REQUIRED FOR DETECTION OF INTERNAL
 
DEFECTS. COATING THICKNESS AND QUALITY IS CONTROLLED BY MPS 525 WHICH
 
WILL REQUIRE CERTIFICATION THAT COATING PROCESS CONFORMS TO THE PROCESS
 
SPECIFICATION, VISUAL INSPECTION1 VERIFICATION OF COATING THICKNESS &
 
TEST TO VERIFY COATING INTEGRITY. TURNAROUND INSPECTION TO INCLUDE
 
VISUAL INSPECTION FOR EVIDENCE OF BURN THROUGH AND WHERE ACCESSIBLE.
 
USE OF FIBER OPTICS NDE TO INSPECT FOR SURFACE FLAWS.
 
(0) NO FLIGHT FAILURE HISTORY.
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Meeting-Minutes
 
Review of JSC 14651, Hardware/Software Interaction Analysis Volume VIII,
 
Forward Reaction Control System Part 1 of 2.
 
1. Meeting held at Rockwell International, Downey, 1:00PM to 2:30PM, 9/24/79.
 
2. Attendees Organization Phone
 
Edward Vonusa NASA X-1470
 
Dave Latham JSC Reliability 527-0323
 
(Boeing) FTS
 
Rudy Kubica RI Propulsion/RCS X-4720
 
Larry Gladu RI System Engineering X-1189
 
Bill Meyers RI System Engineering X-1726
 
Bob DJiehl RI Reliability X-2098
 
3. The following changes were discussed and will be incorporated in the
 
final release of Forward Reaction Control System Hardware/Software Inter­
action Analysis and will be reflected in next update of Fwd RCS FMEA:
 
03-2F-101010-1: Change "SMU" to "SM". Insert "SM Alert" before "blue light."
 
03-2F-101013-1: Same as 03-2F-101010-1.
 
03-2F-101020-3: Same as 03-2F-101010-1.
 
03-2F-101020-4: Same as 03-2F-101010-1.
 
03-2F-101030-1: Add "X1' in No. Block, question la.
 
03-2F-101030-2: Add V42P1116C to Explanation 1. and 2.
 
03-2F-101060-1: Show class 3 alarm with blue light and class 2 alarm with red
 
light. Add V421116C. (Explanation 1.) 
03-2F-101060-2: Add "X", No Block, question la. 
03-2F-101060-3: Same as 03-2F-101060-1. 
03-2F-101060-4: Same as 03-2F-101060-1. 
03-2F-101060-5: Same as 03-2F-101060-1. 
03-2F-lO1070-1: Under 1 & 2 Explanation, add V421113C, 1114C. Change class 
2 to 3. 
03-2F-101080-1: Change FMEA to show detectability method. 
03-2F-101090-1: Under 1 & 2 Explanation, change V42Pll10C, 1112C to 1113C, 
1114C. Change class 2 to 3. Add gross leakage detectability
 
(see 03-2F-101080-1).
 
A~ 1
 
2 
03-2F-01095-2: Change "X" from Yes Block to No Block, questionl. Under 
Explanation, delete 1 & 2 (failure is one leg only- requires 
failure of both legs to actuate C & W). 
03-2F-102106-1: Under 1 Explanation, add gross leakage detectability (see 
03-2F-101080-1). Under 7 Explanation and FMEA change add 
V42Pfl15C. Change FVEA to show detectability. 
03-2F-102108-1: Under 1 Explanation, add gross leakage detectability (see 
03-2F-101080-1) Under 7 Explanation add V42PlllSC. 
03-2F-102120-1: Under 1 Explanation, add oxidizer measurement numbers, and 
addI"failed off thruster will give "failed jet on C & W".' 
03-2F-102150-1: Same as 03-2F-102120-1 plus retain V42P1312C and delete 
1313C and 1314C. 
03-2F-102170-1: Under 1 Explanation, add measurements V42X1333X, 1233X. 
Change class 2 to 3. 
03-2F-1110-1: Under -1Explanation, add V42P1210C, 1212C, 1216C and add to 
to FHEA detectability. Add X in FMEA change recommended 
block. 
03-2F-111110-2: Same as 03-2F-lllllO-l. 
03-2F-llll!O-3: Under 1 Explanation, add gross leakage detectability (see 
03-2F-101080-1) 
03-2F-11111-4: Change X from No Block to Yes block for question 1. Under 
Explanation, delete 1st paragraph and 1. (White Sands Test 
on vernier showed complete loss chamber pressure which is 
detectable. Similar gas bubbles in propellant tests are 
planned for primary thrusters). 
03-2F-121308-1: Under 1 Explanation, the class 3 alarm is doubtful. Check 
and verify findings with Bill Meyers RI Systems Engineering. 
Also add gross leakage detectability (see 03-2F-lO80-1). 
03-2F-121311-1: Change Failure Mode to agree with failure mode in FlEA. 
03-2F-121312-1: Under 1 Explanation, add "If failure is upstream of throat 
it will be detected by PC; if failure is downstream of throat 
it will not be detected." 
03-2F-121313-1: Change X from Yes Block to No Block, question 1. Delete 1. 
under Explanation (failure is downstream of throat and will 
not be detected by PC). 
03-2F-131310-3: Change X from Yes Block to No Block, question 1. Add X to 
FMEA change recommended block. Under 1. Explanation, delete 
entire sentence (the pressure transducers are snubbed by an ori­
.ffreandwill not detect the erratic operation). Change FMEA 
to indicate no detectability. 
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